By Abdikarim Haji Abdi Buh

Four years ago, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince appeared capable of reshaping the kingdom and the Middle East on his own terms. Today, war, mounting fiscal pressures and the limits of international alliances are exposing the vulnerabilities behind his ambitious vision. For Mohammed bin Salman, the challenge is no longer simply transforming Saudi Arabia—it is proving that his model of power can withstand a crisis he cannot control.

There was a time, not so long ago, when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman seemed almost untouchable. Known internationally as MBS, he welcomed powerful leaders, attracted global investors and commanded an oil-funded investment machine capable of turning extraordinary ambitions into reality. He appeared confident that Saudi Arabia could become a global economic powerhouse while he emerged as one of the most influential figures in international politics.

The contrast with today is striking. The Iran war has intensified pressures already confronting the kingdom: a widening budget deficit, expensive investment commitments, regional insecurity and uncertainty over the future of Vision 2030. Projects once presented as symbols of an inevitable Saudi ascent are being delayed, scaled back or reconsidered as financial and security realities collide with royal ambitions.

Saudi Arabia is not on the verge of collapse. It retains substantial financial resources, strategic importance and considerable influence in global energy markets. But the crisis has exposed an uncomfortable truth for its crown prince: immense wealth and concentrated political authority cannot guarantee control over events.

Vision 2030 meets the realities of war

MBS’s central ambition was to reduce Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil while transforming its economy, society and international standing. Vision 2030 promised a future built around tourism, entertainment, technology, manufacturing and global investment rather than an economy overwhelmingly dependent on petroleum revenues.

The ambition was understandable. The problem was not the desire to diversify; it was the scale, speed and financial assumptions behind some of the projects chosen to achieve it.

The warning signs appeared before the Iran war. Saudi Arabia recorded a fiscal deficit of 5.8 per cent of GDP in 2025, according to the International Monetary Fund, significantly above its original budget target. Expensive projects and competing spending priorities were already forcing difficult decisions. The conflict has made those choices more urgent.

Read the IMF’s assessment of Saudi Arabia’s economic outlook.

The kingdom’s recalibration is increasingly visible. Major developments associated with NEOM, including The Line, have faced reductions or restructuring. Reuters reported in October that Saudi Arabia was expected to cancel the 2027 Joy Awards amid budget cuts and the consequences of the war. Read Reuters’ report on Saudi entertainment spending cuts.

These changes do not mean Vision 2030 has failed in its entirety. Economic diversification is a long-term undertaking, and parts of the non-oil economy have demonstrated resilience. But they reveal the difference between announcing a grand vision and financing it through prolonged economic and geopolitical turbulence.

A country cannot indefinitely treat every ambitious idea as an immediate national priority. It must decide what is essential, what can wait and what offers a realistic return on public investment.

The limits of personal diplomacy

MBS also invested heavily in relationships with the world’s most powerful leaders, seeking to turn Saudi Arabia’s financial weight into diplomatic leverage.

His relationship with Washington illustrates the limits of that strategy. The crown prince sought closer ties with Donald Trump through promises of enormous American investment commitments and expanded commercial engagement. Yet the relationship has not guaranteed that Washington will act according to Riyadh’s preferences.

Trump’s reported public remarks about the crown prince in March captured a reversal in their political dynamic. The episode illustrated how quickly a relationship presented as a strategic partnership can become a demonstration of unequal leverage.

The lesson is larger than the personalities involved. Investment promises may generate commercial opportunities, but they do not purchase control over another country’s foreign policy. A US president answers to domestic political calculations, strategic priorities and his own assessment of American interests—not simply to the expectations of a wealthy partner.

For MBS, this creates a difficult dilemma. He needs the United States as a security partner, but dependence on Washington leaves Saudi Arabia vulnerable when American decisions diverge from Saudi interests.

The kingdom’s challenge is to build a relationship based on clear mutual commitments rather than the assumption that personal access to the White House will automatically produce strategic protection.

China cannot replace Washington overnight

Saudi Arabia’s engagement with China has offered another avenue for expanding its diplomatic options. Beijing’s role in brokering the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement demonstrated that China could exercise meaningful influence in the Middle East.

But diplomatic influence is not the same as a willingness to provide military protection during a regional war.

China has important economic and energy interests across the Gulf, including relationships with countries whose interests conflict. It has incentives to preserve stability and maintain commercial access, but those interests do not necessarily require it to assume the security responsibilities Saudi Arabia has traditionally associated with the United States.

MBS may therefore discover that a multipolar world offers more partners without necessarily providing a reliable substitute for the existing security relationship.

The kingdom needs diplomatic flexibility, but diversification of partnerships must be matched by realistic expectations of what each partner is prepared to do in a crisis.

Military spending has not eliminated vulnerability

Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in defence, acquiring sophisticated weapons and building a modern military. Yet the kingdom’s security challenges demonstrate that the cost of an arsenal is not the same as the ability to deter every adversary.

Recent attacks and threats against strategic infrastructure and transport hubs have highlighted the exposure of even wealthy states to missiles, drones and disruptions to vital trade routes. Reuters reported in October that escalating Houthi attacks had struck Riyadh’s airport and Saudi Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran, underlining the vulnerability of critical sites. Read Reuters’ report on attacks affecting Saudi Arabia.

Such threats create economic consequences far beyond the cost of repairing physical damage. They can unsettle investors, disrupt aviation and tourism, increase insurance costs and weaken the confidence on which major development projects depend.

For a country seeking to become a global destination for business, entertainment and tourism, security is not separate from economic transformation. It is one of its foundations.

The kingdom must protect its population and infrastructure while avoiding a prolonged conflict that consumes resources, frightens investors and undermines the economic future it is trying to build.

The domestic bargain under pressure

Vision 2030 was never only an economic programme. It also formed part of a broader political and social bargain: a more dynamic society, expanded entertainment and employment opportunities, and a less oil-dependent future, delivered under a highly centralised system of political authority.

That bargain becomes harder to sustain when expectations rise but major projects are postponed, economic pressures intensify and regional insecurity threatens the promise of stability.

The government will need to demonstrate that economic diversification delivers tangible benefits to Saudi citizens, rather than merely producing spectacular architecture, international events and ambitious announcements. Jobs, productive private businesses, reliable public services and sustainable public finances matter more to long-term success than the size of any single megaproject.

A strategic reset could ultimately strengthen Vision 2030. Concentrating resources on projects with credible economic returns, building domestic industries and expanding private-sector productivity would be more sustainable than attempting to pursue every ambition simultaneously.

But that adjustment would also require acknowledging that some original plans were too costly, too optimistic or too vulnerable to external shocks.

For a leadership that has invested heavily in presenting itself as decisive and visionary, admitting the limits of its plans may be politically uncomfortable. Yet refusing to adjust would be more costly.

A test of leadership, not simply wealth

MBS still has substantial advantages. Saudi Arabia possesses vast energy resources, significant financial assets, strategic geography and the capacity to make difficult policy adjustments. The IMF has stressed that the kingdom retains resilience while warning that prolonged conflict and disrupted shipping could damage investment confidence and economic prospects. Read the IMF’s analysis of the war’s economic risks for Saudi Arabia.

The question is not whether Saudi Arabia can survive this crisis. It is whether its leadership can emerge with a more sustainable economic strategy and a more realistic understanding of its place in the region.

That requires three changes in emphasis: prioritising economically viable investments over prestige projects, strengthening the kingdom’s ability to protect critical infrastructure, and pursuing diplomacy that reduces the risk of being drawn into conflicts whose outcomes Riyadh cannot control.

It also requires recognising that national influence cannot rest entirely on one leader’s relationships, personal authority or financial promises. Durable influence depends on capable institutions, credible partnerships, economic resilience and a clear assessment of national interests.

The Iran war has not erased MBS’s achievements or made Vision 2030 irrelevant. It has, however, exposed the danger of confusing ambition with control.

Four years ago, the crown prince appeared to believe that wealth, speed and centralised authority could transform the kingdom and reshape the region according to his vision. Today, he faces a more difficult reality: international partners have their own agendas, military spending cannot eliminate every threat, and oil wealth cannot indefinitely insulate an economy from strategic miscalculation.

The ultimate test of Mohammed bin Salman’s leadership will not be whether he can build a futuristic city or attract another global summit to Riyadh. It will be whether he can protect Saudi Arabia, manage its resources wisely and deliver lasting prosperity when events refuse to follow his plans.

Vision 2030 may yet succeed in important ways. But its future will depend less on the grandeur of its original promises than on the crown prince’s willingness to adapt them to the world as it is—not the world he hoped to create.

Abdikarim H. Abdi Buh
Email: abdikarimshak@gmail.com