By Mohamed A Yasin

In an unusually candid moment that is shaking the Somali political and security establishment, Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi,  has openly acknowledged that Mogadishu’s safety cannot be guaranteed so long as Al-Shabaab maintains control of towns like Xawaadley in the Shabelle regions. His remarks, delivered during a public ceremony, marked the first such admission of defeat from a senior government official under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s leadership.

 “It is unacceptable for Al-Shabaab to seize Xawaadley. Mogadishu cannot be safe while they remain there,” declared Minister Fiqi.

His comments came just days after Al-Shabaab fighters overran Xawaadley, a strategic location in Middle Shabelle, without encountering significant resistance. The town lies along key logistical routes connecting rural areas to the capital, and its fall is not only a tactical loss but also a psychological blow to a government that has long promised a final push against the group.

“To hold peaceful elections, free from mortar fire, our forces must clear both Shabelle regions of Al-Shabaab,” he added, explicitly linking the militant threat to the security of Somalia’s upcoming electoral process.

But the problems haunting Somalia go far beyond the battlefield. Fiqi’s public admission opens a window into the deeper and more entrenched crisis that has taken root in the country—one of legitimacy, unity, and constitutional governance. His statement may go down as one of the first honest acknowledgments that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is both overstretched militarily and paralyzed politically.

A Nation Divided — The Rift Between the Federal Government and Member States

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, now in his second term, had vowed to prioritize reconciliation, constitutional finalization, and federal harmony. Instead, his presidency has become mired in disputes that have alienated critical Federal Member States (FMS) and raised serious questions about the legality and future of key state institutions.

The National Consultative Council (NCC), originally intended as a platform for dialogue and consensus between the federal and regional governments, has effectively ceased to function after the president established what he called a ‘grand party’ — Justice and Unity.”  Puntland and Jubaland—two of Somalia’s most autonomous and powerful states—have openly rejected the president’s recent constitutional amendments and election plans, accusing him of engineering a power grab.

Puntland, under President Said Abdullahi Deni, severed ties with the federal government last year over the controversial constitution changes and the politicization of international aid. Jubaland’s President Ahmed Islam Madobe has refused to attend NCC meetings without the presence of all FMS and has insisted on upholding the 2012 Provisional Constitution, accusing the federal government of bypassing legal norms to centralize power.

“The president continues to act as if Somalia is a unitary state. He cannot change the constitution without the consent of the states and the people,” a senior Jubaland said under condition of anonymity.

While Puntland and Jubaland resist, the mandates of South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle hang in legal limbo. Elections for new state presidents in these regions have been delayed—some well past their constitutional limits—with strong suspicion that President Hassan Sheikh is propping up loyalists to maintain political leverage at the state level.

This has triggered growing unrest in towns like Baidoa and Dhusamareb, where opposition groups allege that the federal government is deliberately weakening regional institutions in order to force through its political roadmap. There is also concern among civil society groups and international observers that these delays in state leadership transitions are eroding Somalia’s already fragile federal balance.

Constitutional Crisis at the Core

Central to this national crisis is the controversial constitutional overhaul being championed by Villa Somalia. In April, the House of the People hastily approved amendments to the Provisional Constitution without a quorum, and without sharing the draft text with lawmakers in advance—a move widely condemned by legal experts and the opposition.

Among the changes proposed are revisions that would shift the balance of power toward the presidency, weaken federalism, and alter the electoral system. Critics have described the changes as “clan-based centralism in the guise of reform,” and warn that such a move could spark a new cycle of civil unrest and secessionist sentiment.

The opposition also accuses Speaker of the House, Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur (Madobe), of rubber-stamping presidential decisions in exchange for political and financial favors. This has reduced confidence in the parliament’s independence and contributed to the perception that Somalia’s transition to democracy is regressing.

“Somalia is being governed by executive decree, not by consensus. We are drifting dangerously toward authoritarianism,” said an MP who opposed the amendments.

Security Without Consensus?

The federal government continues to promote its security campaign—known as “Operation Black Lion”—aimed at flushing out Al-Shabaab from rural strongholds. But without unified political leadership, logistical support from the FMS, and stable local governance in reclaimed areas, progress is patchy at best.

The fall of Xawaadley has only emphasized the fragility of these gains. Many analysts now question whether the government has stretched its security forces too thin, or whether corruption and internal political rivalries are sabotaging efforts on the ground.

Meanwhile, ordinary Somalis continue to pay the price. The lack of security in key supply corridors has left entire communities under siege, while the unresolved constitutional and electoral questions have paralyzed basic governance.

A Tipping Point?

Defence Minister Fiqi’s remarks may be remembered not just as a rare moment of honesty, but as a turning point. His implicit warning—that Mogadishu’s security is an illusion so long as the countryside remains in militant hands—exposes the hollowness of the federal government’s narrative.

The road ahead is daunting. Without restoring consensus between the FGS and FMS, revisiting the constitution in good faith, and ensuring timely and inclusive elections at both state and federal levels, Somalia risks slipping back into fragmentation. The twin crises of insurgency and political illegitimacy must be addressed together.

Somalia stands at a crossroads. The seizure of Xawaadley by Al-Shabaab, and the federal government’s inability to prevent it, is more than a battlefield loss—it is a stark symbol of a nation under siege, not only by extremists, but by its own internal dysfunction.

Mohamed A Yasin
Email: moyasin680@gmail.com