By Djama Mahamoud Ali

The fight against Al-Shabaab has defined Somalia’s security landscape for nearly two decades. The Al-Qaeda affiliate has proven remarkably resilient against numerous counterinsurgency campaigns, exploiting the Somali government’s lack of appetite to fight against Alshabab, clan divisions, and persistent political crises. The international community has responded with substantial commitments, the African Union has maintained a peacekeeping presence since 2007, transitioning from AMISOM to ATMIS and most recently to AUSSOM, whose mandate extends through December 2026. The United States conducts airstrikes in coordination with the federal government and has completed the creation and training of the Somali Danab elite unit for counterterrorism operations. Turkey has built a parallel security architecture including the TURKSOM Military Training Academy, which has trained thousands of Somali soldiers, including members of the elite Gorgor Commando Brigade.

Yet the results have been disappointing. By 2025, Al-Shabaab had launched a broad offensive, taking control of dozens of towns and villages. In August 2026 alone, the extremist group seized the strategic town of Teedaan in central Somalia’s Hiiraan region following intense fighting with government forces. The much-touted “Total War” against Al-Shabaab, launched in 2022, relied on fragile clan-militia alliances and was quickly derailed by political rifts This failure is not primarily military but political.

The Somali federal government, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has systematically deployed internationally trained and equipped forces not against Al-Shabaab but against its own federal member states and political opponents. Unless Somalia’s internal political divisions are resolved, the fight against Al-Shabaab cannot succeed.

Jubaland Confrontation

The federal government’s campaign against Jubaland represents the most significant and costly misdirection of military assets. In December 2024, armed clashes broke out between Somali federal forces and troops loyal to the Jubaland administration in Raskamboni, a strategic town in the Lower Jubba region near the Kenyan border. The federal government had deployed troops to Raskamboni after disagreeing with the outcome of Jubaland polls in which Ahmed Islam Mohamed Madobe was re-elected as president. The operation ended in catastrophic defeat of Somalia’s federal forces. Jubaland forces managed to neutralize the elite Gorgor troops, forcing some to seek refuge in Kenya. Senior Jubaland officials confirmed that 240 federal soldiers surrendered to Jubaland forces, further consolidating their control in the area. The federal troops suffered heavy defeats and were forced to retreat across the Kenyan border. This conflict displaced over 24,000 individuals.

The Raskamboni debacle was not an isolated incident. In July 2025, clashes between federal troops and Jubaland forces near Beled-Hawo killed at least 10 people. The SNA forces suffered a major defeat in the December 2024 battle at Raskamboni,  As one analysis observed, the federal government “has entirely failed to learn the lessons of Ras Kamboni”. Federal lawmakers from Jubaland accused the federal government of deliberately preparing and financing militias to create insecurity along the border and disrupt peace. The pattern is unmistakable, internationally trained and equipped forces intended for counterterrorism were instead deployed against a federal member state and were defeated.

South-West State Confrontation

The most brazen example of military diversion occurred in March 2026, when federal troops forcibly removed Southwest State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen. Laftagareen, in power since 2018, was re-elected with 66 percent of the vote but the federal government rejected the result as a “ploy” to hold onto power. Since the previous week, federal troops including Turkish-trained special units of the Somali military had been advancing on Baidoa, 246 kilometers southwest of Mogadishu, with instructions to oust Abdiaziz.This military operation used Turkish-trained Gorgor special forces and Turkish-supplied drones. Southwest State authorities accused Turkey of involvement in the military operations, alleging that Turkish-trained forces, equipment, and drones were used in actions against the administration. Laftagareen was forced to resign on March 30, 2026, and was allowed to fly into exile in Nairobi.

The African Union called for restraint, warning that rising tensions between the federal government and Southwest State risked undermining the country’s stability. Renewed fighting continued in Baidoa through July 2026, with forces loyal to Laftagareen taking control of parts of the town while the national army mobilized troops to drive them away.

Political Opponents Confrontation

Beyond conflicts with member states, the federal government used military forces against domestic political opponents within the capital itself. On June 4, 2026, heavy fighting rocked Mogadishu as government forces and militias aligned with opposition leaders exchanged gunfire. The clashes erupted ahead of planned anti-government demonstrations challenging President Mohamud’s leadership and recent constitutional changes.

Former Somalia President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed accused government forces of surrounding and attacking his residence, while former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire alleged that security forces used heavy weapons in densely populated areas and targeted senior opposition figures. Former National Intelligence and Security Agency Director Sanbaloolshe accused President Mohamud of targeting him, Khaire, and traditional elders during the fighting.

The violence had devastating humanitarian consequences. Armed clashes between federal government forces and an opposition-affiliated armed group killed at least 13 people, injured 189 others, and displaced about 12,500 households. The fighting began near Dabka junction before spreading into densely populated areas including Hawlwadaag, Abdiaziz, Hodan, Wardhigley, and parts of Karaan. The United States and the United Kingdom condemned the violence, with the U.S. Embassy describing the clashes as reckless. As one opposition politician stated, “forces trained and equipped by international partners were used against political gatherings instead of being deployed strictly for counterterrorism operations.”

Puntland Confrontation

The most dramatic illustration of the federal government’s misdirection of military assets occurred on August 5, 2026. Heavily armed Puntland forces, backed by military vehicles, launched an operation against a Federal military camp near Galkayo airport. The Army was brought there to conduct operation against Puntland. Howevere, Puntland forces took full control of the camp and detained 101 militia members aligned with the federal government, including senior commanders. They also seized weapons, military vehicles, police uniforms, and other security equipment, including items claimed to be part of Chinese aid provided to the Somali Police Force.

Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni accused the federal government of fueling tensions by deploying troops and weapons to the area. “The operation carried out by Puntland forces in Galkayo sends a clear message to anyone engaged in activities that threaten Puntland’s security and state authority,” Deni said. He warned that any consequences would be the federal government’s responsibility and urged Hassan Sheikh to “change course before the crisis deepens”.

Jubaland backed Puntland’s actions, stating that “weapons and military equipment were being moved into peaceful areas while Somali forces fighting Al-Shabaab were facing shortages of arms and supplies”. This statement underscores a devastating irony: international military aid intended for the counterterrorism fight is being diverted to internal political conflicts, while frontline forces against Al-Shabaab lack adequate resources. The confrontation was triggered by a disputed shipment of weapons allegedly transported by the federal government into southern Galkayo. Puntland President Deni accused the federal government of backing rival forces and attempting to interfere in Puntland’s internal affairs.

Internal Political disagreement and Constitutional Crisis were the bases

At the heart of these conflicts lies a broader constitutional crisis. In March 2026, parliament unilaterally approved a package of constitutional amendments hailed by government supporters as the culmination of a fourteen-year constitutional review process. However, opposition leaders and federal member states argue the changes could extend President Mohamud’s tenure and delay national elections. Relations between Mogadishu and several federal member states remain strained. Multiple state and deputy ministers representing Puntland, Jubaland, and Southwest have stepped down as tensions escalated over constitutional revisions and the framework for upcoming federal and regional elections.

 The heart of Somalia’s recurrent election crisis is tension between the clan-based power-sharing system and direct elections, a conflict made harder to resolve because the distribution of power between the federal government and its member states is not clearly demarcated in the provisional constitution. The federal government’s unilateral constitutional amendments, enforced through military means using Turkish-trained forces, have alienated member states and deepened the political crisis.

Al-Shabaab Exploits Internal Divisions

 The diversion of military resources toward internal political objectives has direct and measurable consequences for the counterterrorism effort. Political tensions in Somalia have fueled concerns over security and stability, with analysts warning that political divisions could undermine recent security gains and complicate efforts to combat Al-Shabaab.

Observers warn that if political divisions persist, they could erode international confidence in Somalia’s stabilization efforts and affect continued support from development and security partners. A letter from opposition leaders to the international community accused Somalia’s government of failing to “sustain progress against al-Shabaab, take ownership of its security functions, or undertake serious security sector reform,” blaming “internal rivalries and political infighting”.

Al-Shabaab has been quick to exploit these divisions. The group launched a broad offensive in 2025, taking control of dozens of towns and villages. In August 2026, Al-Shabaab seized the strategic town of Teedaan in central Somalia following heavy fighting with government forces and allied local militias. The group’s current advance, which it calls Operation Ramadan, began in February 2025. Meanwhile, Somalia’s political class remains “dangerously polarized and unable to forge a united front against their common enemy, al Shabaab.”

The juxtaposition is damning: while Al-Shabaab closes in on Mogadishu, the federal government uses its military to fight Puntland, oust regional presidents, and suppress political opposition. It is clear that political fragmentation hinders the fight against Al-Shabaab. If political divisions continue, the further weakening of state authority could accelerate Al-Shabaab’s expansion from rural areas into cities.

The Role of International Partners

International partners bear partial responsibility for this state of affairs. Turkey has become one of Mohamud’s most prominent bilateral security partners, providing military training, equipment, and support to Somali forces for more than a decade and with no accountability. The TURKSOM Military Training Academy has trained thousands of Somali soldiers, including members of the elite Gorgor Commando Brigade.

The United States has continued to provide military assistance, with AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley reaffirming the United States’ commitment to supporting Somalia’s fight against terrorism. However, as a result of Somali Government’s failure to meaningfully engage war against Alshabab, the US communicated a definitive policy decision establishing December 31, 2026, as the termination date for all support to the United Nations Support Office in Somalia.

By continuing to arm and train a federal army that is then deployed against member states and political opponents, the international community is inadvertently enabling the very internal conflicts that undermine the counterterrorism mission. The African Union has called for peaceful dialogue, warning that rising tensions risk undermining stability. But words of restraint are insufficient when military assistance continues without conditionality.

A State at War with Itself Cannot Fight a Common Enemy

The evidence is unambiguous. The Somali federal government, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has systematically used internationally trained and equipped military forces to:

1. Attack Jubaland, suffering a catastrophic defeat at Raskamboni in December 2024, with 240 federal soldiers surrendering to regional forces;

2. Forcibly remove the elected president of Southwest State in March 2026, using Turkish-trained Gorgor special forces and Turkish-supplied drones;

3. Confront and suppress political opponents in Mogadishu in June 2026, killing at least 13 people and displacing 12,500 households; and

4. Escalate tensions with Puntland, leading to the routing of federal forces and the capture of 101 militiamen on August 5, 2026, all while Al-Shabaab seizes strategic towns and advances its insurgency.

AUSSOM cannot clear Al-Shabaab without the Somali government’s full engagement in the fight. But the Somali government is not engaged, it is fighting its own member states and political rivals. As Jubaland stated, weapons and military equipment were being moved into peaceful areas while Somali forces fighting Al-Shabaab faced shortages of arms and supplies. The international community must recognize that military solutions alone cannot succeed where political unity is absent.

It is therefore imperative that the international community prioritize resolving Somalia’s internal political problems as a prerequisite for any effective counterterrorism strategy. AUSSOM troop-contributing countries have been urged to make a political settlement the foundation for Somalia’s security arrangements and future governance. Somalia’s opposition leaders have appealed to African Union troop-contributing countries to prioritize an inclusive political settlement before implementing any further security transition.

Until Somalia’s federal government and its member states are reconciled, until internationally provided military assets are used exclusively against Al-Shabaab rather than against political opponents, and until Somalia’s political class forges a united front against their common enemy, the fight against Al-Shabaab will continue to yield no fruits. Somalia, which is not with itself, cannot fight against Al-Shabaab.

Djama Mahamoud Ali
Email: djama_m@yahoo.om