By Dr. Farhia Abdi
Abstract
Federalism divides authority between a central government and constituent units, while decentralization is often seen as a pathway to democratization. Somalia’s experience, however, shows the limits of decentralization when authoritarian political culture persists. Although the terms differ; federalism is a constitutional division of power, whereas decentralization broadly refers to the distribution of authority—they are closely related, and using them together in discussions of governance or communication is justified. After the collapse of military rule in 1991, Somalia adopted federalism to disperse power and prevent renewed authoritarianism. Three decades later, governance remains dominated by elite networks, patronage, and coercion, with weak civic participation. This article argues that decentralization without addressing entrenched authoritarian norms risks fragmenting power without democratizing it. The article concludes that genuine democracy requires pairing decentralization with cultural transformation through Institutional-building, civic education, accountability, historical reckoning, and civil society empowerment.
Introduction
The contemporary global order appears increasingly chaotic, marked by the erosion and selective overstepping of agreed international norms. Major powers maneuver aggressively to expand influence with diminishing regard for multilateral constraints, while middle and lower-tier states struggle to sustain political legitimacy. This condition has become a point of reflection for both established democracies and non-democratic regimes alike (Ikenberry, 2018). For polities emerging from autocracy and pursuing decentralization, however, the trajectory is particularly fraught, revealing a tension between formal institutional reform and substantive democratic transformation.
In post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies, decentralization is frequently framed as a corrective to centralized repression and state failure. Somalia’s adoption of a federal system following the collapse of Siad Barre’s military regime in 1991 exemplifies this logic. Federalism was envisioned as a mechanism to dilute authoritarian power, accommodate clan-based diversity, and prevent the reemergence of dictatorship by dispersing political authority (Lewis, 2008; Menkhaus, 2014). More than three decades later, however, Somalia’s decentralized governance structure has not translated into democratic consolidation or meaningful cultural transformation. Rather than reconstituting political authority on democratic foundations, decentralization has fragmented power without fundamentally reimagining it. Federal system is being reduced to reproduce coercive and exclusionary governance practices reminiscent of the authoritarian past (Leonard & Samantar, 2011. The federal government continues to face persistent challenges from the public as it relates to trust, governance, national security, territorial control, etc.
This article contends that Somalia’s central challenge is not federalism and decentralization of authority per se, but federalism and decentralization without detachment—that is, a failure to dismantle authoritarian cultural norms surrounding authority, obedience, and political control (Hadiz, 2010). These norms, embedded during decades of military rule and reinforced through prolonged conflict, continue to shape governance practices across multiple levels of the state. Absent a deliberate rupture from these inherited political cultures, decentralization risks remaining symbolic rather than transformative.
Somalia’s authoritarian legacy as cultural memory
From 1969 to 1991, Somalia was governed under Siad Barre’s military dictatorship, characterized by extreme centralization, repression, and pervasive security surveillance (Laitin 1976; Compagnon 1998; Human Rights Watch 1990). While the regime collapsed in 1991, its political and cultural imprint endured. Authority during the Barre era became associated with coercion, personalization of power, and zero-sum control rather than institutional legitimacy, as state institutions were subordinated to the ruler and his security apparatus (Compagnon 1998; Menkhaus 2003).
Authoritarianism in Somalia thus functioned not only as a political system but as a form of cultural conditioning. As Hannah Arendt (1951) argues, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes leave behind cultural residues that persist long after their formal demise. Following state collapse, these authoritarian habits did not disappear; instead, they migrated into warlordism and militia governance in the 1990s, and later into federal and regional administrations, where political authority often remained personalized and coercive despite new institutional forms (Menkhaus 2006; Lewis 2008). Decentralization occurred in form, but not in political culture, as elite political behavior continued to prioritize control, loyalty, and exclusion over rule-bound institutional legitimacy (Abdullahi 2021).
Federalism without democratic culture
Culturally, citizens conditioned by decades of authoritarianism and protracted conflict often perceive politics as elite competition rather than participatory governance (Menkhaus, 2006; Abdullahi, 2021). This perception undermines civic participation and reinforces tolerance of authoritarian rule when its benefits are selectively distributed to powerful elites or their beneficiaries. Somalia’s federal system emerged from the belief that dispersing political authority would reduce the risk of renewed centralized authoritarian rule and mitigate zero-sum struggles over control of the state (Menkhaus, 2012; Hoehne, 2016). Rather than transforming how power is exercised, however, decentralization has frequently shifted authoritarian practices to the regional arena, reproducing patterns of personalized and coercive rule at the sub-national level (Menkhaus, 2014). Within federal member states, governance is often concentrated in the hands of dominant individual leaders who rely on clan loyalty, patronage networks, and coercive security forces to maintain control, while formal accountability mechanisms remain weak and political competition constrained (Lewis, 2008; Abdullahi, 2021). As a result, political practices at the federal and regional levels often replicate the very modes of authority that federalism was intended to dismantle (Menkhaus, 2014).
This mode of governance resonates with Guillermo O’Donnell’s concept of delegative democracy, in which leaders exercise broad discretionary authority while invoking popular or clan-based mandates as substitutes for institutional oversight (O’Donnell, 1994).
At the societal level, prolonged exposure to authoritarian governance and chronic insecurity has shaped public expectations of politics. Most Somali citizens perceive political life not as a sphere of collective participation but as competition among elites for access to resources and protection. At the same time, Somalia’s predominantly youthful population has limited exposure to formal governance, and those with political experience largely originate from the authoritarian system they purport to dismantle. Under these conditions, authoritarian behavior is often tolerated or even accepted, so long as it delivers immediate stability or advances perceived communal interests.
Trauma, memory, and authoritarian nostalgia
Somalia’s prolonged exposure to dictatorship, civil war, and state collapse has produced collective trauma that continues to shape political expectations. Although most Somalis oppose a return to authoritarian rule, the post-authoritarian alternatives have neither delivered effective governance nor provided reliable security. For many citizens, centralized authority—despite its abuses—is often remembered as a period of order and predictability compared to the instability and fragmentation that followed (Menkhaus, 2014; Leonard & Samantar, 2011). Jan-Werner Müller’s work on memory politics highlights the consequences of unexamined authoritarian legacies: when societies fail to confront past repression critically, nostalgia can fill the void, shaping contemporary political attitudes and expectations (Müller, 2002). In Somalia, this nostalgia undermines trust in decentralized governance and reinforces the cultural acceptance of strongman rule at both federal and regional levels.
Political elites whose experience is rooted in strongman rule have continued to centralize power, undermining the country’ federally agreed framework of power sharing. Without formal mechanisms for historical reckoning, such as truth commissions, public dialogue, or archival accountability—authoritarian memory remains unchallenged and continues to exert a powerful influence over political culture (Lewis, 2008; Hoehne, 2016).
Cultural impact: fragmentation without empowerment
The cultural impact of Somalia’s decentralization has been deeply paradoxical. While political authority has been formally dispersed across federal and states, many ordinary citizens continue to experience governance as distant, coercive, or largely irrelevant to their daily lives (Leonard & Samantar, 2011; World Bank, 2020). Power has been localized, but not meaningfully democratized, resulting in a reconfiguration of authority without a corresponding transformation in political culture. Federalism is frequently perceived not as a mechanism for participation or accountability, but as a framework for elite competition, territorial control, and resource capture among political and clan-based power brokers (Hoehne, 2016). In this context, authorities often reproduce exclusionary and coercive governance practices inherited from Somalia’s authoritarian past, operating within weak institutional and accountability constraints (Leonard & Samantar, 2011).
Consequently, decentralization risks deepening political and social fragmentation while preserving the underlying authoritarian logic of governance. Without a corresponding transformation in political culture—particularly norms surrounding authority, citizenship, and public accountability—decentralization functions less as a vehicle for empowerment than as a mechanism for redistributing control among entrenched elites (Menkhaus, 2014; World Bank, 2020).
Recommendations for Somalia’s governance transformation
To ensure decentralization in Somalia fosters genuine democratic change rather than reproducing authoritarian practices, reform must address both institutional structures and the underlying political culture shaped by decades of dictatorship, civil war, and clan-based authority:
1) Prioritize strong institution-building
Strong institution provides the foundation for stable governance, sustainable development, and public trust. Well-functioning institutions clarify roles, standardize procedures, and enforce rules predictably. This limits arbitrariness and makes misuse of power easier to detect and address. Further, people or citizens are more likely to trust governance structures that function transparently, consistently, and accountable. Trust, in turn, strengthens cooperation between the state and society.
2) Cultivate civic awareness and participation
Introduce education and outreach initiatives that teach democratic principles, citizen rights, and civic responsibility. Encouraging participation beyond clan or elite loyalties can gradually shift public expectations and normalize accountability.
3) Address historical memory and authoritarian legacies
Implement structured mechanisms for public reflection on Somalia’s authoritarian past, such as national dialogues or community-led truth-telling processes. Confronting collective memory and trauma can reduce nostalgia for strongman rule and foster a culture of democratic norms.
4) Empower civil society and alternative leadership
Support organizations, independent media, women’s groups, and youth networks that provide alternative sources of legitimacy and challenge entrenched elite dominance. Expanding leadership opportunities beyond traditional power brokers can strengthen pluralism and civic oversight.
5) Adopt adaptive and context-sensitive federalism
Treat decentralization as an ongoing, flexible process that responds to local political and cultural realities. Piloting innovative governance practices at the regional level and learning from their outcomes can help align structural reforms with societal norms and expectations.
6) Create safe channels for feedback and dissent
Establish protected avenues for citizens to voice grievances, monitor public spending, and challenge authority without fear of reprisal. Safe participation channels reinforce the legitimacy of decentralized institutions and encourage civic engagement.
Conclusion
Somalia’s experience illustrates that decentralization by itself cannot overcome the entrenched legacies of authoritarianism. When reforms fail to address the norms, historical memory, and governance practices shaped by decades of dictatorship and conflict, decentralized structures risk reproducing fragmented forms of control rather than fostering democracy. The central challenge is not merely the creation of federal institutions, but the transformation of the cultural understanding of authority and political legitimacy. Only by combining cultural reckoning, civic engagement, and strengthened accountability can decentralization evolve into a genuine pathway to democratic governance, rather than a reconfiguration of authoritarian power.
By Dr. Farhia Abdi
Email: guure@rogers.com
——————
References
Abdullahi, A. (2021). Somali elite political culture: Conceptions, structures, and historical evolution. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS).
https://ipsed.org/somali-elite-political-culture-conceptions-structures-and-historical- evolution/
Arendt, H. (1951). The origins of totalitarianism. Harcourt, Brace & Company.
Compagnon, D. (1998). Somali armed movements: The interplay of political entrepreneurship and clan-based factions. African Affairs, 97(389), 543–561. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a007993
Hadiz, V. R. (2010). Localising power in post-authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia perspective. Stanford University Press.
Hoehne, M. V. (2016). Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions in Northern Somalia. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 10(3), 459–478. https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2016.1254926
Human Rights Watch. (1990). Somalia: A government at war with its own people. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/somalia/
Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241 Laitin, D. D. (1976). The political economy of military rule in Somalia. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 14(3), 449–468. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00054286
Leonard, D. K., & Samantar, M. S. (2011). What does the Somali experience teach us about the social contract and the state? Development and Change, 42(2), 559–584.
Lewis, I. M. (2008). Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, history, society. Columbia University Press.
Menkhaus, K. (2007). Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping. International Security, 31(3), 74–106. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74
Menkhaus, K. (2014). State failure, state-building, and prospects for a “functional failed state” in Somalia. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 656(1), 154–172. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214547002
Menkhaus, K. (2003). State collapse in Somalia: Second thoughts. Review of African Political Economy, 30(97), 405–422. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240308497
Menkhaus, K. (2006). Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping. International Security, 31(3), 74–106. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74
Müller, J.-W. (2002). Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O’Donnell, G. (1994). “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy, 5(1), 55–69.
World Bank. (2020). Somalia economic update: From crisis to reform—Economic recovery and resilience in Somalia.
World Bank Group. https://doi.org/10.1596/34349