By Hon. Fawzia Yusuf H Adam 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia

For more than two decades, Somalia has been the recipient of extensive military trainings from foreign partners such as the United States, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. Tens of thousands of Somali troops have been trained in modern warfare tactics, counterinsurgency, and military discipline. Yet the Somali government remains heavily dependent on African Union peacekeepers (from AMISOM to AUSSOM) and continues to suffer humiliating defeats at the hands of Al-Shabaab who are reliant on guerrilla tactics, often under-equipped, lacking air power and losing local support in some areas due to brutality and extortion.   

The question is: why?

This article explores the deeper reasons behind this paradox—beyond the surface of military training—and exposes a more troubling reality: Somalia’s dependency is not just due to weak institutions, but also the result of political neglect, hidden foreign interests, and most of all, failure to utilize experienced Somali military leadership.

 Nation Trained, But Not Prepared

Despite years of training, Somali soldiers continue to fall in battle—often in large numbers. This isn’t due to lack of bravery or lack of equipment alone. It is primarily because the army lacks unified command, strategic planning, and logistical coordination. The various military forces trained by foreign partners are not integrated into one national army but are divided by region, clan, and political loyalties. Even worse, there is no centralized military doctrine or strategy. Troops trained by Turkey are different from those trained by the US, Eritrea, UAE, or Uganda. This lack of cohesion undermines joint operations and battlefield success.

The Most Critical Failure: Ignoring Veteran Somali Commanders

Perhaps the most painful aspect of this situation is the Somali government’s failure to consult or includehundreds of available retired generals and senior military experts in national defense planning. These are men who have decades of experience—many of whom received advanced training in world class military academies in Eastern and Western blocks, equipping them with diverse and sophisticated military expertise and who understand the terrain, the enemy, and the art of warfare better than any foreign adviser or troops.

Yet these veterans are sidelined, while young civilian women—often with no military background—are appointed as defense advisers. This politically motivated move has had tragic consequences: poorly coordinated operations, lack of proper military guidance, and ultimately, the deaths of countless young soldiers and officers. A professional army cannot survive without wisdom passed down from seasoned leaders. By discarding their own war veterans, the Somali government has become blind on the battlefield.

The Illusion of Capacity-Building: Why Training Isn’t Enough

While thousands of Somali soldiers have been trained, the military remains fragmented and dysfunctional. Several reasons account for this:

a) Lack of Unified Command: Different regional forces (e.g., Puntland’s PSF, Jubbaland’s , South West and Hirshabelle :Darawiish forces) answer to local administrations, not the central government in Mogadishu. The Somali National Army (SNA) has become more a patchwork of clan militias than a national force.  

b) Corruption and Ghost Soldiers: Numerous reports indicate many trained soldiers abandon posts due to non-payment or clan loyalties.  

c) Inconsistent Training Standards: Some trained troops have higher professional standards compared to others. There is no centralized curriculum, doctrine, or oversight body ensuring cohesion.

Foreign Training with Strategic Interests

The heavy presence of foreign trainers and troops is not purely altruistic. Each donor country has its own strategic and economic interests in Somalia: While their support for Somalia’s security sector has been vital in many respects, it is important to recognize that such involvement is often guided by a blend of assistance and strategic calculation. Several partner countries provide training, equipment, and operational support—but their roles also reflect broader geopolitical and economic interests.

a) Türkiye, for example, operates its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu. While it plays a key role in training Somali forces and contributing to infrastructure and development efforts, this presence also positions Türkiye to strengthen its long-term strategic engagement in the Horn of Africa.

b) The United Arab Emirates (UAE) supports security forces in regions such as Puntland and Jubba land through training and the provision of arms. While these efforts can contribute to local stability, they occasionally proceed outside the framework of federal coordination, suggesting a broader strategic interest in influencing regional dynamics.

c) The United States, through its drone operations and counterterrorism outposts, helps combat extremist threats. However, its enduring presence also aligns with maintaining a strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa—an area critical to global security routes and resource interests.  In fact, they often fill gaps in Somalia’s capacity. But they also position themselves to influence Somalia’s political and economic future—particularly in relation to its untapped reserves of oil, gas, and minerals. Thus, “training” often masks deeper strategic agendas. Somalia is not just a fragile state—it is a strategic battleground.

d) As Somalia rebuilds, ensuring that these partnerships remain transparent, mutually beneficial, and grounded in national sovereignty will be key to long-term stability for the nation.

Peace Keepers or Prolonged Presence?

From AMISOM to AUSSOM: The Evolution and Implications of Prolonged Foreign Military Presence in Somalia”

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was first deployed in March 2007 with the goal of stabilizing Somalia and supporting the fledgling Transitional Federal Government against insurgent groups like Al-Shabaab. Over nearly two decades, AMISOM evolved, transitioning into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022, aimed at gradually transferring security responsibilities to Somali forces. It was envisioned as a short-term intervention to support Somalia’s path toward rebuilding national security institutions. The mission was intended to serve as a bridge, helping the Somali government develop its own capacity to ensure peace and stability.  Yet, the planned handover proved challenging due to persistent security threats and capacity gaps within the Somali National Army. As a result, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) was launched on January 1, 2025, to continue international support in combating extremism and stabilizing the country.

AUSSOM, authorized by the UN and endorsed by the AU, is a large-scale mission with nearly 12,000 personnel tasked with supporting Somalia’s stabilization until 2029. While it claims to assist with training, security, and humanitarian access, its continued presence underscores a troubling dependency narrative. The prolonged deployment of foreign troops not only delays full national ownership of security but also undermines Somalia’s sovereignty and self-reliance. Such missions are no longer essential—they risk becoming obstacles to genuine national control and dignity.” .Henceforth, the continuation and renewal of foreign missions should emphasize empowering Somali-led security initiatives, fostering local ownership, and respecting Somalia’s sovereignty to ensure that peace and stability are built from within.

 In reality, Somalia already has thousands of trained officers and soldiers capable of securing the nation. Yet, more than a decade later, Somalia continues to rely heavily on foreign peacekeeping forces. This enduring dependence raises important and complex questions: Why has progress toward self-sufficiency in security remained so slow? What structural and political challenges are standing in the way? And more critically, is there an unintended consequence of normalizing prolonged foreign military presence?

For many Somalis, the presence of foreign troops has brought both reassurance and concern. On one hand, they have played a vital role, protecting key government infrastructures such airports, and other key government offices as well as supporting humanitarian efforts. On the other hand, their continued presence evokes a sense of dependency, sovereignty erosion, or exclusion from decision-making processes that affect the nation’s future.

Therefore,It is imperative for Somalia to prioritize the deployment of its own national forces—particularly the Somali National Army (SNA) and Police—to replace foreign troops. Tens of thousands of trained Somali soldiers currently work in private security firms and businesses rather than serving in the national defense. Redirecting these capable forces into official state service would not only strengthen national sovereignty but also offer a more effective response to threats like Al-Shabaab. Somali troops possess intimate knowledge of the local culture, terrain, and language—crucial advantages in counterinsurgency operations that foreign forces, no matter how well-equipped, simply lack.

Relying on domestic forces instead of hosting thousands of foreign troops will also reduce long-term dependency and enhance the legitimacy and sustainability of Somalia’s security institutions. This does not necessarily imply intentional harm. Rather, it reflects the complex intersection of global politics, national capacity limitations, and the unintended consequences of prolonged foreign-led stabilization missions. Moving forward, the focus should be on a genuine transition—prioritizing Somali ownership of security, respecting national sovereignty, and ensuring that support from partners is empowering rather than substituting for local authority.

Some observers wonder whether the ongoing insecurity—despite significant international support and investment—may be linked not only to internal challenges but also to broader geopolitical interests. The longer Somalia remains fragile, the more room there is for external actors to influence its political, military, and economic landscape. This enduring dependence raises important and complex questions: Why has progress toward self-sufficiency in security remained so slow? What structural and political challenges are standing in the way? And more critically, is there an unintended consequence of normalizing prolonged foreign military presence?

True peace cannot be outsourced. It must be cultivated from within, with international support aligned behind a clearly defined, Somali-led vision for national security and development.

Conclusion: Somalia a nation at cross roads

After decades of foreign military support and extensive training initiatives, Somalia still finds itself dependent on external troops to combat internal threats. This enduring reliance is not a reflection of the failure or lack of heroism of the Somali soldiers—it is a profound indictment of leadership failure, lack of national cohesion, and poor strategic planning at the highest levels.

The path to genuine sovereignty and national security requires urgent corrective steps. Somalia cannot win its war—be it against terrorism, fragmentation, or foreign influence—unless it:

• Reasserts full control over its national armed forces, ending the fragmentation that leaves military operations vulnerable to foreign agendas.
• Unifies regional militias and clan-based forces under one national command, replacing divided loyalties with a shared national purpose.
• Develops and implements a central military doctrine to guide training, operations, and command structure with clarity and professionalism.
• Rejects foreign manipulation and interference in its military affairs, particularly in decisions regarding command, deployment, and priorities.
• Most critically, reintegrates and honors the expertise of retired generals and senior military commanders—seasoned leaders who understand the realities of Somali warfare, geography, and politics, yet are often sidelined by inexperienced civilian advisers and favoritism.

Victory in war is never achieved through political maneuvering or personal loyalties. It demands unity, sacrifice, deep knowledge, and strategic foresight. Somalia has no shortage of courageous fighters—but many are dying in vain, not for lack of will, but for lack of wisdom at the top. War is not won with politics or favoritism. It is won with strategy, experience, unity, and sacrifice. Somalia has brave soldiers—but they are dying because their leaders are refusing to listen to the voices of wisdom.

If the current leadership does not change course—listening to its veterans, empowering its own command, and ending external dependency—Somalia risks remaining a battlefield of foreign interests, rather than a sovereign, secure nation led by its own people.

Hon. Fawzia Yusuf H Adam 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia