By Abdisaid M. Ali

1. Executive Summary

In March 2024, The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) signed a sweeping oil and gas deal with Türkiye, giving the Turkish state oil company, TPAO, exclusive rights to explore and develop petroleum across Somalia’s land and waters. It was sold to the public as a major breakthrough, a partnership that would breathe life into Somalia’s long-neglected resource sector and open the door to new opportunities. But as the full terms have slowly emerged, the agreement is facing serious backlash. What was supposed to be a path to economic revival now looks like a rushed, secretive deal that bends Somalia’s national laws and surrenders too much control over its future. At the heart of the criticism are deeper concerns: about sovereignty, about who really benefits, and about whether Somalia’s leaders have once again mortgaged the country’s resources without securing the people’s consent.

This legal and policy brief finds that, both in how it was made and what it contains, the Türkiye–Somalia agreement breaches key provisions of Somalia’s national laws, especially the 2020 Petroleum Law and stands in direct contradiction to the principles and protections laid out in the Provisional Constitution adopted in 2012.

The deal was negotiated without competitive bidding, excluded Somalia’s Petroleum Authority (SPA), and was signed without parliamentary approval or public transparency. The fiscal terms heavily favour Türkiye, granting it up to 90% of annual oil production during cost recovery, while exempting it from the standard financial obligations typically included in such agreements, such as signature bonuses, surface fees, and production bonuses.

Of further concern is the agreement’s dispute resolution framework, which removes jurisdiction from Somalia’s courts and mandates international arbitration in Istanbul under UNCITRAL rules. In addition, a “Change of Law” clause obliges Somalia to compensate Türkiye for any future laws that affect project profitability, effectively freezing Somalia’s ability to legislate in its own national interest. The deal also allows Türkiye to conduct its own security operations in Somalia, with the cost recoverable through Somali oil revenues.

These terms not only sideline Somalia’s institutions and undermine the federal constitutional framework but also deviate sharply from international best practices in hydrocarbon contract management. As such, the agreement presents both a legal crisis and a national security liability.

 This brief recommends the immediate suspension of the agreement, a full parliamentary, SPA, and FGC review, engagement with federal member states, and substantial renegotiation of its terms to align with Somali law and international norms. If nothing is done, the Türkiye–Somalia oil agreement won’t just weaken Somalia’s legal foundations, it will hand its enemies an opportunity they could never create on their own. Al-Shabaab, and others like it, will seize on this deal as proof that Somalia’s leaders are once again trading away the country’s wealth behind closed doors. In their hands, it won’t just be an oil contract, it will be a symbol of betrayal, another rallying cry to pull more young men into their fight, and a fresh excuse to undermine the very idea of a Somalia’s state building process.

2. Overview of the Agreement’s Provisions

In March 2024, Somalia and Türkiye signed a sweeping hydrocarbon agreement that goes far beyond typical exploration deals. The arrangement gives Türkiye’s state oil company, TPAO, exclusive rights, not just to explore, but to pick and develop any petroleum blocks it wants, both onshore and offshore. There was no public bidding, no competitive licensing, and no serious debate about the long-term consequences. For a country still trying to rebuild its institutions and secure its future, the agreement raises hard questions about who will really benefit and at what cost. This exclusivity is extraordinary in its breadth and granted without public tender or competitive process.

The agreement authorizes TPAO to select any contract area it deems appropriate. Once a block is selected, Somalia is obligated to enter into a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) with Türkiye on terms already framed by the accord. The FGS must provide all technical data related to the selected block, including seismic, geological, and mapping records, free of charge. This provision grants Türkiye both a first-mover advantage and control over resource mapping that would typically remain under the custody of a national petroleum regulator.

Under Article 4 of the agreement, Türkiye holds the exclusive right to perform seismic surveys, conduct drilling, and undertake all related petroleum operations. TPAO is not required to establish a Somali-based entity or operate through a local subsidiary, unless it voluntarily chooses to during production. The company is also free to subcontract any or all its operations and can assign its rights, obligations, and interests to third parties without prior approval from the Somalia’s government. This clause effectively allows Türkiye to repackage Somali assets and resell them without national scrutiny, further eroding Somalia’s control over its own resources.

The fiscal terms are particularly lopsided. TPAO is exempted from paying signature bonuses, development bonuses, surface fees, or any form of upfront financial commitment. The only guaranteed revenue for Somalia is a capped royalty of up to 5% of production, excluding any volumes reinjected or used for operational purposes. Meanwhile, TPAO is entitled to recover up to 90% of all crude oil and natural gas production annually as “Cost Petroleum,” until all exploration and development expenditures have been recouped. Only the remaining 10% would be treated as profit petroleum subject to a revenue-sharing arrangement that is not specified in the agreement, but left to future PSA terms.

Further clauses grant Türkiye full rights to export its share of production and retain the revenue abroad. Somalia is neither entitled to audit nor track these transactions unless specifically allowed in subsequent contracts. This effectively removes Somalia from the revenue oversight process, undermining the principles of transparency and fiscal accountability enshrined in both national law and global resource governance standards.

Article 6 authorizes Türkiye to deploy its own security forces or personnel to protect petroleum operations, with all associated costs reimbursable from Somalia’s oil revenue. This creates a parallel security architecture that operates independently of Somalia’s security command structures raising serious questions about military sovereignty and accountability.

Finally, Article 10 and Article 12 mandate that all disputes arising from the agreement be resolved through international arbitration in Istanbul, under the UNCITRAL framework. Somalia’s domestic legal system is excluded, and Turkish jurisdiction is effectively prioritized over Somali courts. This includes any contractual disagreements or challenges stemming from legislation passed by the Parliament of Somalia.

Taken together, these provisions not only depart from Somalia’s domestic legal architecture but reflect an imbalance of power between the contracting parties. The agreement entrenches foreign control over national resources, excludes key Somali institutions, and severely limits the country’s future ability to regulate its oil sector. It sets a dangerous precedent not only for how Somalia manages its extractive sector, but for the role of foreign powers in shaping the country’s post-conflict recovery.

 
3. Violations of Somalia’s Petroleum Law (2020)

When Somalia passed its Petroleum Law in 2020, it was trying to turn a page. For decades, deals around international concessions were made in the shadows, informal, unaccountable, and often entangled in political calculations. The new law was supposed to end that. It was meant to bring order, transparency, and a clear set of rules to one of the country’s most sensitive sectors. It laid out how contracts should be awarded, who has the authority to review them, and how institutions like the SPA were meant to act as safeguards against abuse.

But it was not just about paperwork or legal formality. At its core, the law was a response to real-world risks: corruption, elite capture, foreign exploitation, and the marginalization of the relevant institutions. The law recognized that oil and gas, if mishandled, could deepen political rifts and destabilize the country. That is why it demanded competitive bidding, public oversight, and cooperation between the federal government, federal member states, and the other state agencies. No one actor was supposed to control the whole game.

The Türkiye agreement ignores all of that. It was not awarded through an open process. It bypassed the SPA entirely. There was no public tender, no parliamentary and FGC review, no meaningful consultation with the states. The law was not just skirted, it was sidelined. And with it, the entire vision for how Somalia was supposed to govern its most valuable resource. The agreement signed with Türkiye, however, disregards several of the law’s key provisions not just in technical terms, but in its overall spirit. What was intended as a legal guardrail has been effectively sidestepped.  

Read more: Legal, Policy, and Constitutional Analysis of the Türkiye–Somalia Hydrocarbon Agreement  

Abdisaid M. Ali
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Abdisaid is the chairperson of Lomé Peace and Security Forum and Former Somalia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Somalia. X:@4rukun