By Isha Qarsoon
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution establishes a sovereign state in which public authority derives exclusively from the Somali people and is exercised solely in their name. That authority is vested in defined constitutional organs—the federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches—and is conditioned on fidelity to the state as a single political entity. Public office within those organs exists only within this constitutional framework and draws its legitimacy from it. Allegiance to Somalia’s sovereignty is therefore not optional; it is the legal premise upon which public authority rests.
Allegiance to two competing claims of sovereignty over the same territory is constitutionally oxymoronic and institutionally corrosive within Somalia’s constitutional order, because it permits public officials to qualify or deny the very sovereignty from which their authority is derived. Somali officials commonly described as “Somaliland politicians in Mogadishu” have recently taken a constitutionally incompatible position by holding senior federal offices across the executive, legislative, and judicial branches and speaking publicly in the capacity of those offices while acting in ways that treat Somaliland as standing outside Somali sovereignty. Following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, some of these officials urged the Federal Government of Somalia to refrain from asserting its authority. They warned against political, economic, or security measures that might affect Somaliland and framed Somalia’s sovereign response as dangerous or illegitimate. They did so while occupying offices created, funded, and protected by the Somali state, and while exercising authority in its name. In substance, their conduct treats Somalia’s sovereignty as conditional rather than as a constitutional fact.
The claim that one can be “pro-Somalia” and “pro-Somaliland” at the same time reflects an earlier political context in which ambiguity was tolerated after state collapse to keep negotiations alive. That context changed with the adoption of the Provisional Constitution, which settled sovereignty, territory, citizenship, and state continuity in favor of a single, united Somali state. Once that settlement occurred, divided allegiance ceased to function as a negotiating posture and became incompatible with constitutional order. What is now presented as neutrality is, in constitutional terms, allegiance divided between mutually exclusive sovereign claims. Treating loyalty to two competing claims of sovereignty as neutrality weakens the sovereignty of the nation.
The Constitution defines the state at the outset. Article 1 establishes Somalia as a federal, sovereign, and democratic republic. All power is vested in the people and exercised only in accordance with the Constitution and the law through recognized institutions. The same provision affirms the unity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Somalia without qualification. These provisions place sovereignty at the foundation of the constitutional order. Public institutions exist because that sovereignty exists, and public offices derive their authority from it. Exercising public power while denying or qualifying the sovereignty that authorizes it is incompatible with the constitutional structure.
The Constitution also regulates the use of sovereignty. It prohibits any person or group from claiming the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Somalia or using it for personal or sectional interest. When an officeholder treats Somali sovereignty as negotiable in order to advance a secessionist or sectional political position, that conduct falls squarely within what the Constitution prohibits.
Territorial integrity is addressed with equal precision. Article 7 extends Somalia’s sovereignty over all the territory of the Federal Republic of Somalia and characterizes that territory as inviolable and indivisible. These provisions admit no exceptions. They recognize no provisional arrangements and no internal opt-outs. Somaliland is part of Somalia as a matter of constitutional law. An official who publicly warns the federal government against exercising authority over Somaliland, or who frames Somaliland as existing outside Somali sovereignty, acts in direct contradiction of a constitutional command. That contradiction cannot be reconciled with the lawful exercise of public authority under the Constitution.
The Constitution reinforces this position through its treatment of citizenship and unity. Article 8 affirms that the people of the Federal Republic of Somalia are one and indivisible and that there is only one Somali citizenship. The constitutional framework recognizes no intermediate political status between belonging to the Somali state and separating from it. Divided political allegiance therefore has no constitutional footing. A person may privately hold political views favoring secession. Once that person accepts public office, those views conflict with constitutional obligations. Holding office while acting as a representative or defender of a secessionist claim places the officeholder in opposition to the constitutional order.
The supremacy of the Constitution removes any remaining ambiguity. Article 4 establishes the Constitution as the supreme law of the country and binds all branches of government. Executive, legislative, and judicial officials are equally bound. A judge who treats Somaliland as external to Somali jurisdiction, a minister who frames federal authority as illegitimate in Somaliland, or a parliamentarian who conditions national action on secessionist approval acts outside the legal framework that authorizes the position they hold.
The Constitution also imposes affirmative duties. Article 42 requires every citizen to be patriotic and loyal to the country, to foster national unity, to uphold and defend the Constitution and the law, and to defend the territory of the Federal Republic of Somalia. These duties apply to all citizens and apply with greater force to those who exercise public authority. Public office intensifies these obligations. Conduct that undermines sovereignty or territorial integrity cannot be reconciled with them.
Office-specific provisions reinforce the same conclusion. Members of the Federal Parliament are required under Article 61 to act in the best interests of the nation as a whole. Judges exercise authority in the name of the Federal Republic of Somalia under Article 105. Executive officials swear oaths to uphold the Constitution and perform their duties accordingly. None of these roles authorizes an official to operate as an internal restraint on sovereignty itself. None permits unity or territorial integrity to be treated as negotiable political variables.
Constitutional violations by officeholders persist because they are not met with institutional or political consequence. The President, the Prime Minister, and the Speakers of both Houses raised no objection when senior officials advanced positions that treated Somalia’s sovereignty as divisible or conditional. No statement clarified that divided allegiance is incompatible with public authority. No institutional response followed. Silence from the highest constitutional offices therefore functioned as acquiescence.
Public reaction followed the same pattern. Protests in Mogadishu after Israel’s recognition of Somaliland expressed broad support for national unity. They did not translate into sustained political pressure on the officials whose divided allegiance weakens sovereignty from within.
The absence of political consequences for politicians with conflicted allegiances reflects the political culture produced by the 4.5 power-sharing system. Many citizens now understand the state primarily as a distribution of offices among clans rather than as a constitutional order that demands allegiance. Offices are treated as clan entitlements instead of constitutional trusts. Violations of sovereignty therefore produce symbolic protest rather than direct political confrontation with officeholders.
The conduct of these politicians reveals significant constitutional failure. Public authority in Somalia exists only within a single sovereign order. When an official rejects that order in substance while continuing to exercise power under it, the logic of constitutional authority disintegrates. A state cannot function when its own officials treat sovereignty as optional.
The issue, therefore, is not the private beliefs of individual politicians. It is the use of public office to advance positions that deny the constitutional order from which that office derives its authority. These officials were not speaking as private citizens. They spoke as holders of federal office, invoking the authority, visibility, and legitimacy of the institutions they represented. That is what gave their words force, and that is why the conduct matters constitutionally. When public authority is used to qualify or deny the sovereignty that authorizes it, the constitutional foundation of the state is weakened from within. Dual allegiance in public office is therefore not neutrality. It is incompatibility with constitutional governance.
Isha Qarsoon
Email: Ishaqarsoon1@gmail.com
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