By Isha Qarsoon

The electoral framework is fundamental to balancing central authority and regional autonomy in any federal system. In Somalia—where federalism is both a constitutional mandate and a fragile compromise—the control of elections marks the line between central domination and state autonomy. The management of elections is not merely a procedural task; it is the gateway through which power is distributed, and authority is legitimized. Elections are how federalism breathes. Whoever controls the electoral machinery, controls the very mechanisms of governance.

Until recently, Somalia lacked a unified national framework for managing elections. In its absence, some Federal Member States (FMSs) established their own electoral authorities and held regional, district, and local elections. Others aligned with the central government, using appointed leaders or indirect voting methods. While these efforts were uneven, they reflected an early exercise of state-level autonomy within the federal system. Some states, constrained by political instability or limited capacity, lagged behind. Instead of supporting this organic, decentralized progress, the federal government opted to assert control, attempting to replace the gradual development of state electoral systems with a rigid, centralized model.

That moment came on November 23, 2024, when the federal government enacted a sweeping Election Law that did not reinforce Somalia’s federalism—it effectively transformed the system into a unitary government controlled from the capital. The law stripped FMSs of their constitutionally protected role in managing their own elections and transferred authority to a centralized commission. The law placed virtually all aspects of electoral administration—federal, regional, and local—under the control of a new national body: the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC). The implications of this move are profound. Electoral control is not simply an administrative function—it is inherently political. It defines which rules govern the process, which candidates may run, and ultimately, who gains power. When exercised appropriately, it is the means by which states form autonomous governments and assert themselves as co-sovereigns within a federal system.

Article 4 of the new law grants the NIEBC sweeping authority. It extends federal reach over voter and candidate registration, sets eligibility criteria, defines winner-determination methods, and oversees elections not only for the President and Federal Parliament but also for FMS leaders, deputy leaders, FMS parliaments, mayors, local councils, and their deputies. The law imposes a standardized electoral model on every tier of government. Articles 5 through 7 cement this authority by giving the NIEBC exclusive control over all election offices nationwide. The result is a unified, centrally controlled electoral process that relegates states to the role of logistical facilitators—tasked with carrying out decisions they did not make. There is no genuine decentralization, only delegated implementation.

But what makes this framework particularly alarming is that it is not only politically disruptive—it is also unconstitutional. Somalia’s Provisional Constitution lays down a clear, structured understanding of federalism and the division of powers. It does not grant the federal government authority to control how states conduct their elections. Article 3 of the constitution affirms federalism as the foundation of Somalia’s system of government. Article 50 reinforces this by stating that power (such as conducting elections) should be exercised at the level where it is most effective. Article 51 underscores the importance of mutual respect between levels of government, warning each to remain within the limits of its powers and to protect the powers of others. Article 120 affirms the right of Federal Member States to form their own governments—a right that has little meaning without electoral control. After all, forming a government requires the ability to hold the elections that create it.

Perhaps most critically, Article 54 spells out the exclusive powers of the federal government—foreign affairs, national defense, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy. Notably, elections are not on that list. This omission is not a drafting error or oversight; it is a deliberate exclusion consistent with federalism framework. Indeed, in any true federal system, the default rule is that subnational entities manage their own elections. The Constitution’s silence on giving the federal government electoral control is in fact confirmation that no such power exists. Furthermore, Article 111G defines the role of the federal electoral commission. It states that the commission’s responsibilities include registering voters and political parties and managing elections for the President and Federal Parliament. Nowhere does it mention state or local elections. This omission, consistent with Article 54’s exclusion of elections from the list of federal powers, carries significant legal weight. It confirms that the NIEBC’s mandate does not extend beyond the federal level.

Yet, despite the constitutional clarity, the federal government pushed forward. It justified the NIEBC’s expansive role through, presumably, a reading of Article 111G that strained credibility—arguing that the Commission’s authority over “the electoral process” implied control over all elections nationwide. Any such interpretation ignores the specific language of the Constitution and violates the structure of federalism it enshrines. In truth, the federal government’s position relied not on legal clarity but on the expectation that constitutional amendments would soon legitimize this power grab. Specifically, the proposed amendments to Chapter 4 of the Constitution were designed to expand federal authority over elections nationwide. Although inconsistent with the fundamental principles of federalism and the constitutional provisions outlined above, the proposed amendments—if adopted—could have offered a plausible legal basis to override the current balance of power and legitimize the NIEBC’s sweeping mandate.

That pretense has now collapsed. In a significant political development, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has reportedly agreed to withdraw the proposed amendments to Chapter 4 of the Constitution. Central to those amendments was proposed Article 58, which would have served as the constitutional basis for the NIEBC’s sweeping mandate. It aimed to legitimize federal control over elections at all levels, including those of FMS leaders and parliaments. With the withdrawal of the proposed amendment to Chapter 4, the only plausible constitutional basis for the NIEBC’s expansive authority has also been disavowed. Even if the amendment had been adopted, the NIEBC’s mandate would still lack validity unless the constitutionally unamendable principles in Article 3 were also amended—an act that would upend federalism and unravel the foundational grand bargain of the Provisional Constitution. The President’s concession is therefore not a cosmetic adjustment but a structural retreat. It eliminates both the pretext and the potential for any constitutional justification of the NIEBC’s current overreach, helping to avert a constitutional crisis.

This moment demands a deeper reckoning. With any plausible legal basis for NIEBC’s role in non-federal elections gone, its continued operation in those domains becomes not just unconstitutional—it becomes an active violation of the rule of law. Accepting the withdrawal of the proposed amendment to Chapter 4 while allowing the NIEBC to maintain control over regional elections is a contradiction. It would preserve the centralized electoral architecture while removing its only plausible justification. It would be, in essence, to preserve the body of a centralized regime while declaring the death of its constitutional soul.

Somalia finds itself at a crossroads. The opportunity before the country is not just to walk back a proposed amendment. It is to correct a broader constitutional breach. If the President’s concession is to have meaning, it must be followed by action. That means suspending the NIEBC’s involvement in any non-federal elections. It means recognizing that its authority is lawfully confined to Presidential and Federal Parliamentary elections. It means recommitting to a vision of federalism in which FMSs manage their own democratic processes, in line with constitutional design.

To be clear, electoral reform is not a luxury Somalia can forgo. The country urgently needs credible, transparent, and standardized election processes. But such reforms must emerge through lawful means—through consensus, consultation, and constitutional alignment. Reform cannot come by decree. It must not be imposed through institutional overreach disguised as national coordination. The NIEBC, as it stands, is not a neutral administrative body. It is the institutional face of an attempted centralization of political power. If allowed to continue operating in its current form, it will reduce FMSs to mere administrative districts of a unitary state, robbing them of the autonomy they are entitled to under the Constitution.

The danger here is not abstract. The structure of the NIEBC and the federal government’s insistence on centralized control strike at the heart of Somalia’s fragile political settlement. The country’s federal model emerged from hard negotiations—a recognition that no single authority could govern the entire nation without devolving meaningful power. Federalism is not a gift from the center; it is a compromise born of necessity. When one side violates that compromise, the legitimacy of the entire system falters. The federal government cannot be both party to a federal agreement and arbiter of its own authority.

Across the world’s established federations, electoral control is devolved. In Germany, each Land manages its own state elections independently. In Canada, the provinces maintain distinct electoral systems. In Australia, states and territories oversee their own elections through local commissions. In the United States, the Constitution delegates authority over federal elections to the states, allowing them to administer all aspects of the process—including registration, voting procedures, and counting—subject to limited federal oversight. The federal government’s role is primarily to ensure that states do not violate individual voting rights, rather than to direct or manage the electoral process itself. These examples are not coincidental—they reflect the foundational principle that federalism cannot survive unless power is divided and sovereignty respected at all levels. Somalia’s Constitution was drafted in this tradition. Articles 3, 50, 51, 54, 111G, and 120 all reflect the clear architecture of shared rule that must be respected.

Somalia’s current trajectory undermines the core logic of federalism. If the NIEBC continues to exceed its mandate, the federal government risks cementing an unconstitutional and centralized system. Electoral control is not just procedural—it is the foundation of political autonomy. Without it, states cannot choose their leaders, exercise self-governance, or function as co-sovereigns. Federalism then becomes a label, not a reality.

To restore balance, the federal government must immediately halt NIEBC involvement in any election not expressly covered by Article 111G, launch a constitutional dialogue with FMSs on electoral reforms, and work with Parliament to finalize the Constitution with clear, enforceable rules on electoral authority. FMSs, in turn, must reclaim their role by building transparent, inclusive, and lawful electoral institutions. Donors should recognize that support for centralized control undermines the federal order they claim to back.

The President’s withdrawal of the Chapter 4 amendment offers a chance to reset. It must not be a symbolic gesture. Somalia cannot afford to embed past failures—manipulation, overreach, and instability—into permanent institutions. The Constitution remains the clearest path to a shared future. But it must be upheld in action. That means curbing NIEBC overreach, restoring state electoral authority, and grounding reform in law, not convenience. Anything less is not reform—it is abandonment.

Isha Qarsoon
Email:  Ishaqarsoon1@gmail.com
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