By Abdelkarim A. Haji Hassan

Since its adoption in 2000, Somalia’s 4.5 power-sharing model was designed as a temporary mechanism to ensure broad-based representation in the aftermath of state collapse. However, what was intended as a transitional arrangement has matured into a permanent system of governance, where clan loyalty routinely supersedes rule of law, meritocracy and institutional integrity.

This entrenched clan-based patronage system has fostered a political culture in which leadership appointments, policy decisions, and resource allocation are dictated by kinship. The consequences have been dire: systemic governance failures, institutional decay, and a persistent inability to achieve progress in security, economic development, and state-building. Rather than progressing toward stability, Somalia remains trapped in a cycle of regression, where short-term self and clan interests consistently override long-term national development.

The Somali government most notably under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s leadership—has weakened state institutions through a pervasive clan appointment system that values connections over qualifications. By filling both political offices and senior bureaucratic positions with unqualified loyalists, this nepotistic machinery has rendered professional recruitment standards and even the Civil Service Commission meaningless, creating a self-perpetuating cycle where skilled professionals are systematically excluded in favor of patronage hires, guaranteeing administrative dysfunction.

The Somali Civil Service Commission, established as the cornerstone of professional government recruitment, stands as a tragic symbol of institutional collapse. Mandated to ensure fair and competitive hiring in strict accordance with civil service laws and procedures, this critical body has been systematically neutered, its authority replaced by an entrenched culture of nepotism and cronyism. What was designed to be the guardian of meritocratic principles has become little more than a rubber stamp for clan-based patronage networks that now dominate public sector employment.

The Commission’s effective marginalization represents more than just bureaucratic failure – it signifies the complete subversion of state-building principles. Where transparent competitive examinations and standardized qualification criteria should determine civil servant appointments, kinship ties and personal connections now reign supreme. This systemic perversion of hiring practices has created a civil service where:

• Government payrolls swell with unqualified political and civil service appointees
• Technical competence is secondary to clan affiliation
• Professional qualifications matter less than personal connections
• Critical ministries lack subject-matter expertise

The Blurring of State and Clan Roles: A Threat to Institutional Integrity

While Somalia’s state institutions and traditional clan systems can serve complementary roles in governance, maintaining clear functional boundaries between these systems remains essential for effective administration. The clan structure, with its deep-rooted social legitimacy and conflict resolution mechanisms, continues to play an important role in community-level governance. However, the increasing encroachment of clan politics into formal state functions has created dangerous institutional ambiguities. This blurring of roles manifests most destructively when ministerial positions become clan fiefdoms rather than centers of technical competence, when security forces prioritize kinship loyalty over constitutional duty, and when development projects are allocated as clan patronage rather than national priorities.

It has become an alarming pattern among certain Federal Government officials who frequently overstep their official mandates by making inappropriate public statements that risk inciting clan conflict and insecurity. A notable example is the current Director of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), Abdullahi Sanbalooshe, whose repeated inflammatory remarks about clan politics and opposition figures—often expressed with unprofessional rhetoric—highlight a concerning disregard for the standards of decorum expected from public officials. These ongoing reckless remarks raise serious questions about his suitability not only for his current position but for any public office, and cast doubt on the administration’s commitment to institutional professionalism.

A striking illustration of this dysfunction is also the recent “Hawiye Conference” in Mogadishu, convened to discuss counterterrorism strategies. While combating extremism is a legitimate and urgent priority, the very existence of such a clan-centric forum raises fundamental questions about the role of formal state institutions. In a functional governance system, security policy should be deliberated through official channels—namely the cabinet, national security council, parliament, and relevant ministries—rather than through clan assemblies operating parallel to the state.

More troubling was the participation of high-ranking government officials, including Foreign Minister Mohamed Fiqi, who exploited the clan forum to make reckless allegations against international partners operating in Somalia. By alleging that certain entities within Halane Camp—the diplomatic and operational hub for the UN, AU, and foreign embassies—are sympathizers of extremist “Al Shabab,” Fiqi ventured far beyond his ministerial mandate. Such inflammatory rhetoric, delivered in an unofficial clan setting rather than through proper government channels reveals a disturbing disregard for protocols. This breach of diplomatic norms further undermines confidence in the federal government’s capacity to conduct responsible foreign policy and reinforces perceptions of a state apparatus held hostage to clan posturing.

Minister Fiqi’s presence at the Hawiye Conference epitomizes a broader crisis in Somali governance: the conflation of state responsibilities with clan allegiances. His ambiguous role—whether he was attending as a government representative or a clan advocate—highlights a dangerous trend where senior officials prioritize kinship loyalty over national duty. This duality undermines institutional credibility and reinforces perceptions that Somalia’s politicians are more accountable to their clans than to the state. Fiqi’s conduct is symptomatic of a deeper governance malaise. He has repeatedly overstepped his diplomatic mandate, commenting on issues outside his purview—particularly domestic affairs under the Ministries of Interior, Defense and Security.

His unprofessionalism reached a nadir in his disparaging remarks toward presidential candidate Farah Shirdon, whom he derided as an overreaching in law- outsider meddling in Mogadishu’s business that don’t concern him. Beyond its sheer impropriety, this statement carried an alarming subtext: the suggestion that Mogadishu is the exclusive domain of Fiqi’s clan, rather than the capital of all Somalis. Such rhetoric entrenches exclusionary politics and directly contradicts constitutional principles of equal citizenship and inclusive governance.

When government officials engage in clan-based politicking, they do more than violate protocol, they actively erode state authority. By legitimizing parallel power structures, they weaken the very institutions needed to stabilize Somalia. Mogadishu, as the seat of national government, must function as a neutral space where all citizens regardless of clan can participate in politics. When senior officials instead treat it as a clan fiefdom, they perpetuate a system in which governance is fragmented, accountability is absent, and progress remains elusive.

Somalia’s future hinges on its ability to transcend clan-based governance. The current system—where loyalty to kinship trumps competence, where parallel clan structures rival state institutions, and where leaders openly prioritize narrow interests over national cohesion—is unsustainable. Without decisive institutional reforms, Somalia will remain trapped in a perpetual cycle of instability, unable to achieve the security, development, and democratic governance its people deserve.

The choice is clear: either Somalia builds a functional state grounded in rule of law and meritocracy, or it continues to languish under the weight of its own clan divisions.

Pathways to Reform: Rebuilding Institutional Credibility

For Somalia to break free from this cycle, systemic reforms are imperative:

1) Depoliticizing Appointments – Leadership positions must be filled based on qualifications, merit with rigorous transparent vetting processes to ensure competence.

2) Clarifying Official Roles – Government representatives must strictly separate state duties from clan advocacy, avoiding conflicts of interest.

3) Strengthening Institutional Channels – Policy discussions, particularly on foreign policies, must occur within formal government structures, not clan assemblies.

4) Enforcing Accountability – Unprofessional conduct by officials must have consequences, including public reprimands or removal, to reinforce norms of governance.

5) Promoting National Identity Over Clan Identity – Civic education and leadership discourse must emphasize unified Somali citizenship rather than divisive clan narratives.

For Somalia to develop functional governance, the state must assert its monopoly on official policymaking and administration while allowing clans to operate within their traditional sociocultural sphere – not as parallel governance structures.

Constitutional sovereignty demands that clan elders advise while state institutions govern, that customary law inform but not override statutory law, and that kinship networks support rather than supplant meritocratic systems. Only through such institutional clarity can Somalia escape its current paradox where both state and traditional systems are weakened by their improper entanglement.

Abdelkarim A Haji Hassan
Email: abdelkarimhass@gmail.com