By Dayib Sh. Ahmed

“It is a crime for someone without a national ID to receive services from a telecom company, a bank, or a ministry.”  President Hassan 

“In a functioning constitutional system, such a declaration would be recognized as political rhetoric, not binding law. But Somalia is not such a system.” Isha Qarsoon

I. Foundational Citizenship Framework Under Somali Law

Somalia’s citizenship system rests on a long-standing legal foundation—primarily Law No. 28 of 22 December 1962, supplemented by the administrative decrees including the 24 April 1976 nationality regulations. These laws were enacted in the early post-independence period and remain in force unless formally amended by Parliament. Article 1 of Law No. 28 states that “any person whose father is a Somali citizen shall be a Somali citizen by operation of law.” Article 2 further affirms that “any person who is Somali by origin, residing in the territory of the Somali Republic or abroad, and who declares willingness to renounce any status as citizen or subject of a foreign country, shall be a Somali citizen by operation of law.” The law also establishes additional procedural and substantive safeguards. Article 4 outlines how foreign citizenship must be renounced, Article 5 sets conditions for naturalization of non-Somalis, and Article 6 governs the authority and procedures for granting citizenship through presidential decree. These statutory provisions are still valid and have not been annulled or superseded by parliamentary act.

For this reason, recent public claims that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud “has annulled Somali citizenship laws” are legally incorrect. No executive authority in Somalia has the constitutional power to unilaterally repeal or nullify a statutory citizenship regime. Only Parliament can amend, repeal, or replace Law No. 28. This makes President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s recent declaration deeply troubling after proclaiming that, “If you are holding a foreign passport, you are not a Somali” and ordering that all Somalis with foreign passports must be treated as “foreigners” and must apply for an e-visa to enter their own country. This move contradicts established citizenship law, violates constitutional guarantees, and threatens to strip millions of Somalis of their most basic rights. Unsurprisingly, condemnation from legal and constitutional scholars, and civil society is mounting, as they warn that the President’s pronouncement breaches the Provisional Constitution, overrides statutory norms, and infringes upon the fundamental rights of Somalis to return to and reside in their homeland.

II. Constitutional Violations in the NIRA Plan

At its core, the Somali state is still in the delicate process of rebuilding institutions and renegotiating the balance of authority between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States (FMS). The Provisional Constitution is explicit: citizenship is not an exclusive federal power, nor is it an administrative matter that can be transferred to a federal agency by executive directive. Under Article 48, the structure of the Somali state is grounded in federalism that divides powers between two levels of government with delineated constitutional boundaries. Meanwhile, Article 54 mandates that powers in sensitive areas of citizenship and immigration must be negotiated and agreed upon between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States before any federal organ can assume authority. Therefore, no federal agency, including NIRA, can lawfully take control of citizenship matters without a binding political settlement.

The President’s attempt to create centralized control through NIRA bypasses these constitutional delineations, undermines federal legitimacy, and risks fueling political tension at a time when national unity is fragile.  The NIRA proposal would dismantle the legal guardrails of the existing citizenship law and replace them with a system vulnerable to political manipulations with selfish end game. Citizenship is not merely a registry but a legal question governed by procedures, judicial oversight, and presidential decrees are only valid when issued on the recommendation of advisory commissions. Articles 4, 5, and 6 of Law No. 28 require judicial certification of renunciation, formal oaths before a court, and the involvement of multiple state organs to prevent abuse. NIRA has none of these checks. Concentrating such power in a single executive-controlled agency creates an environment where citizenship could be granted, denied, or revoked based on political loyalty rather than law. Somalia’s history makes such centralization exceptionally dangerous. The Constitution envisions citizenship matters remaining closely connected to judicial authority, not controlled by a registry that answers to the presidency.

III. Policy Perspective.

Finally, from a policy perspective, centralizing citizenship under NIRA while simultaneously claiming that foreign passport holders are “not Somali” invites new national instability. Citizenship in Somalia is tied to ethnic identity. Millions of Somalis in the country, across the region and in the diaspora hold foreign passports by necessity, not out of explicit disloyalty to the country. Treating them as “foreigners” and forcing them to obtain visas to enter their homeland violates their constitutional rights under Articles 41, 48, and 54, and severs the shared Somali bond. It too destabilizes the social compact, and risks severing links with the very communities that sustain Somalia’s economy through billions in annual remittances.

Somalia’s political history shows how authoritarian manipulation of identity documents has fueled exclusion, mistrust, and conflict. Article 48’s protection of federal autonomy and Article 54’s demand for negotiated authority exist precisely to prevent such abuses. Instead of imposing an unconstitutional federal takeover, the government should adopt a cooperative framework in which states retain administrative roles, courts maintain oversight, and Parliament legislates nationality policy through consensus.

Conclusion

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s recent proclamations—declaring it a “crime” to receive services without a national ID and insisting that Somalis who hold foreign passports are “not Somali”—represent not isolated misstatements, but a systemic pattern of executive overreach that threatens the foundations of Somalia’s constitutional order. By asserting criminal liability where Parliament has enacted no offence, and by redefining citizenship in direct contradiction to Law No. 28 of 1962, the president moves far beyond the authority granted to him under the Provisional Constitution. Somalia’s legal framework is explicit. Criminal offences must originate from parliamentary legislation, not from unilateral presidential declarations.

Citizenship, likewise, is governed by statutory law and constitutional protections—not by executive reinterpretation. Law No. 28 affirms that Somalis by descent remain citizens “by operation of law,” whether residing inside or outside the country, regardless of foreign passports acquired for necessity or safety. No president has the legal power to annul, redefine, or restrict this status by proclamation. The attempted centralization of citizenship authority under NIRA compounds these violations. Articles 48 and 54 of the Provisional Constitution require that sensitive powers—especially those concerning citizenship, immigration, and identity— No such agreement exists. In Somalia’s constitutional framework, any law—especially one that creates duties, penalties, or restrictions—must come from Parliament, not the President. By seeking to place citizenship decisions under an executive-controlled registry with no judicial safeguards, NIRA bypasses federalism, undermines due process, and exposes citizenship itself to political manipulation.  

What emerges is a dangerous convergence presidential proclamations treated as law, statutory citizenship overridden by rhetoric, and federal authority seized without constitutional negotiation. This signals a drift toward governance by decree rather than governance by law a form of authoritarian legalism in which the executive substitutes its will for legislative process and constitutional order.

If Somalia is to move forward, the government must restore respect for constitutional boundaries, reaffirm the supremacy of parliamentary legislation, and return citizenship and identity matters to the lawful framework envisioned by the Constitution and by Law No. 28. Anything less risks transforming necessary reforms into instruments of arbitrary authority and further destabilizing the fragile constitutional order the nation is struggling to rebuild.

Dayib Sh. Ahmed
Email: Dayib0658@gmail.com
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Dayib is a writer, political analyst and WardheerNews contributor