Former Enemies Unite as Tigray Fighting Shatters the Post-Pretoria Order and Opens a New Front Across Ethiopia

ADDIS ABABA (WDN) — Eight years after Abiy Ahmed came to power promising political reform, reconciliation and a break with Ethiopia’s old order, his government is confronting an extraordinary reversal: former enemies who once fought one another are now joining forces against the federal government.

The formation of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival has transformed Ethiopia’s security crisis from a collection of separate insurgencies into a potentially coordinated national challenge.

The alliance, announced on September 20, brings together seven armed and political movements, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara Fano National Movement and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), alongside movements from Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and the Somali region. Their declared objective is to remove Abiy’s government and establish an inclusive transitional administration. Only a few years ago, such an alliance would have appeared almost unthinkable.

During the 2020–2022 Tigray war, Amhara Fano forces fought alongside federal troops against the TPLF. The OLA, meanwhile, has been engaged in its own armed conflict with the federal government.

Now, those former adversaries have identified a common opponent in Addis Ababa. And as fighting has erupted again in Tigray, the political alliance is being tested on the battlefield.

The Alliance That Changed the Equation

The significance of the new coalition lies less in the number of groups involved than in the political geography it represents. The TPLF is rooted in Tigray. Fano is a major armed force in Amhara. The OLA operates primarily in Oromia. Other members have grievances tied to Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and the Somali regions.

Together, they give the alliance a presence across several of Ethiopia’s most politically sensitive areas. The groups remain deeply divided over territory, ethnicity and Ethiopia’s constitutional future. Their competing interests are particularly evident in the dispute over Western Tigray, claimed by both Tigrayan and Amhara actors. But for the moment, they have found common ground in opposition to Abiy’s government.

The coalition says it wants to remove the current government, establish an inclusive transitional government, resolve outstanding disputes peacefully and eventually move toward a new political settlement. That creates an unusual political equation:

Groups that once fought each other have concluded that their immediate interests are better served by confronting the federal government together.

Tigray: The Peace Deal Unravels

The immediate battlefield is once again Tigray. The region descended into a devastating war in November 2020 after relations between the TPLF and Abiy’s government collapsed. The conflict ended with the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement, but many of the issues that produced the war were left unresolved.

Those unresolved disputes have now returned to the centre of Ethiopian politics. Fighting intensified sharply in September, with federal and Tigrayan forces accusing each other of triggering the renewed conflict. Tigrayan forces moved against federal positions and seized several airports, while Ethiopian Airlines suspended flights to Tigray. Fighting also spread toward neighbouring Afar and Amhara.

The renewed violence has effectively shattered the fragile political calm created by Pretoria. The question is no longer whether the agreement is under pressure. The question is whether the political order created by the agreement can survive at all.

From Former Allies to New Enemies

Perhaps the most damaging development for Abiy is what has happened in Amhara. During the Tigray war, Fano forces were among the federal government’s important allies. Their relationship with Addis Ababa later deteriorated dramatically, particularly after the federal government moved to dismantle or integrate regional armed forces.

That dispute developed into a major armed conflict in Amhara from 2023 onward. The transformation is striking.The forces that helped Abiy fight the TPLF have now joined the TPLF in opposing Abiy.

This does not erase the profound differences between Fano and Tigrayan forces. Nor does it mean that their alliance will necessarily survive once their common confrontation with Addis Ababa is over. But strategically, it creates a new problem for the federal government. A regional force that once helped contain the TPLF is now part of an alliance that seeks to challenge the federal government itself.

A War on Multiple Fronts

Ethiopia’s security challenge is no longer concentrated in one region. The renewed fighting in Tigray has coincided with continuing instability in Amhara and the long-running insurgency involving the OLA in Oromia.

That creates the possibility of simultaneous pressure across several major regions. The federal government therefore faces a difficult military calculation: maintaining sufficient forces in one theatre while preventing deterioration in another.

The seizure of airports in Tigray has already demonstrated how quickly the conflict can affect infrastructure and mobility. Communications disruptions have also accompanied the fighting, complicating the flow of information from the region.

Federal forces retain substantial military capabilities, including air power and drones. But expanding the conflict across several regions would place additional demands on Ethiopia’s military and security institutions. The result could be a prolonged contest rather than a single decisive confrontation.

The Political Cost of a Return to War

For Abiy, the challenge is not only military. His rise to power in 2018 was initially associated with political opening, reconciliation and reform. His peace initiative with Eritrea contributed to his receiving the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. But the Tigray war fundamentally altered that image.

The return of large-scale fighting now threatens to reinforce the perception that Ethiopia’s underlying political conflicts were never fully resolved. The government’s national dialogue process was intended to provide a political mechanism for addressing some of those disputes. Yet major armed movements have remained outside or opposed to the process.

The new alliance is therefore presenting a competing political proposition: remove the current government, establish a transitional arrangement and reopen the country’s constitutional and political settlement. Whether the alliance can deliver such an outcome is far from established.

Its members have competing territorial claims, different political objectives and very different histories. That is its greatest potential weakness. But its existence is already a major political fact.

Eritrea and the Regional Dimension

Ethiopia’s internal conflict is also becoming increasingly difficult to separate from the wider politics of the Horn of Africa. Relations between Addis Ababa and Eritrea have deteriorated sharply since the Pretoria Agreement. The two governments have exchanged accusations, particularly over the future of Tigray and Ethiopia’s ambitions for access to the Red Sea.

The Ethiopian government has also accused Eritrea of supporting armed opposition groups. Eritrea has denied the allegations. The new alliance adds another layer to those regional tensions.

The possibility of outside involvement is one reason the conflict is attracting attention well beyond Ethiopia’s borders. Ethiopia’s relations with Sudan have also become increasingly complicated, while its disputes with Somalia and Egypt have added further strategic pressure around the Horn and the Red Sea. A domestic Ethiopian conflict could therefore acquire regional dimensions very quickly.

The Alliance’s Greatest Test

For all its political drama, the Alliance for Survival faces a fundamental test. Can groups with profoundly different interests maintain cooperation once the immediate objective of confronting Abiy’s government comes under pressure?

The alliance itself acknowledges that its members have differences. Tigrayan and Amhara forces, in particular, remain divided over territory and political authority. The coalition says those disputes can be resolved through dialogue.

That proposition will be tested if the alliance gains greater military influence. The groups must demonstrate that they can move from shared opposition to shared governance. That is considerably harder. Removing a government is one political objective. Agreeing on what comes afterward is another.

Abiy’s Most Difficult Political Moment?

Abiy Ahmed remains in control of Addis Ababa and the principal institutions of the federal state. His government retains significant military capabilities and considerable political resources.It would therefore be premature to assume that the new alliance can overthrow the government. But the political landscape has undeniably changed.

The most consequential development is not simply that fighting has returned to Tigray. It is that the old alliances have been rearranged. The TPLF is no longer isolated in the way it was at the beginning of the 2020 war. Fano is no longer uniformly aligned with Addis Ababa. The OLA and other regional movements have joined the same political project.

That does not guarantee their success. But it creates a challenge that cannot easily be managed through the regional alliances and military interventions that shaped the earlier phase of Abiy’s rule. The Horn of Africa is now watching a potentially dangerous new chapter unfold.

A peace agreement that ended one Ethiopian war is coming apart. Former enemies have found a common cause. Fighting has returned to Tigray. And a government once celebrated for reconciliation is confronting an opposition coalition whose reach extends far beyond one region.

The central question for Ethiopia is no longer simply whether another war has begun. It is whether the country can find a political settlement before its newest alliance turns a collection of regional conflicts into a single national war.

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