By Isha Qarsoon [1]

The electoral framework is fundamental to balancing central authority and regional autonomy in a federal system. It establishes the power structures necessary to sustain this balance, ensuring that governance is distributed between the central government and the Member States. Since adopting federalism, Somalia have not had a national electoral system to regulate elections at the federal level. At the state level, some Federal Member States (FMSs) exercised their autonomy by establishing electoral authorities and holding regional and local elections, while others have yet to develop electoral frameworks.

When the federal government finally established an electoral framework, it did not strengthen state autonomy—it seized control. The new federal Election Law,[2] enacted on November 23, 2024, strips FMSs of electoral authority, granting sweeping power to a national commission and reducing states to mere logistical facilitators. Far from creating a balanced system, it undermines federalism, dictating how state and local leaders are elected and who ultimately governs.

Under Article 4, the Electoral Law grants federal authority over all electoral management activities at the federal, state, and local levels across Somalia. It defines winner determination methods, regulates voter and candidate registration, and governs elections for the President, FMS Leaders, Deputy Leaders, and local officials. Additionally, it oversees elections for representatives in Federal and FMS parliaments, administers local council, mayoral, and deputy mayoral elections, and regulates all electoral procedures and operations.

Articles 5–7 establish the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC) and grant it exclusive control over election offices at all levels. The NIEBC sets election timelines, manages polling stations, and oversees state and local elections, sidelining FMSs in their own electoral processes. Article 11 mandates a majority vote system for electing the President, FMS Leaders, Deputy Leaders, mayors, and their deputies, while proportional representation systems apply to federal and regional parliaments and councils as well as local councils.

The law establishes candidate eligibility criteria at all levels, including the FMS candidates, imposing uniform requirements for age, residency, criminal history, fees, and qualifications (See Chapter 6). By enforcing federal selection standards, it prevents FMSs from setting their own eligibility rules, effectively stripping them of control over who can run for leadership positions at regional and local levels. In sum, the Electoral Law consolidates federal control over all aspects of elections, eroding FMS autonomy. It centralizes authority under the NIEBC, standardizes procedures, and imposes a rigid electoral framework that eliminates regional flexibility.

Elections are undeniably central to the autonomy and sovereignty of any government. By granting the NIEBC exclusive control over elections, the Election Law strips FMSs of the authority to design and implement their own electoral systems, set candidate and voter criteria, and oversee their electoral processes. Instead, their role is reduced to logistical support, such as facilitating voter registration and coordinating security. While the national government justifies its takeover of FMS elections as a measure to ensure uniformity, it instead undermines FMS autonomy by stripping them of direct control over their electoral processes. The centralization of election oversight undermines Somalia’s federal structure by eroding FMS autonomy and escalating tensions between their constitutional right to self-governance and the central government’s push for greater control. Indeed, the structure of the NIEBC and its enforcement of the Election Law pose a direct threat to Somalia’s federalism. It also exceeds the federal government’s mandate under the provisional constitution, which limits its oversight to federal elections. The NIEBC’s assertion of control over state, regional, and local elections is not a minor overreach—it is a deliberate power grab that not only undermines Somalia’s federalism but also risks dismantling it entirely.

The NIEBC’s overreach directly contradicts Somalia’s constitutional framework. The Constitution answers a fundamental question: Who controls elections in Somalia’s federal system? The answer is clear. Article 3 establishes federalism as the foundation of governance, built on power-sharing. Article 50 reinforces this by requiring all levels of government to uphold federalist principles, ensuring power remains where it is most effectively exercised. Article 51 explicitly warns against overreach, stating that each level of government must “respect and protect the limits of its powers and the powers of other governments.”

Article 120 further affirms this principle, granting FMSs the authority to form their own governments. Since elections are the primary mechanism for government formation, they must remain under state control—not federal oversight. Meanwhile, Article 111G establishes a federal electoral commission responsible for voter and candidate registration, election processes, and overseeing elections for the President and Federal Parliament. Notably, while Article 111G grants the NIEBC authority over federal elections, it makes no mention of state-level elections. The absence of FMSs or their equivalents in Article 111G is clear evidence that the NIEBC’s mandate is strictly confined to federal elections.

Furthermore, the Constitution explicitly limits federal power. Article 54 grants the federal government exclusive control over foreign affairs, defense, citizenship, immigration, and monetary policy—noticeably omitting elections. In a federal system, each sovereign governs its own electoral process—to each sovereign, its own—which explains why Article 54 is silent on election matters. This omission is deliberate and affirms that while the federal government controls federal elections, electoral processes at the state and local levels remain under FMS jurisdiction. Any attempt by the central government to control the FMS electoral process violates the Constitution and disrupts the balance of power.

The conclusion is unavoidable. Article 50(b), read alongside Articles 3, 51, 54, and 120, makes it clear: governance must happen at the level where it is most relevant. Few powers are more fundamental than the right to control elections. Without this right, federalism is hollow. The federal government’s attempt to take over state and local elections is not just unconstitutional—it is an attack on the core principles of Somalia’s federal system.

To be clear, in federal systems, regional autonomy over elections is the standard practice, not a deviation. Established federations divide electoral responsibilities between national and subnational governments, ensuring each level controls its own democratic processes. For example, Germany’s Länder (federal states) manage their own state elections separately from national elections. In Canada, the United States, and Australia, subnational governments (provinces, states, and territories) oversee their own electoral systems, often through independent local electoral commissions. This division of electoral authority is fundamental to federalism, preserves shared power, and protects local governance.

Somalia’s Constitution is built on a federal model. To reiterate this key principle, Article 3 of the Provisional Constitution establishes federalism as the foundation of governance. Article 50 upholds federalism by ensuring power is exercised at the most effective level, while Article 51 mandates that all levels of government respect their limits. Article 120 affirms FMSs’ right to determine their own governmental structures, a power that inherently includes conducting their own elections. Article 54 does not list election management as one of the powers exclusively reserved for the federal government, while Article 111G confines the federal government’s electoral role to federal elections.

Yet, the federal government insists that a vague reference to “elections” in Article 111G of the constitution grants the NIEBC authority over all electoral processes—a claim that crumbles under even minimal scrutiny. Article 111G explicitly defines the NIEBC’s responsibilities, including managing the electoral process—such as registering voters, political parties, and overseeing other electoral activities—and overseeing elections for the President and Members of the Federal Parliament. Article 111G makes no mention of elections at the FMS level or equivalent sub-entities, leaving no doubt that the NIEBC’s mandate is strictly limited to federal elections.

If the power to control and manage elections at the FMS level were meant to be centralized, it would be explicitly included under the federal government’s exclusive powers in Article 54 or assigned to the NIEBC in Article 111G—but it is not. The exclusion of elections from federal powers under Article 54 is intentional, not an oversight. It is a deliberate affirmation that authority over elections is not assigned exclusively to either sovereign and that each sovereign entity manages its own elections, as federalism requires. Consistent with Article 54, the Constitution’s silence on state elections in Article 111G is not an oversight but a clear recognition of FMSs’ sovereignty over their own electoral affairs and a confirmation that the NIEBC has no authority over state and local elections. Had the Federal Constitution intended to assign authority over regional and local elections beyond its acknowledgment that FMSs have the power to form their own governments under Article 120—which indirectly affirms their authority over state and local elections—it would have explicitly stated so, just as it authorizes the NIEBC to manage federal elections. It did not, because regulating state and local elections falls outside the scope of the Federal Constitution.

So, who manages regional and local elections? A combined reading of Articles 3, 50, 51, 54, and 120 provides an unmistakable answer: FMSs control their own elections. The Constitution’s exclusion of state elections from federal authority, its recognition of FMSs’ right to form their own governments, and the essential role of elections in government formation reaffirm that electoral control belongs to FMSs as sovereign entities.

NIEBC’s encroachment into FMS autonomy is not just a legal violation—it is a political power grab. The NIEBC’s creeping centralization is about control, not governance. If states lose control over their elections, what remains of their self-governance? If the federal government monopolizes state elections, it gains absolute leverage over regional power structures, stripping FMSs of their autonomy. Federalism cannot survive if one sovereign entity controls the election of the other sovereign entity. Centralized electoral control is not just unconstitutional—it is a direct path to central rule.

The dangers of federal control over state elections are not theoretical—they are real and immediate. First, it creates the perfect conditions for election manipulation, allowing the central government to engineer outcomes in its favor. Second, it strips FMSs of their rightful autonomy, weakening local institutions and governance. Third, it fuels political instability, as disenfranchised states inevitably resist central domination. These risks are not distant threats—they are unfolding before our eyes.

History has already issued its warning. Puntland and Jubaland have actively resisted federal interference in their elections. If this pattern continues, other states will follow, and Somalia may already be on the brink of political crisis. Federalism is not optional—it is the foundation of Somalia’s constitutional order. Undermining it is an open invitation to turmoil and conflict.

Somalia stands at a critical crossroads. To uphold federalism, decisive action is required. The Provisional Constitution must be finalized with clear, binding provisions that guarantee state control over their own elections. The NIEBC’s mandate must be restricted to national elections, while FMSs must independently establish electoral commissions to oversee state and local elections—free from federal interference. Most importantly, the federal government must relinquish its overreach and adhere to the constitutional limits of its authority.

Federalism functions only when states retain control over their own affairs. A system that centralizes authority while masquerading as federalism is nothing more than a unitary regime in disguise. Somalia faces a critical choice—uphold the Constitution and preserve true federalism, or erode the very foundation that was designed to sustain national unity.

The path forward is clear: Honor the Constitution. Protect the rights of FMSs. Safeguard the people’s ability to govern themselves. Anything less is a betrayal of federalism.

Isha Qarshoon

Email: ishaqarsoon1@gmail.com

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Notes and References

[1]Isha Qarsoon- is a platform dedicated to addressing critical issues pertaining to good governance, corruption, and social challenges. It emphasizes investigative journalism as a means to uncover and disseminate information, enabling the public to engage with and understand the realities of the country. Through its focus on transparency and accountability, the forum aims to foster informed public discourse and contribute to societal awareness and reform.

[2] The Election Law is entitled: Hindisaha Xeerka Doorashooyinka Qaranka ee Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya.

[3] References to Articles 50, 51, 54, 111G, and 120 in this essay follow their numbering in the Provisional Constitution before the National Consultative Council’s (NCC) attempted amendments. The NCC’s proposed constitutional changes, later ratified by Parliament, expanded former Articles 46 and 47 into Articles 48–61. However, since Articles 50, 51, 54, 111G, and 120 remained unchanged in numbering, this essay maintains their original references despite the broader restructuring.

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