By Balal M. Cusman

Although I consider myself someone who has closely engaged with Somali’s political journey, both in theory and in practice, I do not claim to have all the answers, nor to fully grasp every dimension of its complexity. However, like many others who care deeply about the country, I remain a student of its unfolding story, continually trying to understand the deeper roots of its perpetuated governance impasse. I found that Somalia’s recent political crisis is multi-layered and resistant to single explanation. Yet the strikingly consistent patterns that continue to emerge – leaders clashing, negotiations stalling, legitimacy being contested, institutions becoming paralyzed and external actors ultimately stepping in to broker compromise – suggest structural governance challenges that warrant deeper and more systematic analysis. While the specific circumstances may vary, the underlying script rarely changes. 

Scholars such as I M. Lewis and Ken Menkhaus, despite their limited organic attachment to the lived realities of Somali society, have argued that clan dynamics, institutional weakness and external interference help explain this pattern. These explanations may hold some validity but still, they often describe the symptoms more than the underlying condition. The deeper issue, I cautiously suggest, lies in a structural mismatch between imported governance systems after independence and the political culture shaped over millennia primarily by pastoral nomadism.

In reflection on Somalia’s governance experience, one useful interpretive lens is the idea of cultural “neurodivergence” – not in the clinical sense, but as a metaphor for how nomadic societies often develop cognitive patterns distinct from those of sedentary and bureaucratic civilizations. Somali cultural psychology has largely been formed by mobility. Social organization historically developed in an ecological environment defined by movement, uncertainty and negotiated access to scarce resources. Anthropological literature consistently shows that pastoral nomadic societies tend to cultivate egalitarian decision-making, situational leadership and scepticism toward rigid hierarchy (Lewis 1961; Salzman 2004). Authority and rules (xeer) are respected when earned, not assumed when declared.

In such societies, governance is relational rather than institutional. Agreements are frequently negotiated but not rigidly codified and leadership is persuasive but not coercive. These norms function effectively in mobile nomadic environments yet sit uneasily alongside centralized bureaucratic states that depend on standardized compliance and impersonal rules. I do not claim that this cultural inheritance is the sole explanation for Somalia’s political challenges. Of course, geopolitics and economic shocks have all played significant roles, yet the neglect of the cultural dimension during state formation and institutional development helps explain why formal institutions have often struggled to inspire deep public ownership and lasting loyalty.

At the independence in 1960, Somalia adopted a centralized state model derived directly from European administrative traditions. Like many post-colonial states, it inherited institutions designed elsewhere and expected them to generate legitimacy locally. Political theorists from Alex de Waal to Herbst (2000) note that such institutional transplants frequently lack embedded social authority when they are not organically rooted in local political traditions. In Somalia’s case, this gap became painfully visible when the state collapsed. When civil war erupted in 1991, there was no broad and spontaneous civic mobilization to defend national institutions. This absence should not be misread as indifference to order or governance, rather, it suggested that many citizens viewed the state as something external, an apparatus they lived under, not one they collectively owned, supporting the argument that political systems that grow from within the society’s cultural logic tend to inspire defense during crises whereas systems perceived as imposed rarely do.

A Somali professional in Mogadishu may navigate politics through personal trust networks, while the same individual operating in a highly institutionalized environment such as Copenhagen can function comfortably within formal bureaucratic frameworks. This adaptability shows that Somalis are not resistant to institutions per se, rather, institutional legitimacy depends on the context and the perceived principles.

Experience suggests that governance systems can gain durability when people feel they own them, even if that ownership is more perceived than absolute. In the Somaliland and Puntland regions of Somalia, relative stability developed following the collapse of the central government through processes broadly perceived by local communities as locally owned, as the foundational conferences shaping political arrangements were initiated, led and negotiated by the communities themselves. These hybrid systems blended modern administrative institutions with traditional authority structures – elders participated in formal decision-making, customary law complemented statutory frameworks and political settlements were forged through mechanisms people recognized and trusted (Menkhaus 2014; Walls 2011). These examples do not represent perfect models, but they suggest that institutional legitimacy increases when governance frameworks reflect lived local realities and culture rather than attempting to overwrite it.

Although Somalis have missed several opportunities to reshape their governance systems in ways that align with local culture, norms and values in the past, meaningful chances for reform continue to arise periodically often coinciding with the rhythm of electoral cycles for every four years. The current moment therefore presents another chance to reconstitute governance and its institutional design in a way that aligns more closely with societal culture, norms and values. The upcoming government has the opportunity to get its priorities right by focusing first on rectifying the structural deficiencies of the current governance system, while at the same time maintaining the relative security and stability the country currently enjoys. By doing so, it can lay the foundation for a system that citizens not only recognize as legitimate but also feel empowered to sustain. This does not entail rejecting modern statehood model, in the contrary, it calls for grounding it in locally resonant legitimacy. Such reforms may not instantly eliminate political rivalry or external pressures immediately, but they have the potential to solve the long-awaited puzzle of creating a governance system that is genuinely Somali-owned and Somali-led, where leaders are incentivized to resolve disputes internally, grounded in the trust and legitimacy of their own society, rather than relying on outside mediation.

In addition to the rectifications of the governance system and to avoid institutional malfunctioning and most importantly, for citizens to wholeheartedly trust the governance system designed to reflect their cultural realities and operate in an integrated manner, the bureaucracy that sustains the system must also be built on a transparent and seamless meritocratic foundation at all levels -federal, regional and district levels. It is well known that public institutions function best when officials are selected through competence, integrity and demonstrated capability rather than political bargains or traditional power-sharing formulas. Therefore, while negotiated representation may remain necessary at political levels, the administrative core of the state must be insulated from such arrangements, otherwise, inefficiency, patronage and institutional fragility risk undermining the very system people are being asked to believe in.

In conclusion, I offer this perspective not as a definitive diagnosis, but as a contribution to an ongoing conversation about the reconstitution of Somalia’s statehood. I believe that Somalia’s challenge is not that its people are incompatible with governance, instead, it is that the current governance structures have too often been incompatible with the social logic of its people. If institutions can be shaped to reflect that logic while still meeting the demands of a modern state, Somalia may finally move from cyclical crisis management toward stable national stewardship.

Balal M. Cusman
Email: bcusman@gmail.com
X:@BalalCusman
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Balal Mohamed Cusman, Former State Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia. ____________________________
Reference
1.Lewis, I. M. (1961). A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali. Oxford University Press.
2.Menkhaus, K. (2014). State Failure, State-Building, and Prospects for a “Functional Failed State” in Somalia. ANNALS. 3.Herbst, J. (2000). States and Power in Africa. Princeton University Press.
4.Walls, M. (2011). State Formation in Somaliland. African Affairs.
5.Salzman, P. (2004). Pastoralists: Equality, Hierarchy, and the State. Westview Press.