By Abdiweli Garad, PhD

Introduction

Today heralds the commencement of Somalia’s Independence Week—a period for both solemn reflection and collective national pride throughout the Somali Peninsula. Concurrently, recent weeks have witnessed escalating global tensions between Iran and Israel, which pose a significant threat to international stability. Amidst the national bride and the broader geopolitical strains, Somalia’s domestic political climate continues to be marked by profound instability.

This analysis examines the political trajectory of Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni (Deni), scrutinising his past strategic failures while projecting the likely outcomes of his current presidential bid. Through this dual lens of retrospective assessment and forward-looking analysis, the piece reveals a concerning pattern of repeated miscalculations that continue to undermine his political ambitions. Against this backdrop, ambitious Somali politicians like Deni are jostling for power, forging alliances, and positioning themselves for the upcoming electoral contests. However, as this analysis demonstrates, not all learn from past mistakes.

This article critically examines Deni’s past strategic failures, analyses his current approach, and offers recommendations for a more viable pathway to Villa Somalia. This piece argues that Deni risks repeating past errors unless he adopts a more visionary agenda by dissecting his miscalculations in coalition-building, parliamentary selection, and alliance management.

Strategic Debacle 1: The Ill-Fated Tripartite Alliance

Deni’s initial strategy in the 2020-2021 elections centred on a singular objective: unseating then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. However, his ambition lacked a coherent roadmap for securing the presidency himself. Instead of cultivating broad-based support, he co-formed the Tripartite Alliance with Damujadiid and Ala-Sheikh—a coalition that weakened his position rather than consolidating power.

Crucially, Deni failed to extend his outreach beyond Puntland. While Mogadishu-based alliances strengthened their grip on electoral politics, he neglected potential partnerships with Southwest, Somaliland, Beesha Shanaad, or Jubbaland politicians. This oversight left him isolated, unable to secure critical votes outside his immediate constituency. A more astute strategist would have recognised that Somalia’s fragmented political landscape demands cross-regional alliances, not insular power plays.

Strategic Debacle 2: Exclusion of Key Puntland Stakeholders

A second critical error was Deni’s failure to engage Puntland’s traditional leaders and political heavyweights in the parliamentary selection process. Influential figures such as Boqor Burhan and Islaan Bashir—alongside seasoned politicians and intellectuals—were sidelined in favour of inexperienced loyalists.

This decision proved disastrous as many of Deni’s handpicked MPs later defected to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) camp. In contrast, MPs aligned with Jubbaland’s President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) remained steadfast with him to this date. The lesson was clear: political durability requires the backing of established powerbrokers, not just transient loyalists. Deni eroded the foundation of his political legitimacy by alienating Puntland’s traditional leadership.

Strategic Debacle 3: Lack of a Post-Farmaajo Roadmap

Deni’s singular focus on removing Farmaajo left him without a viable succession plan. He assumed that the Garowe Conference (December 2020), backed by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), would anoint him as Somalia’s next leader or co-owner of the upcoming administration. Instead, HSM outmanoeuvred him through pragmatic coalition-building, leaving Deni politically marginalised.

When defeat became reality, Deni doubled down on counterproductive tactics—publicly criticising Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre as a mere “secretary of HSM” and antagonising many in the Jubbaland community. These missteps only further eroded his dwindling support base.

The Upcoming Election: Repeating Past Mistakes?

Deni appears to be recycling flawed strategies as Somalia approaches another electoral cycle. His current approach hinges on three risky pillars:

1) Deni’s outreach to Somaliland politicians – whether secessionists or unionists represents a fundamental miscalculation of Puntland’s geopolitical position. This strategy dangerously conflates two incompatible political projects: Somaliland’s pursuit of separation or disproportionate influence within Somalia (“large cake” federalism), both of which directly threaten Puntland’s interests as:

a) An Institutional Counterweight: Since 1998, Puntland has positioned itself as the institutional bulwark against Somaliland’s separatist claims. By engaging with Somaliland figures, Deni inadvertently lends legitimacy to their claims over these disputed territories.

b) A Federalism Standard-Bearer: Puntland’s constituency views the region as the guardian of Somalia’s federal model—a system fundamentally incompatible with Somaliland’s aspirations.

c) This creates irreconcilable tension when Deni courts, as the secessionist groups reject Somali unity, and the unionists demand a special autonomous status. Resource Competition: The “large cake” theory—where Somaliland seeks disproportionate resource sharing in any union—directly disadvantages Puntland’s interests in oil blocks and maritime boundaries. Deni’s engagement suggests a willingness to bargain these assets.

2) Deni’s increasingly adversarial posture toward the nascent Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo (SSCK) Federal Member State (FMS) represents a significant strategic blunder. Traditionally, SSC-Khatumo and Puntland share deep sociopolitical ties, common security interests, and a mutual commitment to Somali federalism. Yet rather than cultivating this natural alliance, Deni has chosen to antagonise its leadership, primarily due to his ill-advised overtures to Somaliland’s political elites.

a) This hostility has placed SSC-Khatumo in an untenable position. Deni’s alignment with Hargeisa-based actors—many of whom still assert territorial claims over SSCK territories—directly threatens Khatumo’s sovereignty, so its leaders have little incentive to support his presidential bid. On the contrary, their political survival may depend on actively opposing him.

 b) From a realpolitik perspective, Deni’s approach is perplexing. SSC-Khatumo could have been a crucial voting bloc, reinforcing his federalist credentials and offsetting opposition from Mogadishu. Instead, his actions have pushed them toward alternative candidates—HSM or another consensus figure—who pose no existential threat to their governance. Unless Deni recalibrates his strategy, this self-inflicted rift will only weaken his already precarious electoral prospects.

3. Reliance on Online Propagandists (“Deni Drones”)—These activists undermine Somali unity, promoting divisive rhetoric that contradicts Puntland’s union and federalist principles.

Projected 2026 Electoral Outcomes

Current calculations suggest Deni may secure no more than 35 MPs in the first voting round, with significant defections likely. Key voting blocs are expected to align as follows:

10 former Puntland MPs, now SSCK, are likely not to vote for Deni, and would favour HSM due to concerns over Deni’s secessionist ties.

a) Dir Woqooyi MPs (59 seats): Likely to back HSM, viewing Hawiye as a more reliable ally than Darod-affiliated candidates.

b) Jubbaland MPs: Madobe’s influence will likely steer votes towards former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre or former President Sheikh Sharif, not Deni. This is because Madobe envisions a threat of sharing the influence of Jubbaland if a member of the Darod president sits in the Villa Somalia; thus, he prefers a non-Darod president. No indications show that the Southwest MPs (79) and Beesha Shanaad (37) are forging a coalition with Deni.

Therefore, without a drastic shift in strategy, Deni’s bid appears doomed to fail—perhaps even more spectacularly than in May 2022.

The Way Forward: Strategic Recommendations

For Deni to mount a credible presidential campaign, he must abandon his current trajectory and adopt a more statesmanlike approach. Key recommendations include:

1) Articulate a Coherent Federalist Vision—Puntland’s aspirations are rooted in the pursuit of a unified yet federal Somalia, moving beyond the divisive confederal discourse. President Deni ought to anchor his political strategy in this foundational principle, prioritising long-term constitutional integrity over transient electoral manoeuvres.

2) Foster Organic Alliances—In line with Puntland’s commitment to federalism, the Southwest State offers a strategic opportunity for coalition-building. This partnership could extend to neighbouring regions such as Galmudug and SSC-Khatumo, promoting a cohesive bloc based on shared governance principles.

3) Disavow Divisive Online Campaigners—The so-called “Deni Drones” harm Deni’s credibility. Replacing them with strategists and tacticians would bolster his legitimacy.

4) Re-engage Traditional Leaders and Elders—Respecting Puntland’s political elite will be crucial to regaining their trust.

Conclusion

Said Abdullahi Deni stands at a crossroads. His previous electoral failures stemmed from poor coalition-building, the exclusion of key stakeholders, and a lack of strategic foresight. Unless he learns from these mistakes, his 2025-2026 campaign risks meeting the same fate.

To succeed, Deni must transcend narrow-sighted politicking, embrace a unifying national vision, and cultivate durable alliances. Otherwise, history may judge him as a leader who squandered Puntland’s political capital—not through lack of ambition, but through a failure of strategy.

Abdiweli Garad, PhD
Email: aogarad@gmail.com
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Abdiweli Garad is a researcher focusing on state-building interventions and the associated security complexities of the HoA.