opinion, Politics, Slideshow

The North-East State Is Not a Provocation — It’s a Reset for Somali Federalism

November 6, 2025November 7, 2025
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The North-East State Is Not a Provocation — It’s a Reset for Somali Federalism

By Ali H. Abdulla

On October 13, Addis Standard republished an op-ed that casts Somalia’s newly declared North-East State (formerly referred to as SSC-Khaatumo) as a Machiavellian project from Mogadishu—a gambit to weaken Somaliland and Puntland, rearrange clan balances, and risk a spiral of escalation. That framing substitutes innuendo for history and ignores both the constitutional basis of the new state and the lived experience of communities who bled for a federal order that protects them.

The North-East State is not a top-down political creation but rather a bottom-up corrective movement born out of the aspirations of the local population. Its roots trace back to 15 October 2007, when Somaliland forces captured Lasanod by force, triggering widespread displacement and resentment among its residents.

In response, community leaders and intellectuals organized under the Northern Somali Unionist Movement (NSUM), which evolved into the Sool, Sanaag, and Ayn (SSC) Resistance Movement—a grassroots campaign defending local autonomy and federal unity. This movement later matured into Khaatumo State, a structured regional administration led by the traditional leaders and renowned Somali intellectuals whose leadership helped institutionalize governance and dialogue with the Federal Government.

Building upon these successive stages of political and social mobilization, Khaatumo has now transformed into the North-East State (NES) — a recognized Federal Member State of Somalia, representing the culmination of nearly two decades of community-led struggle for legitimate governance, inclusion, and constitutional order within the Somali federation.

What the Addis piece gets wrong

1) “A Mogadishu-sponsored creation.”
The op-ed implies the state was engineered in the capital and then bestowed upon locals. In reality, the new administration grew out of an 18-month arc of community mobilization and defense after the 2023 siege of Laascaanood, where hospitals, neighborhoods, and civic infrastructure came under shelling and hundreds were killed or wounded. International reporting documented repeated strikes and mass displacement; humanitarian organizations called for withdrawal of besieging forces and unfettered access. These are not the conditions of a manufactured project; they are the crucible of local self-organization.

2) “A threat to neighbors’ sovereignty.”
The piece elevates political discomfort in Hargeisa and Garowe to the level of sovereignty claims, as if a community’s choice to align with the federal order is an act of external aggression. But the Provisional Constitution of Somalia creates a pathway for federal member states comprised of two or more regions. Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn meet that threshold; organizing within the federal framework is precisely how Somalia is supposed to channel local self-rule into national unity. It is the constitutional antidote to fragmentation—not its cause.

3) “A centralist power grab.”
The argument that the federal government backs the new state to “recalibrate power in Mogadishu” mistakes normalization for domination. When the Prime Minister visited Laascaanood in April 2025, the message was not annexation; it was reintegration—security sector coordination, services, and the rule of law after a traumatic war season. Recognition of the interim administration dates back to October 2023 and reflects federalism working as intended: integrating a region through constitutional channels instead of leaving it in a grey zone vulnerable to renewed conflict.

4) “Hydrocarbons and demographic engineering.”
Speculation about oil, ports, and clan arithmetic obscures the straightforward, urgent reality: people fled artillery, clinics were hit, and civic life collapsed. The immediate policy test is whether governance structures can restore basic security, enable the return of displaced families, and re-open schools and hospitals—goals that demand federal-member coordination more than they do conspiracy theories about resource cartography.

A constitutional and pragmatic reset

Somali federalism was designed to transform armed competition into rules-based devolution. Article 49 of the Provisional Constitution is explicit: federal member states are constituted from two or more regions. While lawyers can argue boundary minutiae, the operative mechanism is clear—and it is what communities in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn have chosen to use after paying war’s price. The alternative to constitutional integration is a vacuum that invites renewed coercion.

The Addis piece frames “legitimacy” as something granted downward by other regions. In federal systems, legitimacy is built upward: through inclusive local councils, credible budgeting, transparent appointments, and service delivery that citizens can see. Legitimacy is earned—not owed—by every member state, new and old.

Lessons from Laascaanood

The 2023–24 Laascaanood fighting taught three hard lessons:

a) Civilians bear the brunt. Shelling of populated areas and even medical facilities was reported by international media; displacement reached into the hundreds of thousands. Any political design that leaves the region in limbo risks relapsing into the same humanitarian pattern.

b) Security vacuums are tinder. After the defeat and withdrawal of Somaliland forces around Goojacade in August 2023, a lull held but the front hardened west of the city. Durable calm requires integrating local forces into federal command while screening out spoilers and ensuring community-based policing.

c) Process matters more than slogans. Unionist sentiment was not fabricated; it was consolidated by months of siege. The durable outlet for that sentiment is constitutional federalism—disciplining politics through institutions rather than trenches.

A responsible path forward (for everyone)

To avoid the zero-sum trap the Addis op-ed predicts, all parties can take concrete steps that reduce risk and raise the cost of relapse:

1) Codify federal compliance from day one.
Adopt and publish a compliance checklist—public finance management (PFM) standards, procurement rules, audit cycles, and anticorruption disclosures—aligned with national laws. Tie federal fiscal transfers to meeting these benchmarks; reward performance, not patronage. (This is federalism as incentive design.)

2) Inclusive governance guarantees.
Lock in reserved seats and rotating leadership arrangements for minority sub-clans  and institutionalize grievance mechanisms. Publish monthly dashboards on service delivery and representation so inclusivity is measured, not asserted. The Addis piece’s concerns about “tribal competition” are best answered with verifiable inclusion.

3) Security integration under a single doctrine.
Register and vet local forces, integrate them into the federal chain of command, and phase out parallel command structures. Prioritize community policing and civilian harm mitigation training. The lesson from Laascaanood is simple: artillery is not a governance tool.

4) Borders without barbed wire.
Empower a technical boundary and inter-state cooperation commission—co-chaired with Puntland and facilitated by AU/IGAD—to manage disputes over administration, revenue sharing, grazing routes, and police cooperation. Technical tracks de-pressurize political ego. (They also make escalation harder to justify.)

5) Humanitarian return compact.
Launch a joint “Right of Return” compact, co-signed by federal and member-state leaders, guaranteeing safe return for displaced families, property adjudication panels, and priority rehabilitation of clinics and schools. Benchmarks should be auditable and time-bound, with donor support contingent on access and transparency.

6) Moratorium on maximalist rhetoric.
A public pledge—by Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Garowe—to reject force as a tool for resolving administrative status in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn. Replace press-conference brinkmanship with AU/IGAD-chaired working groups. The international community has repeatedly urged de-escalation; let’s institutionalize it.

Why this matters beyond one region

Somalia’s federal project has always wrestled with a paradox: diverse local identities seeking self-rule within one republic. The way out is not to deny identity or recentralize power; it’s to govern difference—through law, budgets, data, and inter-state compacts. The North-East State is a chance to prove that constitutional devolution can reverse the logic of siege and retaliation.

The Addis op-ed warns that neighbors could “encircle” or dismantle the new administration. That warning becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy only if we accept the premise that federalism is a winner-take-all contest. It is not. Federalism is a rules-based bargain with three tests: protect civilians, deliver services, and resolve disputes without guns. On each test, constitutional integration beats a frozen front line.

The communities of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn are not asking outsiders to pick sides in a propaganda war. They are asking Somalia—and its partners—to respect the constitution, honour the costs borne by civilians, and give federalism the resources and guardrails it needs to work.

That is not a provocation. It is a reset.

Ali H. Abdulla
Las Anod, North East State of Somalia
Email: aliegeh@ssckh.org
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Notes & Sources