By Anwar Maxamed Diiriye

“When the Constitution is ignored, government is not empowered, it is unleashed.” —Judge Andrew P. Napolitano, Constitutional Chaos: What Happens When the Government Breaks Its Own Laws, p. ix. [1]

In a federal republic still grappling with the legacies of conflict, institutional weakness, and regional fragmentation, the Constitution must serve as the supreme arbiter of authority. The 2012 Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, although imperfect, offers a clear vision of power sharing, balance, and accountability. It lays out the structure of a parliamentary federal system in which the President serves as a symbol of unity, a guardian of constitutional order, and a moderator among the branches of government.

However, recent developments under the current administration have revealed a dangerous drift toward executive aggrandizement, raising alarms among federal member states, legal scholars, and civil society alike. The Constitution defines the role of the president with precision. Article 87(1) states that “The President of the Federal Republic of Somalia is the Head of State and represents the unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.” [2] He is entrusted with safeguarding constitutional order, not dominating it.

Article 90 enumerates limited presidential powers, including: appointing the Prime Minister in accordance with Article 100; appointing and dismissing federal ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister; signing draft laws passed by Parliament; appointing high-ranking officials, judges, and military officers on appropriate recommendations; and declaring a state of emergency or war per law. [3] These powers are designed to operate in a system of checks and balances, with oversight by Parliament, cooperation with the Council of Ministers, and consultation with federal member states.

Critically, while the President holds the authority to nominate the Prime Minister, this choice is subject to parliamentary approval. Article 90(c) authorizes the President to appoint the Prime Minister, while Article 100(2) stipulates that the Prime Minister, once appointed, must present a cabinet and obtain a vote of confidence from the House of the People before assuming full executive authority. [4] This shared arrangement ensures that the executive branch reflects both presidential prerogative and democratic legitimacy through legislative endorsement.

Yet in early 2024, current President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud presided over a set of controversial constitutional amendments that fundamentally altered the system. These changes stripped Parliament of its constitutional role in approving the President’s nominated Prime Minister and his cabinet, allowed for unilateral executive action, and proposed the introduction of a Vice President, effectively abolishing the Prime Minister’s authority. [5] These revisions proceeded without the inclusive consent of federal member states and in violation of multiple constitutional safeguards. Article 1(3) clearly defines Somalia as a “federal, sovereign, and democratic republic founded on inclusive representation of the people.” [6] Similarly, Article 50(2) guarantees the decentralization of power through federalism, and Article 54 stipulates that powers over foreign affairs, national defense, citizenship, and monetary policy are exclusively federal. [7] Everything else is to be negotiated and shared.

The President deliberately manipulated Parliament using promises and corrupt practices, including the offer of government positions and money to force through his unilateral and unconstitutional changes, in clear violation of Article 69(1), which assigns Parliament the role of representing the public and exercising legislative authority. [8] Reforming the structure of the executive without legislative debate and ratification is not reform, it is constitutional sabotage.

Reactions from federal member states have been swift and severe. Puntland, Jubaland, and others have publicly denounced the changes and suspended cooperation with the federal government. [9] Article 50(4) requires the federal government and member states to promote “mutual respect and dialogue,” while Article 50(8) insists that power be exercised cooperatively. [10] By ignoring these norms, the presidency has pushed Somalia closer to fragmentation and weakened the already fragile national compact.

Supporters of the presidential shift argue that centralized authority will produce faster governance and more efficient decision-making. But speed without legitimacy is tyranny. The Somali Constitution was designed for consultation, power-sharing, and restraint values that emerged from decades of authoritarianism and collapse. Concentrating power in one office will not stabilize Somalia; it will deepen mistrust and inflame regional resistance.

This raises a critical question that one must ask: Why do Somali presidents continue to repeat this pattern of behavior, time and again?

In my meager understanding, one of the main reasons is a fundamental misunderstanding of the symbolic and spatial power of Villa Somalia. Once presidents, both current and previous post-civil war leaders, feel securely ensconced within its walls, under the protection of foreign troops and international allies, they begin to believe, mistakenly, that the rest of the country is equally within their grasp. This illusion is further reinforced when their electoral base or clan constituency is rooted in Mogadishu, allowing them to wield disproportionate influence in the capital while marginalizing voices from the federal member states. They often exploit this proximity to the seat of power to blur the line between state authority and personal or factional rule. Additionally, the absence of robust institutional checks, the legacy of militarized politics, and a culture of impunity have made the presidency a tempting platform for unilateralism rather than a role of national stewardship.

At the top of it all, they wield the de jure pen of governance; signing decrees, making appointments, and approving budgets that shape the nation’s course, often funded by begged resources from international allies, without respecting the Constitution or the limits of their power.

If Somalia is to endure as a federal constitutional democracy, the presidency must retreat to its lawful boundaries. The 2024 amendments must be reversed. Parliament’s constitutional role in confirming the Prime Minister and shaping the executive must be restored. Federal member states must be re-engaged as equal stakeholders, not sidelined as dissenters. And above all, the President must remember that his authority is derived from the Constitution, not above it.

The ceremonial dignity of Somalia’s presidency lies not in command but in constitutional restraint. When that restraint is abandoned, and when the Head of State crosses the legal boundaries that protect democracy, the result is not unity, but unmaking.

Anwar Maxamed Diiriye 
Email: anwar@usfamily.net 
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Anwar Maxamedis is a lecturer in Comparative Cultural Studies and the author of The Literature of Somali Onomastics (2006) and the English-Somali and Somali-English Medical Dictionary (2010). He also served as editor-in-chief of the Gobaad Multidisciplinary Journal from 2000 to 2012.