By Ahmed A. Yusuf
Somalia’s political crisis has entered a far more dangerous phase. What began as a dispute over elections, constitutional amendments and presidential mandates is now raising the possibility of deeper state fragmentation — including the potential separation of Puntland from Somalia’s federal system. At the same time, some of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s former political allies have broken ranks with him, with one of the most senior figures in his own ruling party accusing him of concentrating decision-making in his own hands and refusing to listen to those around him.
The striking feature of these departures is the explanation offered by former allies: that they no longer felt able to influence decisions and did not want to become mere supporters of decisions already made. In March, Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein Odowaa, then secretary-general of Hassan Sheikh’s Justice and Solidarity Party and a former interior minister, resigned from both positions. He accused the president of making decision-making in the country and the party something that “begins and ends with him alone,” and said the president had rejected dissenting views and refused to consult his political team.
That rupture is politically significant because Odowaa was not a traditional opposition figure. He was part of Hassan Sheikh’s own political structure. It adds another dimension to a crisis that is already dividing the federal government from major federal member states. At the centre of the confrontation is Hassan Sheikh, who is pushing ahead with a new constitutional and electoral order while maintaining that his mandate extends into May 2027. His opponents reject that interpretation and argue that his original four-year mandate expired in May 2026 under the previous constitutional framework.
The disagreement has already fractured relations between Mogadishu and several federal member states. Puntland has refused to recognize federal institutions since its 2024 dispute with Mogadishu over constitutional amendments. Jubaland has also been in prolonged confrontation with the federal government, while South West suspended cooperation with Mogadishu amid the escalating dispute over political control and the future of President Abdiaziz Laftagareen.
The result is an increasingly fragmented political landscape in which the question is no longer simply who will win the next election, but whether Somalia’s federal system can remain politically intact long enough to hold one.
Puntland’s Warning Changes the Stakes
For years, Puntland’s position has generally been that it wants a functioning federal Somalia with substantial powers for the member states. The latest warning from Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni goes further.
In a September 13 letter to the United Nations, Deni warned that Puntland could eventually consider permanently severing ties with Mogadishu if an inclusive political settlement cannot be reached. The letter also referred to pressure from citizens favouring full independence from the centre.
The letter does not declare independence, call for a referendum or establish a formal secession process. But the political significance is considerable: the possibility of permanent separation has now been formally placed before the United Nations.
That does not mean Puntland has decided to follow Somaliland’s path, nor does it establish that a majority of Puntland residents support independence. But it signals how far the political relationship between Puntland and Mogadishu has deteriorated.
Could Others Follow?
The prospect of Puntland separating raises a wider and more consequential question for Somalia’s future. If Mogadishu fails to reach political agreements with the federal member states, could Jubaland and South West eventually conclude that remaining within the federal arrangement no longer serves their political interests?
There is currently no evidence that either administration has formally announced a plan to secede from Somalia. But both have already experienced severe political and institutional confrontation with Mogadishu.
That creates a potentially dangerous sequence: political disagreement produces institutional separation; institutional separation produces competing security and administrative structures; and prolonged separation can eventually make political reunification increasingly difficult.
Puntland’s warning therefore matters not only because of what Puntland itself might eventually do, but because it introduces the possibility of a much wider fragmentation of Somalia’s federal system.
The erosion of Hassan Sheikh’s political coalition adds another layer to the crisis. The departure of Odowaa was particularly significant because he had occupied senior positions inside Hassan Sheikh’s political camp. His resignation suggested that disagreement was no longer confined to opposition leaders, Puntland, Jubaland or other external political actors.
It had reached the president’s own inner political structure. Odowaa’s central complaint was consultation. He said the president was making decisions alone, rejecting alternative views and disregarding advice from his political team and state institutions. He also challenged the government’s constitutional and electoral strategy, arguing that major changes required broader political agreement.
The political message from such departures is therefore more consequential than the loss of individual personalities. When senior allies leave while saying they can no longer influence decisions, it raises a fundamental question about how much room remains inside the governing coalition for disagreement, consultation and compromise.
Hassan Sheikh himself has defended a different approach. In April, while responding to criticism from former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo,” he said he had deliberately moved away from the previous political model of consulting opponents and argued that Somalia needed to move forward rather than remain trapped in the old system.
The contrast is striking: the president presents his approach as decisive reform, while former allies describe the same style of leadership as excessive concentration of decision-making.
Hirshabelle Adds Another Fault Line
Hirshabelle demonstrates how quickly political disputes can acquire a security dimension.
Hawadle leaders have rejected the state’s electoral process without a prior political agreement over power-sharing. The dispute intensified after Hirshabelle Vice President Yusuf Hagar Dabageed accused Hassan Sheikh of reversing an earlier understanding that the presidency would go to a Hawadle candidate and instead supporting incumbent Ali Abdullahi Hussein Guudlaawe, who is from the Abgaal community.
The Justice and Solidarity Party associated with Hassan Sheikh subsequently won 78 of the 99 parliamentary seats, giving it a commanding position in the state assembly. Then came reports that segments of the Hawadle community, including former Macawisley fighters, reached an understanding with Al-Shabaab in Maxaas after years of conflict.
The reported agreement has not been independently verified in full and should not be interpreted as a decision by the entire Hawadle clan to support Al-Shabaab. But the sequence is significant.
A community that played a major role in fighting Al-Shabaab during the 2022 offensive is now experiencing a political dispute with the federal leadership while some of its members are reportedly seeking an accommodation with the insurgency.
The Disintegration Scenario
This is where Somalia’s current crisis becomes more serious than an ordinary electoral confrontation. A country can survive a disputed election. It becomes far more difficult to preserve national institutions when major political units no longer recognize the same constitutional framework, electoral timetable or central authority. The possibility of full political disintegration is therefore no longer merely an abstract scenario.
Puntland has placed permanent separation on the political agenda. Jubaland and South West have experienced severe institutional breakdowns with Mogadishu. Hirshabelle is facing internal political divisions with security implications. Somaliland has operated outside the federal system for decades and continues to seek international recognition as an independent state.
None of these developments, individually, establishes the breakup of Somalia. Together, however, they demonstrate how prolonged political disagreement can progressively weaken the institutions that hold a federal state together.
The 2027 Election Could Become a Test of the Union
The government maintains that constitutional reform and direct elections are necessary to build a more democratic political system. Its opponents argue that the rules must first be agreed upon by the country’s principal political stakeholders and federal member states.
That disagreement is now occurring against a much more consequential backdrop. If the federal government proceeds toward the 2027 election without restoring political relations with the major federal states, the central question may eventually become not who wins the election, but who accepts its authority.
An election held without broad political agreement could deepen rather than resolve the existing divisions. And if political institutions continue separating along regional lines, the country could move toward a situation in which Somalia remains one country legally while functioning increasingly as several competing political systems.
The political crisis is therefore no longer simply about Hassan Sheikh’s electoral strategy. It is about whether the president can rebuild enough political consensus to keep the federal system together.
Puntland has now raised the possibility of permanent separation. Jubaland and South West remain deeply estranged from Mogadishu. Political disputes are intensifying inside Hirshabelle. And senior figures who once stood beside Hassan Sheikh have publicly complained that their advice is no longer being heard.
The president and his supporters can present this as the difficult price of pursuing constitutional and electoral reform. His former allies and political opponents see something very different: a presidency increasingly operating without the consultation needed to carry the country through a contested transition. The immediate dispute may be about elections and constitutional authority. The larger question is whether Somalia can resolve those disputes before political fragmentation becomes permanent.
Because once federal states begin contemplating whether they are better off outside the political system, and senior political allies conclude that they can no longer influence decisions from within, the crisis is no longer merely about who governs Somalia. It becomes a question of whether there will still be one political Somalia to govern.
Ahmed A. Yusuf
Email: aayuusuf44@gmail.com
