From Ports to Proxy Armies: Tracing the UAE’s Regional Footprint in Sudan, Yemen, and the Horn

From Ports to Proxy Armies: Tracing the UAE’s Regional Footprint in Sudan, Yemen, and the Horn

By Abdikarim Haji Abdi Buh

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has in little more than a decade transformed itself from a commercial, trade-focused state into a power that mixes high finance with high-intensity geopolitical interventions. Its activities span commercial port investments and private security, expatriate mercenary networks and aerial logistics.

Nowhere are the consequences of this strategic mix clearer than in Sudan’s civil war, Yemen’s fragmentation, and the Horn of Africa’s contested port diplomacy. The pattern that emerges is not simply “military adventurism” but a distinctive model of power projection that combines commercial instruments with covert support to proxy actors often with deeply destabilizing effects.

The Sudan Case: Airlifts, Arms, and International Scrutiny

Sudan’s civil war, which erupted in April 2023 when the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) turned on one another, quickly became one of the world’s most acute humanitarian disasters. Analysts and UN investigators have documented not only atrocities on the ground but the external flows that have fed the conflict. Evidence compiled by journalists, non-governmental investigators, and UN expert panels points toward an aerial supply chain funneling materiel from the Gulf into eastern Chad and from there into RSF-controlled areas of Sudan. Much of this activity has been linked to aircraft and logistics routes tied to the UAE.1

The UN Panel of Experts reported irregular cargo flights to Amdjarass and other regional airstrips; investigative reporting later identified dozens of flights originating from UAE territory that landed in Chad, often operated by carriers previously implicated in arms trafficking.2 Satellite imagery, flight-tracking data, and on-the-ground seizures of ammunition with serial numbers linked to earlier UAE imports have sharpened suspicions that military-grade supplies including mortars, ammunition, and armored vehicles have reached RSF units used in Darfur and elsewhere.3 The UAE denies responsibility for illicit re-exports and insists its flights serve humanitarian purposes, but UN requests for cargo manifests have yielded limited transparency.4

Beyond logistics, scholars situate UAE actions within a strategic calculus: cultivating political leverage over Sudan’s future through patronage of non-state military actors who can hold territory and influence resource flows (notably gold and strategic borders).5 The international legal consequences are already playing out: Sudan filed a case against the UAE at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing it of complicity in genocide for allegedly enabling RSF atrocities in Darfur, while UN experts continue to investigate re-export chains and possible violations of arms-control regimes.6

Yemen: Proxy Patron and the Shadow of Covert Operations

The UAE’s role in Yemen is better documented and has been subject to sustained human-rights scrutiny. Initially a member of the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis, Abu Dhabi shifted strategies: it funded, trained, and equipped local militias—particularly in southern Yemen—while gradually withdrawing most conventional forces.7 Human rights organizations have documented disappearances, secret detention facilities, and credible allegations of torture and targeted killings connected to Emirati-backed forces and detention networks in southern Yemen.8

The UAE’s patronage of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other local militias effectively restructured the conflict into competing sub-conflicts, undermining prospects for a unified counter-insurgency and enabling de-facto Emirati control of strategic ports and islands such as Socotra and parts of the southern littoral.9 Investigations by journalists and human-rights groups also linked Emirati use of mercenary contractors to targeted operations and assassinations of Islamist leaders and perceived opponents—operations executed in a climate where transparency and due process were absent.10 These practices, analysts argue, transformed the UAE from an external coalition partner into an autonomous proxy patron whose tactical gains deepened Yemen’s fragmentation and humanitarian calamity.

Port Politics: DP World, Djibouti, and the Limits of “Commercial” Power

The UAE’s most visible instruments of influence have often been economic. DP World, the Dubai-based port operator, pursued major concessions across the Red Sea and the Horn. Its dispute with Djibouti over the Doraleh Container Terminal illustrated the limits of commercial power when it is perceived as politics in disguise. Djibouti’s challenge arguing that DP World’s contract threatened sovereignty culminated in international arbitration and diplomatic confrontations, and subsequent rulings favored Djibouti, underscoring that host states can and will push back against foreign port control perceived as strategic rather than purely commercial.11

The Doraleh episode is indicative of a broader lesson: port concessions can be instruments of geopolitical leverage when combined with security ties, and host governments are increasingly sensitive to the national-security implications of ceding control over strategic maritime gateways.

Assab and the Eritrea Interlude: A Military Footprint Retreats

The UAE’s military deployment in Eritrea—centered on a deep-water base and facilities at Assab—epitomized the attempt to fuse commercial access with expeditionary mobility. During the Yemen intervention, Assab served as a logistical node for operations across the southern Red Sea; satellite imagery and reporting confirmed Emirati build-outs that converted desert facilities into usable naval and air platforms.12 Yet the arrangement proved ephemeral. Political frictions, strategic overstretch, and changing cost–benefit calculations led Abu Dhabi to dismantle parts of the facility and withdraw forces by early 2021.13 The Assab interlude underscores both the tactical utility and the political vulnerability of overseas basing arrangements that lack deep multilateral support or host-nation integration.

UAE–Israel Security Ties: From Normalization to Defense Cooperation

Normalization between the UAE and Israel following the Abraham Accords (2020) introduced a new security dimension. Public and academic analyses detail growing intelligence-sharing, joint training, and defense cooperation, which have given Abu Dhabi access to advanced surveillance and strike-capable technologies and bolstered deterrence posture in the Gulf.14 These ties also complicate the strategic map: actors who once viewed the UAE as a regional broker are now seeing it as an actor integrated into a broader, U.S.-aligned security architecture that includes Israeli capabilities—an alignment that critics argue lowers the threshold for external military interventions and reroutes accountability through opaque intelligence partnerships.15

A Pattern or an Ad Hoc Doctrine?

Taken together, Sudan, Yemen, Djibouti, Assab, and the UAE–Israel relationship suggests a coherent, if contentious, model. Abu Dhabi increasingly blends commercial investments, private security, and state-backed support to proxies to secure strategic footholds. This model aims at fast, reversible influence—ports today, militia patrons tomorrow without full-scale, high-casualty conventional deployments. Yet this very flexibility can be a liability: it externalizes the costs of instability onto host societies while leaving reputational and legal risks for the UAE.

Critics contend that such a strategy is destabilizing because it weaponizes ostensibly economic instruments and leverages plausible deniability to obscure accountability, thereby undercutting norms against state-sponsored proxy warfare. Supporters counter that the UAE is pursuing a realpolitik strategy to protect maritime trade routes and national interests in a fractious neighborhood. The truth lies in the intersection: commercial and strategic motives are not mutually exclusive, and the human toll of these policies—whether in Darfur, Aden, or displaced Djiboutian workers—cannot be detached from boardroom decisions in Gulf capitals.

Policy Implications and the Road Ahead

For policymakers, the UAE’s model raises urgent questions: how should the international community respond to external actors that use commercial platforms to project force? What measures export controls, port-investment review frameworks, or more rigorous licensing of private military companies can be deployed to reduce the risk that flows of goods and services will facilitate armed conflict? How can humanitarian access be preserved in wars where external patrons manipulate supply chains and logistics?

International institutions, from the UN to regional bodies, must also sharpen investigative and enforcement mechanisms. The UN expert panels and ICJ proceedings linked to Sudan represent necessary, albeit imperfect, tools for accountability. If the global norm against proxy wars is to be enforced, it will require coordinated multilateral action that combines legal recourse and targeted sanctions with diplomatic engagement that offers host countries alternatives to predatory investments.

Finally, a longer view is required: the UAE’s geopolitical posture reflects deeper shifts in the regional order, rising middle powers willing to leverage economic clout for geopolitical influence, the privatization of force, and the erosion of post-World War II constraints on indirect warfare. Unless checked by norms, law, and collective diplomacy, such practices risk perpetuating cycles of violence and conflict across fragile states.

Abdikarim H Abdi Buh
Email: abdikarimbuh@yahoo.com

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References:

  1. Reuters, “UAE flights flood airstrip, UN says supplies weapons to Sudan rebels,” Dec. 12, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/uae-flights-flood-airstrip-un-says-supplies-weapons-sudan-rebels-2024-12-12/.
  2. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan (S/2024/65), Jan. 15, 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4039195/files/S_2024_65-EN.pdf.
  3. Reuters, “UN panel investigates Emirati links to seized weapons in Darfur,” Apr. 29, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/un-panel-investigates-emirati-links-seized-weapons-darfur-2025-04-29/.
  4. The Guardian, Leaked UN experts report raises fresh concerns over UAE’s role in Sudan war, Apr. 14, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/apr/14/leaked-un-experts-report-raises-fresh-concerns-over-uaes-role-in-sudan-war.
  5. Atlantic Council, A. author, “Sudan is caught in a web of external interference,” Dec. 17, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/sudan-rsf-saf-uae-intervention/.
  6. The Guardian, “ICJ hears Sudan case accusing UAE of ‘complicity in genocide’,” Apr. 17, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/17/icj-hears-sudan-case-accusing-uae-complicity-genocide.
  7. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020: Yemen, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/yemen.
  8. Amnesty International, “Disappearances and torture in southern Yemen detention facilities must be investigated as war crimes,” July 12, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/07/disappearances-and-torture-in-southern-yemen-detention-facilities-must-be-investigated-as-war-crimes/.
  9. The Guardian and Associated Press reporting on UAE role in southern Yemen and STC empowerment, e.g., “Crisis in Yemen as Aden separatists declare self-rule,” Apr. 26, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/26/crisis-in-yemen-as-aden-separatists-declare-self-government.
  10. ACLED and investigative reporting on targeted assassinations and mercenaries in southern Yemen (see ACLED background and BuzzFeed reporting cited in ACLED), https://acleddata.com/archived/targeting-islamists-assassinations-south-yemen.
  11. Jus Mundi; Reuters and Arbitration Monitor reporting on Djibouti v. DP World disputes; see Arbitration Monitor, “DP World’s $1 Billion Battle in Djibouti,” Oct. 16, 2025, https://arbitrationmonitor.com/dp-worlds-1-billion-battle-in-djibouti-deepens-after-arbitration-setback/ and JusMundi, “Djibouti v. DCT and DP World,” https://jusmundi.com/fr/document/decision/… (accessed 2025).
  12. VOA, “UAE Dismantles Eritrea Base as it Pulls Back After Yemen War,” Feb. 18, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_uae-dismantles-eritrea-base-it-pulls-back-after-yemen-war/6202212.html.
  13. Africa Intelligence, “Emirates quits its Assab military base,” Feb. 11, 2021 (subscription), https://www.africaintelligence.com/.