Dr. Abdurahman Baadiyow

The question of whether clans are the victims of modern state, or whether clans themselves victimize that state, is analytically puzzling and contested. However, the dominant narrative is that clans victimize the state and are an incurable cancer in the process of state-building, and that it is one of the major reasons why the Somali state collapsed in 1991. However, this narrative requires further analysis: which institution in the Somali case is more indigenous to the Somali culture, the clan system or the modern state? Which of these two institutions has been initially marginalized, undermined, and stripped of its functions? Who initiated this process of victimization? Are clans victimizing the state, or is this the reaction to the intrusive nature of the clan system in the face of the externally imposed nature of the modern state which had pursued the eradication of clannism, even though clannism constituted the essential basis of clan identity, protection, and collective survival?

A second and equally important question relates to the relationship between political elites and their clans. The question of whether political elites genuinely prioritize the welfare of their clans may seem awkward or even counterintuitive, especially considering the widely acknowledged phenomenon of clan-based favoritism that is characteristic of Somali politics. Nevertheless, the awkwardness of this question serves to further emphasize the need to not only question the existence of clan loyalty but also to question the very basis upon which clan loyalty is enacted, justified, and perceived within the realm of Somali politics. An interrogation of the question reveals that the issue is far more complex than it may have initially appeared to be. By asking this question, we open a further space of inquiry into the nature of clan loyalty and the extent to which clan loyalty is operationalized, instrumentalized, or manipulated by political elites. It challenges us to ask whether Somali political elites genuinely serve the welfare of their clans or whether clan loyalty is simply a rhetorical device that may be invoked when politically expedient but never actually aligns with the interests of the clan that the political elite seeks to represent.

The idea of the victimization of Somali clans, therefore, comes naturally out of the very argument that has been presented throughout this analysis. As the evidence has shown, political elites do not act in the best interest of their clan constituencies, but instead use the identity of the clan to advance their own interests towards power, to favor a select group of loyal supporters, and to gain access to resources, whereas the clan as a whole suffers the consequences of life, destruction of property, underdevelopment, and political marginalization without receiving anything in return. This highly exclusive group, which forms a patronage network, enjoys the benefits of state resources, government appointments, business, or prestige, not because of their loyalty to the clan constituency, but because of their loyalty to the elites, which translates into the consolidation of their personal power. Therefore, the idea of the clans of Somalia as “victims” of the politics played by elites, as argued in the analysis, is a natural conclusion of the analysis itself, which encapsulates the harm, exploitation, and marginalization of clans whose identity has been used improperly but never served by the elites.

The core argument of this article challenges the widespread assumption that Somali political elites are motivated by a commitment to advancing the interest of their clans. Instead, available evidence indicates that these elites are primarily driven by their assumed self-interest, personal ambition, political survival, and the desire to capture and control state resources. Within this dynamic, clan identity functions less as a moral obligation and more as a strategically deployed tool of mobilization, invoked opportunistically to legitimize authority, generate loyalty, and deflect rival claims under the guise of “clan loyalty.” Yet the broader clan community, frequently referenced during political contests, gains little from the elite’s rise to power; it remains politically marginalized, economically neglected, and socially excluded despite celebratory rhetoric that the clan’s “son” has ascended to office. This asymmetrical relationship reveals that while elites benefit from the legitimacy and numerical strength of their clans themselves receive virtually nothing in return. What emerges is not communal advancement but a personalized system in which clan identity is instrumentalized to conceal the individualized pursuit of power and privilege.

In practical terms, the basic needs of all Somali clans, indeed of communities everywhere, are remarkably similar: access to clean water, functional schools, reliable healthcare, and pathways to sustainable economic development capable of generating employment. These shared material requirements hold far greater practical significance than the rhetorical distinctions emphasized by the political class. Yet despite the similarity of these needs, they rarely appear in the actual priorities of Somalia’s political elites. Instead of addressing water scarcity, improving education, upgrading healthcare systems, or planning long-term development, elites remain primarily focused on consolidating their own power, engaging in politics for its own sake, and extracting economic benefits. As a result, the common good of the nation, is routinely sacrificed for short-term publicity, transactional loyalty, and personal gain. In this sense, the collective needs of entire clan communities are subordinated to the private interests of political elites who consistently prioritize their own advancement over the welfare of the people they claim to represent.

One of the best examples of this phenomenon is Mohamed Siad Barre’s rule in Somalia. During his more than two-decade-long rule, he managed to recruit a substantial number of military personnel from his own clan to increase his own political strength and consolidate his regime’s grip on power. Some individuals from his own clan were given privileged positions in the government, the military, and other crucial institutions of the state. These individuals formed a kind of inner circle for the president, who enjoyed the benefits of their proximity to the highest office in the land. Nevertheless, this distribution of power did not translate into the overall development of his own clan constituency. In fact, the regions inhabited by his own clan were among the least developed and marginalized in the country. These regions lack infrastructure, clean water supplies, educational institutions, and economic opportunities. This is a clear example of the difference between the strategies of survival for the elite and their own clans.

Similarly, an analysis of the various presidents, prime ministers, and ministers in the various political periods in Somalia shows the same phenomenon: the leaders always publicly present themselves as champions of the welfare of the Somali people and, by extension, their own clan, but in reality, their actions are guided by their own narrow self-interest, apart from a few exceptions. While these leaders often appeal to the clan issue as a source of legitimacy and mobilization, the appeal to the clan does not translate into actions and policies and development initiatives that benefit their clans in general. Rather, the appeal to the clan hides the reality of the highly personalized nature of the leadership in Somalia, whereby the office is used to consolidate their own power and to reward their own inner circle and to maintain their own access to power and resources. This phenomenon further buttresses the thesis that the Somali political class does not use the clan issue to advance the welfare of the people, but rather to advance their own political ambitions.

Another evidence of this process can also be seen in the experiences of clans whose members have provided the country with presidents, prime ministers, warlords, and commanders of the armed groups. These clans have suffered huge losses in terms of lives and property in the name of protecting their leaders who, despite claiming the clan to be their political umbrella, showed little concern for the well-being of the members of the clan. Instead, they used the name of the clan to fulfill their own political agenda. For example, besides the clan of former president Mohamed Siad Barre, similar suffering of the clans can also be seen in the clans of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Mohamed Farah Aidid, and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. These leaders also showed little concern for the well-being of the members and instead used the name of the clan to fulfill their own agenda. The same applies to the cases of Mohamed Qanyare, Mohamed Dheere, Muse Sudi Yalahow, Hussein Atto, Abdi Qeybdiid, Mohamed Nur Shatigudud, General Adan Gabyow, among many others, whose political or military activities have greatly utilized the clans as a source of manpower and legitimacy, yet have little to offer in return. These examples, therefore, validate the argument that the clan communities have, on many occasions, suffered the worst of the consequences, yet the leaders of the clans have highly personal agendas to pursue.

Many political elites in Somalia have not even bothered to visit the territories or constituencies that they, themselves, claim allegiance to, based on their clan identity, indicating that they have no interest whatsoever in working with the people, mobilizing them, or taking the first step towards working with them for the purposes of self-help or community development, etc. The fact that they claim political representation for the people of their clans does not, therefore, imply that they are working for the people, as they seem not to be aware of the realities of the people whose name they claim for political legitimacy, etc. The question, therefore, is why the political elite seem to be enjoying some form of support from their clans, even though they seem not to be doing anything for them. This is not because they have done anything for the people, but because of the power of clan pride that makes people feel a sense of belonging, which is easily manipulated by political elites for the purposes of climbing to political heights, regardless of the fact that they may be working against the community or the country as a whole.

For those who choose to support predatory politicians, it is essential to remember the Qur’anic warning: “And do not incline toward those who do wrong, lest the Fire touch you; and you will have no protectors other than Allah, nor will you be helped” (11:113). This verse conveys a clear and uncompromising message: one must not support, lean toward, or align with oppressors, even in the slightest way, for doing so makes one complicit in their wrongdoing and exposes one to the same moral and spiritual consequences. Against this backdrop, a critical question arises for all members of any clan: What do we truly gain by supporting a clansman who is corrupt, parasitic, and destructive to the national wealth and collective future of all Somalis? If such an individual contributes to the erosion of state institutions and the plundering of national resources, then the clan must recognize that supporting him ultimately undermines not only the country but their own wellbeing, their children’s future, and the destiny of the entire nation. This moment requires a profound shift from emotional, identity-driven loyalty to leaders toward a principled commitment to national integrity, justice, and the common good.

Having demonstrated how clans have been victimized by their own political elites, it is now crucial that the new generation of Somalis, those who genuinely desire to create a better and more dignified future, begin to critically evaluate their political affiliations to clan leaders rather than providing blind loyalty based on clan membership. Rather, they need to pose the basic question: What has this political leader done for the country? What is this political leader capable of doing? Is this political leader committed to serving the interests of the country and his/her clan constituency, and not merely the narrow parasitic circle of friends and associates who benefit from his/her power? It is only through such a change in political consciousness that the Somali people can begin to move towards a more just and future-oriented political culture.

In conclusion, it can therefore be said that Somali clans have gradually and consistently been made victims of their own political leaders and clan elders who have chosen to identify with their leaders. Over time, a symbiotic relationship between political leaders and clan elders of influence has emerged, one that is not based on their communities’ well-being but on their own self-interest and gain, privilege, and power attainment. In essence, it is through such a relationship that the clan itself has been manipulated and weaponized into a net that catches and ensnares ordinary people within systems of exploitation and political manipulation and manipulation itself. Rather than being a source of unity and protection from marginalization, it is through such a framework that the clan itself has come to catch and ensnare its own constituency within a web of elitism and political manipulation and domination by its leaders.

Dr. Abdurahman Baadiyow
Email: abdurahmanba@yahoo.com
———-
Dr. Abdurahman Baadiyow is an author and Professor of Modern Islamic History  at Mogadishu University.