By Faisal Roble 

Introduction 

This report is a cursory review of “MINOR DEMARCATION, MICRO-DAMS – MAJOR DRAMA” (Micro-Dam) prepared by the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) of the Ethiopian Peace Research Facility (EPF).^[1] This review is not to extensively discuss the history of the region, nor is it to go into a detail discussion about the origins of the Somali and Oromo clans involved in the RVI’s report. Rather, it evaluates the Oromo Regional State (ORS)-led, multifaceted, and contentious Marar Dam and the boundary demarcation between the Somali and Oromo regions. The contested Marar Dam is located within 15 km of Jigjiga. Marar is a village that is administered under the center of Sheekh Madow in the District of Tuliguuleed. Legally speaking,  it is within the SRS. However, the ORS is unilaterally developing the Dam. Many Somalis see this an expression of injustice. Also, the boundary demarcation is equally contentious in that the ORS “upscaling of administrative” capacity and status for the village of Makaniis to a full district level. Makaniis village is also located between Jigjiga and the border town of Togwajale, Somalia. Until recently, both Marar and Makaniis were part of the SRS. What had transpired until recently is the triumph of politics of Oromo identity in the depth of Somali region. 

The alleged territorial expansion of the Oromia elite towards the Somali territories is an expression of power dynamics between the often “restrained” SRS leadership and the more aggressive ORS leaders. The later flexes its political muscle over contested [Somali] territories due to its prominent role in the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) structure. The behavior of the ORS disproportionately affects the Geri Somali in the contested areas of the Faafan zone, as well as the Garre and Gura clans in Liban zone, a subject not covered by the RVI’s report, which is here under review. Somalis both in Faafan and Liiban zones feel they receive no protection from the SRS and its leaders. Many ask how the ORS elite got to decide the fate of villages on the outskirts of Jigjiga, while, according to the Rift Valley Report, Mustafa Omara remains “restrained.” 

The most plausible answer lies in the imbalance of political power between the two regional states. The Jarso, a Somalised clan, whose origins are traced back to Oromo blood, is used for justification in territorial claims against the SRS and to resurrect an Oromo identity inside the Somali region from a thin air. Suffice it to say, the Jarso have been Somalised, and the territory they live on cannot be a justification to obfuscate the SRS. The Jarso have in the past claimed, as the RVI shows, multiple identities including but not limited to Somali; even within the Somali they have clan identities such as Dir, Daarood, Ajuraan of the Somali lineages, and, at extreme times, Oromo. Cathrine Besteman calls the adoption of a Somalised identity by non-Somali groups “sheegato,” or “adoption of local identity,” It is not impossible, therefore, to find a Jarso with a triple identity as Jarso, Dir, Haberawal, or Jarso, Darood, Ogaden. However, instead of using such fluidity of the Jarso identity to strengthen diversity, Shimeles Abdisa, Ethiopia’s most powerful regional president, in this case that of Oromia, used to foster a new political geography and weaken the Oromo-Somali kinship. 

The Somali-Oromo conflict has roots in the collectivization program of the Derg. However, the current shape of armed conflict and displacement of thousands of innocent civilians trace their origins to the 1991 ethnic-based federal system, designed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF was dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), with the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) as the main surrogate of TPLF.  The current government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is also fully dominated by Oromo elite that morphed from OPDO to Oromo Prosperity Party with a Pentecostal twist. 

Historically, the SRS has had a troubled relationship with the central government of Ethiopia. The region is a typical periphery zone within the Ethiopian body politic and can easily be explained by the theoretical construct of “core vs. periphery” as utilized by regional development planners, such as John Friedman^[2] or David Harvey.^[3] The annexation of the SRS to Ethiopia began in the latter part of the 19th century but was completed following the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty in 1954.^[4] Somalis resisted for about 60 years, between 1890 and 1954, to avert the arbitrary incorporation of their land into Abyssinia, but to no avail. The Geri clan dearly paid heavy prices in their fight to thrust back the forces of feudalism and partition, but lost the battle after two wars with Abyssinians between 1942-1947 and 1948-1957.^[5] According to John Markakis, the marginalization of the Somali periphery region could be argued to be one of the counterforces to delay Ethiopia’s state formation.^[6] Ethiopian governance in the SRS has yet to have a tangible impact, for most of the region is outside the reach of the central state, with weak near absence of public services.^[7]

SRS’s history is replete with devastating pillages of resources by the center and exclusion of development benefits.^[8] The feudal order of Abyssinia and subsequent regimes have administered the SRS as a buffer and a militarized zone. No territory in Ethiopia suffered as much as SRS did through all the regimes that came and passed, including the current Prosperity Party (PP) regime.  What makes this time unique is that the SRS is mired in a territorial dispute with the ORS, the latter being the political base of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. This festering issue has yet to climax. If not arrested, it could explode and have far-reaching consequences.

The following cursory review of the RVI report, published in May 2025, is limited to areas of strength as well as points of bias or a lack of historical context regarding the Geri (Somali) and Jarso (Oromo) conflict and their respective historical relationship. The purpose of the review is to correct misconceptions that serve as conflict derivers in the current political atmosphere of Ethiopia. The review will demonstrate that the Rift Valley’s reports used a weak methodology, lacked historical context or shown bias which in the end perpetuates the marginalization of Somalis in favor of the powerful ORS. In short, the review will unveil how the RVI’s report could potentially accentuate the territorial claim of the ORS over that of Somalis, thus adding fuel to an already blazed identity politics.

The Rift Valley Institute’s report is part of an ongoing “knowledge” production. A related report was completed by Juweria Ali on the same region in 2023.^[9] Juweria, a native of the SRS, significantly contributed to our understanding of the complexity, political geography, and potential environmental/health risks of oil politics surrounding the Ogaden Gas in the SRS. She highlighted how the EPRDF regime corrupted the SRS’s leaders to exploit the Ogaden Gas without community buy-in. She writes: “Communities impacted by natural resource exploration around Calub Hilaala cite a lack of accountability for the crisis in the Ogaden Basin, and the need for reparations, environmental rehabilitation, and economic inclusion.” She cautions that current policy-makers of the Prosperity Party (PP) should not ignore the community’s concerns about environmentally induced health risks. She also raises the question of matching the “political visibility” Somalis claim to have attained in the PP administration and whether that will be translated into “tangible benefits for the region’s population.” That same question Juweriya raised haunts the SRS leadership as the ORS encroaches and, as critics say, puts a chokehold on Jigjiga.

Read More: Manufactured Identity, Territorial Claims, and the Displacement of Somalis

By Faisal Roble
Email: faisalroble19@gmail.com 
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Faisal Roble, a prominent essayist and public intellectual, is writing a book on state formation in the region. His past writings have appeared on WardheerNews, where he served as Chief Editor, as well as in The Ethiopian Review and The Horn of Africa Journal, where he was a contributing editor.