By Abdirashid Hashi

To move Somalia forward, political leaders must recognize that only credible and creative strategies can shift the country’s trajectory. It is also time to accept that futile maneuvers will neither buy time nor deliver stability. As of May 15, 2025, Somalia will officially enter the final year of the current federal and regional mandates. The clock has been ticking — and it has now started blinking red.

Given the current political stalemate and deepening legitimacy crisis, only two realistic options remain for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud:

1) First, to opt for a negotiated extension, reached through consensus with political actors and stakeholders, in order to form a competent Government of National Unity tasked with steering the country through critical political and security priorities.

2) Second, to agree — alongside relevant actors — to a reimagined and inclusive indirect election, anchored in merit and held on time, as the current mandate ends on May 15, 2026.

Both options begin with the same prerequisite: President Mohamud must rescind the controversial constitutional amendments, disband the disputed electoral commission, and reset the process — this time through genuine consensus with federal member states and sidelined national political actors. His predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, made a similar U-turn in 2021/2022, which helped avert a dangerous constitutional crisis. It is now President Hassan Sheikh’s turn to choose prudence over brinkmanship. It is not easy to eat humble pie — but when it becomes necessary and inevitable, it is better to get it over with.

A unity government must mean exactly that: a competent, technocratic cabinet that governs effectively — not one that simply balances clan quotas or rewards loyalists. It must reflect a return to constitutional order. As Article 97 of the 2012 Provisional Constitution affirms: “The executive power of the Federal Government is vested in the Council of Ministers… [which] is the highest executive authority.”

Yet for three years, this provision has been sidelined. Power has been concentrated in the presidency to the extent that the Prime Minister, Hamza Abdi Barre — otherwise a fine man — was made to sign a document suggesting that Somalia does not need a prime minister or a parliamentary system. That alone shows how far Somalia has drifted from its constitutional model.

If the President refuses to reset and continues down this path, two other outcomes become increasingly likely — neither of them orderly, nor advantageous for him or the country.

First: Internal pressure and external fatigue may converge and force him out — as happened to President Abdullahi Yusuf in December 2008, when he resigned and went into exile after losing both domestic legitimacy and international support. Whether President Hassan sees it or not, he is now staring down a 2008-style moment. When the United States — whose military, diplomatic, and financial support is so vital to Somalia’s war against Al-Shabaab and overall stabilization — issues a public rebuke, it is not just another bad day. It is a flashing red warning. And no serious pilot ignores a Ground Proximity Warning System that screams: “Terrain! Terrain!” You either change course — or you crash. President Hassan Sheikh is in that situation. And sadly, almost everyone other than him knows it.

Second: The entire federal system could collapse — it is already critically strained. We’ve seen this before, and more than once. In 2002, the Transitional National Government (TNG), led by President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, weakened, went into exile in the Kenyan cities of Eldoret and Mbagathi, and eventually disintegrated. In 2012, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), under Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, had its sovereignty stripped under the infamous Kampala Accord. That agreement gave veto power over Somali governance to UN envoy Augustine Mahiga, removed a prime minister, and imposed a foreign-designed roadmap.

Think that’s history? Think again.

The 2025 Kampala Meeting followed the same pattern. With the AU and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) short on resources, and Western partners — especially the U.S. — growing impatient, a “peer-review oversight mechanism” was proposed by Uganda and supported by others as public pressure on President Mohamud. This uniquely odd proposal would be overseen by President Museveni, now self-styled as the “Dean of the TCCs.”

Reports and transcripts confirm that the FGS, backed by allies like Egypt, pleaded for time. The result was reportedly a quiet two-month window for the Somali President to fix internal fractures — stemming, among other things, from a self-tailored constitution and a unilateral electoral model.

Fifteen days later, instead of initiating inclusive negotiations, President Hassan began rallying loyalists: the NCC comprised his Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Mayor of Mogadishu, expired FMS leaders, and the recently crowned leader of SSC-Khatumo. More concerningly, these officials were encouraged to join the President’s new political party — a move that felt more like a campaign launch than a national consultation. The communique issued by the NCC reaffirmed unilateral electoral plans, drawing serious concern and a pointed rebuke from the U.S.

The United States tagging the Somali President’s statement was no gentle correction. It was a calibrated warning: change course now — and stop playing fast and loose with international support.

The Unity Government’s Mandate

Should the path of extension and a unity government be chosen, its mandate must be clear, time-bound, and results-driven. It should govern for two additional years and achieve two core objectives:

1. Deliver credible one-person-one-vote elections — national, regional, and local — by 2028.

2. Rebuild and unify Somalia’s security forces under professional command to defeat Al-Shabaab and stabilize the country.

The United Nations Electoral Assistance Division should step in with greater visibility and involvement — not to override Somali sovereignty, but to help safeguard it through structured technical support, as it has done in Kosovo and East Timor. Somalia doesn’t need more dialogues — it needs institutions and systems that work.

The President’s role during this period should be limited and clearly defined: appoint a credible, widely accepted Prime Minister — and step back.

Likewise, former leaders — ex-presidents, ex-prime ministers, and Puntland’s hardline elites — all vying for leadership must not turn this transition into a bidding war. None of them has a moral high ground or a better track record than Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. If they attempt to derail the process, the international community must intervene decisively. Somalia cannot afford another round of self-serving obstruction while Al-Shabaab regroups and the public suffers.

Finally, if President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is granted this unearned extension — and we suggest it, to avoid systemic collapse and prevent disorder — it must come with one condition: he must not run in the next election. By 2028, he will have led Somalia for over a decade since his first term began in 2012. In any serious democracy, two terms is enough. Staying longer would not build legacy — it would erode it.

A Reformed Indirect Election as a Fallback

If no consensus is reached by July 1, the fallback must be a reformed indirect election — not a return to the toxic 101-clan delegate model where MPs were selected through backroom deals and blatant vote-buying.

Instead, Somalia should adopt a broader and more credible model. Each clan or sub-clan could select 300 diverse voters — youth activists, respected elders, religious scholars, professionals, women leaders, and business figures.

To illustrate: in a region like Bay or Mudug, where 10 MPs are elected, this would mean 3,000 voters. In Hiiraan, or any region with 20 seats, that would mean 6,000 voters. These multi-clan, diverse delegates would collectively elect the MPs from each of Somalia’s pre-1991 regions. The sheer scale and diversity would make bribery and manipulation far more difficult.

These voters must be real community representatives — individuals with deep roots, reputations, and integrity. They are far less likely to sell their votes, and even if someone tried, the math is against it: no candidate can buy the loyalty of thousands. This model would force candidates to campaign — to present their ideas, platforms, and vision.

Finally, Somalia’s options are narrowing. The longer we delay course correction, the more collapse becomes a serious and immediate risk. The choice isn’t between power and concession — it’s between order and chaos. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud still has time to steer Somalia away from the edge.

Abdirashid Hashi
Email: rashid2025@yahoo.com

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The author is a Somalia analyst and researcher. He is the co-founder and former director of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, a Mogadishu-based think tank, and a former cabinet minister. He also tweets at @AnalystSomalia.