Mogadishu (WDN) – After nearly two decades of international naval deployments, military patrols and expensive anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast, the return of armed pirates raises an uncomfortable question: what exactly has the international community achieved?

The European Union is once again showcasing its naval presence in the waters off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, presenting its Operation Atalanta as a key instrument in combating piracy and protecting international shipping. Yet, for all the warships, helicopters, drones, heavily armed personnel and elaborate operational briefings, piracy continues to threaten one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

The latest developments suggest that the international response has become increasingly characterised by monitoring, reporting and military demonstrations rather than a meaningful effort to eliminate the conditions that allow piracy to flourish.

An Associated Press report indicates that piracy attacks have increased amid escalating conflicts in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Since Yemen’s Houthi movement began attacking commercial vessels in November 2023, the region has recorded 79 piracy incidents, nearly 30 of them following the outbreak of the Iran war in February 2026.

The figures point to a worrying resurgence of a problem that international naval forces once claimed to have brought under control.

Another naval deployment, another round of promises

The EU’s Operation Atalanta was established in 2008 to combat piracy and protect commercial shipping across the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Nearly two decades later, the mission remains active, with the Spanish warship ESPS Santa Maria reportedly leading the latest operations.

The vessel carries more than 200 personnel, heavy weapons, missiles, helicopters and unmanned surveillance aircraft. Special forces aboard are also trained to retake vessels seized by pirates.

Vice Admiral Ignacio Villanueva, the operation’s commander, has acknowledged that regional instability creates opportunities for illegal activities and pushes some people towards piracy.

But this explanation, while relevant, does little to answer the central question: why, after so many years of international military intervention, are pirates still able to organise, capture commercial vessels and hold their crews hostage?

The deployment of sophisticated naval equipment may demonstrate the capacity to monitor maritime movements and respond to individual incidents. It does not necessarily demonstrate an ability to dismantle the networks, financial structures and coastal support systems that sustain piracy.

Six hijackings and an unresolved hostage crisis

The resurgence is no longer theoretical. According to the report, six commercial vessels were hijacked between April and August 2026. Five were subsequently released, but the Tanzanian-flagged tanker MT Asana remained in pirate hands, with 22 seafarers reportedly still aboard according to Operation Atalanta’s October 16 update.

Fishing vessels have also been targeted, with pirates reportedly using some of them as floating bases from which to launch attacks against larger commercial ships.

These developments expose the limitations of a naval strategy that concentrates heavily on patrols and surveillance while leaving the underlying criminal infrastructure largely intact.

The pirates have demonstrated an ability to adapt, exploit regional instability and return to operations whenever security conditions deteriorate.

The real problem lies beyond the sea

Poverty, unemployment, food insecurity, rising fuel prices and political instability in Somalia and neighbouring countries are among the factors identified by maritime security experts as contributing to piracy.

However, these conditions have existed for years. Somalia’s prolonged absence of effective coastal governance, weak maritime institutions and limited capacity to police its territorial waters have created an environment in which criminal networks can survive and regenerate.

The international community has spent enormous resources protecting commercial shipping, but far less attention appears to have been devoted to establishing a sustainable Somali maritime security system capable of taking ownership of its coastline.

Patrolling international waters is not the same as restoring authority along the Somali coast. Nor is the occasional release of a hijacked vessel equivalent to dismantling the organisations responsible for the crime.

Without effective coastal policing, functioning courts, credible intelligence networks and the prosecution of financiers and organisers, naval operations risk becoming an expensive exercise in containing symptoms rather than eliminating the disease.

A strategic waterway under growing pressure

The stakes extend far beyond Somalia. The Bab al-Mandab Strait, linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, is one of the world’s most strategically important maritime passages. Under normal conditions, approximately 12 per cent of global trade passes through the corridor, including a substantial share of container shipping between Asia and Europe.

The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the wider confrontation involving Iran have further complicated maritime security. Disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz have also increased the strategic importance of alternative shipping routes and placed additional pressure on international naval resources.

For shipping companies, renewed piracy means higher insurance premiums, additional spending on armed protection and the possibility of costly diversions around dangerous waters.

The consequences ultimately extend to consumers and economies far beyond the Horn of Africa.

An operation that needs more than academic assessments

The EU maintains that the presence of warships, aircraft and drones helps deter piracy, although its officials acknowledge the difficulty of measuring how many attacks have been prevented.

That may be a reasonable operational argument, but it is hardly sufficient evidence of lasting success.

After nearly two decades, the international community should be asking why piracy continues to return, why criminal networks remain capable of holding seafarers hostage and why Somalia’s coastline remains vulnerable despite successive international security initiatives.

The problem is not the absence of naval technology or international conferences. It is the absence of a comprehensive strategy that addresses both the criminal networks at sea and the political and economic conditions sustaining them on land.

Somalia’s coastline should not remain an international security problem managed indefinitely by foreign warships. The objective should be to build Somali institutions capable of protecting their own maritime territory, supported by international partners rather than permanently dependent on them.

Until that happens, Operation Atalanta and similar deployments risk becoming recurring exercises in naval containment, accompanied by impressive operational reports but little lasting change.

The uncomfortable reality is that the international community has spent nearly two decades fighting Somali piracy without finally defeating it. Another warship, another patrol and another report will not change that reality.

WardheerNews