By Abdullahi A. Nor
Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre has reopened one of Somalia’s most sensitive questions by saying the government is prepared to engage members of Al-Shabaab who renounce the group and its ideology. He also denied that the government has held negotiations with the group or paid it to reduce attacks in Mogadishu.
That distinction matters. The government is currently describing its position as an offer of reintegration to defectors, rather than a political negotiation with Al-Shabaab as an organization. But the comments inevitably raise a much larger question: who has the political mandate to negotiate Somalia’s future with an armed movement that still controls or heavily influences large parts of the countryside? That question cannot be separated from Somalia’s unresolved constitutional crisis.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s mandate has been the subject of a major political dispute since the scheduled end of his original four-year term in May 2026. Parliament subsequently approved constitutional amendments extending the presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years. Opposition leaders rejected the change and accused the government of using constitutional reform to prolong its tenure. Reuters reported that Hassan Sheikh remained in office amid the dispute.
The result is a fundamental disagreement over political legitimacy. For those who reject the extension, the current administration cannot legitimately make far-reaching political commitments on behalf of Somalia when the country’s electoral and constitutional settlement remains unresolved. From that perspective, any comprehensive political dialogue with Al-Shabaab should be left to an incoming government established through a broadly accepted constitutional and electoral process.
Al-Shabaab Still Holds the Rural Advantage
The argument for political engagement cannot, however, be dismissed simply because the government is politically divided.Al-Shabaab remains a powerful armed actor. The European Union Agency for Asylum reported that, as of March 2026, the group controlled or maintained a heavy presence across large parts of south-central Somalia and had expanded its territorial influence in several areas.
This creates a striking contradiction at the heart of the Somali state. The government operates from Mogadishu, but its reach outside major urban centres remains severely constrained. Large areas of the countryside remain insecure or contested, and government officials and security personnel frequently depend on air transport when travelling beyond the capital because major roads remain vulnerable.
The result is a state whose political authority is national in theory but whose effective reach remains limited in significant parts of the country. That reality makes any future political settlement with Al-Shabaab an issue that cannot simply be wished away.
Rumours of a Secret Deal
The relative reduction in the frequency of some of Al-Shabaab’s spectacular attacks in Mogadishu has also generated rumors that the government may have reached an undisclosed financial arrangement with the group.
The allegations claim that millions of dollars are being paid in exchange for keeping the capital relatively quiet. There is no independently verified evidence establishing such a deal.
Prime Minister Hamza has categorically denied the allegation, saying the government and Al-Shabaab have had no negotiations and that their relationship remains one of armed conflict. He attributed the payment allegations to figures associated with a previous administration and also accused some former officials of having links to Al-Shabaab, without providing publicly available evidence for those claims.
The allegations should therefore remain allegations—not facts. But their circulation reflects a deeper public question: why has Al-Shabaab retained such substantial influence outside the capital despite years of international military assistance to the Somali government?
A Fragmented Federal System
The political crisis is further complicated by the fragmentation of Somalia’s federal system.Puntland and Jubaland have remained openly opposed to key policies of the Federal Government, while South West State suspended cooperation with Mogadishu before the federal government deployed forces to Baydhabo and established an interim administration there. Hirshabelle and Galmudug have remained considerably closer to the Federal Government.
Some critics interpret this alignment through a clan-political lens, arguing that the states still cooperating with Mogadishu are politically closer to President Hassan Sheikh’s constituency. That interpretation is a political allegation rather than an established explanation; the governments involved have their own political calculations and interests.
Nevertheless, the fragmentation is real. Somalia therefore faces the unusual prospect of considering negotiations with Al-Shabaab while its own federal political actors remain deeply divided over constitutional authority, elections and the distribution of power.
The Timing of Dialogue Matters
There is an important difference between reintegration and political negotiations. The government has a legitimate policy option to encourage individual Al-Shabaab members who abandon violence to defect, disarm and return to civilian life. Prime Minister Hamza says former members of the group already serve in government institutions and security forces.
A national political negotiation with Al-Shabaab is a different matter. Such a process could involve questions of governance, constitutional authority, security arrangements, justice, territory and the future political order. Those decisions would affect every Somali community—not simply the administration currently occupying Villa Somalia. That is why the unresolved constitutional and electoral crisis cannot be separated from the question of dialogue.
An Opening Al-Shabaab Could Exploit
There is also a strategic danger in entering any major negotiation from a position of political weakness. If the Federal Government remains divided from several federal member states, lacks a broadly accepted electoral settlement and continues to face restrictions on its territorial reach, Al-Shabaab could enter negotiations with considerable leverage.
Rather than producing peace, a poorly structured process could potentially allow the group to use political dialogue to consolidate gains made through years of armed conflict.
That does not mean dialogue should be permanently rejected. It means that the legitimacy, timing and mandate of any dialogue matter as much as the dialogue itself. Somalia’s next political leadership may ultimately have to confront the question of whether military operations alone can defeat Al-Shabaab or whether a broader political settlement will eventually be necessary.
But if that question is to be addressed nationally, it should be addressed by a government whose constitutional authority and electoral mandate are broadly accepted. Somalia does not merely need a conversation with Al-Shabaab. It needs first to settle the question of who has the legitimate authority to speak for Somalia.
Abdullahi A. Nor
Email: abdulahinor231@gmail.com
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