By Abdiweli Garad, PhD

Introduction: Echoes of Dissent in a Fractured Landscape

Somaliland’s secession from Somalia has been a contentious issue since the collapse of Somalia’s central government in late 1991. Recently, this topic has gained renewed attention in Somalis’ discussions on social media, resonating with some non-formally secessionist regions that show sympathy for it. This article was prompted by an X-space conducted by a group of young Puntlanders who expressed empathy for the secessionist cause.

This article critically reassesses the historical narratives underpinning Somaliland’s secessionist claim, prompted by these contemporary dialogues. Central to this examination are three pivotal questions: the formal ratification of the 1960 union between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland; the true motivations behind the 1961 military rebellion; and whether the rejection of the 1961 constitutional referendum by northern districts signified an early withdrawal of consent. This analysis seeks to clarify the historical record by engaging rigorously with authoritative sources while acknowledging the weight of politicised narratives.

Contested Narratives: Romanticism versus Rigour

The secessionist perspective draws significantly from the works of I.M. Lewis (A Modern History of Somalia) and his disciples after him. Their interpretations, particularly concerning the 1961 events, have often presented an idealised view, framing the military incident as a principled stand against the union rather than a more prosaic grievance. This narrative posits that the 1960 union was never properly ratified, rendering the integration provisional. It further links the 1961 referendum rejection and the military rebellion directly to northern disillusionment with the union, portraying them as foundational moments in an inevitable trajectory towards secession, culminating in the Somali National Movement (SNM). For instance, Michael Walls (2009) encapsulates the view that: “within eighteen months, northerners had rejected a referendum on a unifying constitution, and British-trained officers had attempted a coup”.

However, this interpretation faces substantial challenge from the meticulous scholarship of Paolo Contini, Jama Mohamed Ghalib, and Abdi Ismail Samatar (The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration; The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience; Africa’s First Democrats). Their work offers distinct advantages:

a) First-hand Testimony: General Ghalib, as Hargeisa’s Police Commissioner in 1961, participated directly in the arrest of the rebel officers, providing an unparalleled eyewitness account.

b) Primary Source Reliance: Samatar’s research extensively utilises President Aden Abdulle Osman’s diary, a crucial and respected primary document.

c) Regional Objectivity: Ghalib and Samatar hail from northern Somalia, yet their analyses eschew romanticism, offering balanced and critical perspectives grounded in evidence. Their rigorous methodology contrasts with interpretations perceived to adjust events out of context to fit a predetermined narrative.

d) Paolo Contini was the UN legal Advisor to the Somali Government and Chairman of the Consultative Commission for Integration from 1960 to 1965.

Reassessing the Pillars of Secessionist Narratives

1) The Ratification of Union: Provisional or Perfected?

The assertion that the union lacked formal ratification does not withstand scrutiny. According to Paolo Contini (1969, pp. 11-13), the elected parliament of the Somaliland Protectorate in April 1960 “unanimously voted for immediate independence and union with Somalia.” Following a unification conference in Mogadishu (April 16-22, 1960). The Somaliland Legislative Assembly passed the “Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law” on June 27, 1960. Section 1(a) unequivocally stated: “The state of Somaliland and the state of Somalia do hereby unite and shall forever remain united in a new, independent, democratic, unitary republic, the name of which shall be the Somali Republic.” Contini details the initial procedural complications arising from political manoeuvring and time constraints preventing an “Act of Union” before July 1st, 1960; this deficit was rectified. The National Assembly unanimously enacted the Act of Union on January 31, 1961, explicitly granting it retroactive effect from July 1, 1960. Legally and politically, the union was formalised and made irrevocable.

2) The 1961 Referendum: Rejection of Constitution or Rejection of Government?

Secessionist narratives simplistically interpret the “No” vote in four northern districts as rejecting the union. However, contemporary evidence reveals a more complex political dynamic. Abdi Ismail Samatar (2016, p. 102), drawing on President Osman’s diary and interviews with former Prime Minister Abdirizak Haji Hussein, demonstrates that prominent northern politicians like Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and Sheikh Ali Jimale actively campaigned against the constitution. Their motivation was not secession, but rather a calculated political strategy: Sheikh Ali, Egal, and their associates decided to campaign against the constitution to get even with Osman and Sharmarke and their political camp.

They assumed the government would be discredited if voters turned down the constitution. As a result, they could sail to power.” They leveraged clan allegiances (“politicised genealogy”) to mobilise votes against the constitution in their home constituencies (Berbera and Beledweyne), viewing its rejection as a path to ousting the incumbent government. This was an intra-union power struggle, not a plebiscite on secession. Samatar notes that despite this campaign, “the vast majority of the Somali voters approved the constitution.

3) The 1961 Incident: Mutiny or Secessionist Coup?

Sandhurst-trained junior officers’ portrayal of the December 1961 rebellion as a secessionist uprising is directly contradicted by authoritative sources with detailed knowledge of the event. General Ghalib (1995, p. 123), who was the police commissioner of Hargeisa and may have been involved in arresting the officers, dismisses the secessionist interpretation: “Many Somalis in both the North and the South, mistakenly believed — and have since maintained — that the rising led by Hassan Keyd on 10 December 1961, was part of a broader northern secessionist manifestation.” General Ghalib categorically states:

I can confirm that there were no wider separatist tendencies. The ‘coup’ attempt, as it came to be called, resulted only from the young officers’ dissatisfaction over the lack of comparable adjustments of military rank upon the integration of the Somaliland Scouts Regiment into the Somali National Army, six months after the Union.

Therefore, the main complaint was the perception of unfair rank disparities compared to their southern counterparts after integration, not political separation. Abdi Samatar (2016, pp. 111-114) supports this. He also notes that there is limited evidence of regional discontent as the main motive. Instead, he points to factors such as youthful ambition and frustration over promotions. Importantly, the government commission investigating the incident reported on December 15, 1961, confirming that promotion grievances were the root cause. Additionally, the officers’ legal defence admitted guilt for mutiny but explicitly not for a coup d’état. The government’s subsequent actions, including paying legal fees and not appealing a dismissal on minor technicalities, further suggest it was not regarded as a fundamental threat to the union.

Conclusion: Disentangling History from Contemporary Politics

This critical reassessment, grounded in authoritative first-hand accounts and rigorous primary source analysis, challenges core tenets of the historical narrative often invoked to legitimise Somaliland’s secession. The evidence indicates that the 1960 union was formally ratified, with retroactive effect, resolving initial procedural delays. The 1961 referendum “No” vote in parts of the north stemmed from intra-governmental power struggles and clan politicking, not a rejection of the union itself. The rebellion of December 1961 was a mutiny driven by military rank grievances, not a secessionist coup. The works of Contini, Ghalib, and Samatar provide a necessary corrective to romanticised interpretations that project later secessionist aspirations onto these earlier events.

While current grievances and Somaliland’s political evolution are essential, a fair examination of the 1960-61 union and its origins shows a different picture from what the secessionist story suggests. Understanding this history is key to meaningful discussions about Somalia’s past and future.

This article critically analyses the tendency among contemporary political figures, elites and some scholars to instrumentalise historical narratives in the service of their present objectives, often as a means of legitimising their stances. Rather than engaging substantively with the documented historical record—including, for instance, the authentic grievances of junior officers concerning overlooked rank disparities—these actors frequently resort to selectively curated interpretations of the past.

Whilst acknowledging the profound failures and injustices that undeniably characterised the Civil War period, the article contends that attributing these solely to an allegedly flawed foundational union or unratified system risks flattening a deeply complex historical terrain. It argues that this instrumentalisation of history primarily functions to advance immediate political ends, thereby obscuring a fuller, more nuanced understanding of the lived complexities and socio-political contexts inherent to the actual conditions of the time.

Abdiweli Garad, PhD
Email: aogarad@gmail.com
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Abdiweli Garad is a researcher focusing on state-building interventions and the associated security complexities of the HoA.
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References

• Contini, P. (1969). The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration. Frank Cass.
• Ghalib, J.M. (1995). The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience. Lilian Barber Press.
• Lewis, I.M. (2002). A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (4th ed.). James Currey.
• Samatar, A.I. (2016). Africa’s First Democrats: Somalia’s Aden A. Osman and Abdirazak H. Hussen. Indiana University Press.
• Walls, M. (2009). The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland. African Affairs, 108(432), 371–389.