By Balal M. Cusman

The geopolitical landscape of the 21st century is marked by multipolar competition, shifting economic networks and strategic recalibrations by global powers. From my perspective as an observer of international politics, Africa – home to vast human and natural resources, dynamic youth populations and emerging markets – is increasingly central to global strategic calculations. Yet despite this importance, African states too often find themselves positioned as objects of external strategy rather than architects of their own geopolitical destiny. This article is written with a deliberate African lens and argues that the continent’s future position in the developing world order will depend as much on internal reform and strategic clarity as on how external powers choose to engage Africa.

Since the end of World War II, global power dynamics have shifted repeatedly, from bipolar competition in the Cold War Era to unipolar dominance after the total collapse of the USSR in 1991 and now toward a multipolar system characterized by strategic rivalry, economic fragmentation and renewed competition over resources and influence. Obviously, Africa, as many other parts of the world, has historically been incorporated into the previous global power dynamics as a supplier of raw materials and/or strategic geography rather than as a co-designer of global rules. Today, however, Africa’s demographic growth, critical mineral wealth and geographic position places Africa at the centre of global transformation, even as global governance institutions themselves show signs of strain.

Therefore, if Africa is to alter its standing in the emerging global order, future relations with global powers must understand its rightful position and be driven by strategic negotiation, mutual benefit and mutual respect, systematic knowledge transfer and purposeful efforts to develop robust manufacturing and industrial capabilities. What is increasingly evident is that, while the emerging new global order is still in flux, major powers are not waiting for clarity. They are actively preparing for the next phase of global power distribution and Africa features, explicitly or implicitly, in nearly all of these recalibrations. For instance, The United States’ new National Security Strategy (NSS) indicates a significant change in its rhetorical and normative emphasis on Africa, placing increased attention on the continent in relation to broader U.S. economic, security, and geopolitical priorities. That is to say, in the NSS, Africa is viewed through the lenses of critical minerals, maritime chokepoints, counterterrorism and strategic competition with China, rather than as a priority arena for promoting lasting stability, democratic governance or transformative development.

China, by contrast, is operating with long-term clarity and institutional coherence. Through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and successive Beijing Action Plans, China has embedded Africa into its vision of global supply chains, industrial relocation, digital connectivity and geopolitical alignment in global governance forums. China’s Infrastructure development, industrial parks, manufacturing zones, security cooperation, peacekeeping and diplomatic coordination with African countries are not isolated initiatives but as a component of, what seems to be, a deliberate preparation for a post-Western-centric world order.
Europe is also repositioning. The European Union’s Global Gateway Initiative, alongside individual country strategies such as Denmark’s Africa’s Century, Germany’s emerging Africa pivot and Switzerland’s Africa Strategy, reflects a recognition that Africa will be central to future supply chains, green transitions, migration management and geopolitical stability, whereas the United Kingdom’s post-Brexit engagement with Africa similarly reflects preparation for a reordered world. Trade, investment, security cooperation and diplomatic outreach are increasingly pursued through bilateral flexibility rather than multilateral dependency. While framed in the language of partnership and shared values, these strategies are equally designed to secure Europe’s long-term economic resilience and strategic autonomy.

Correspondingly, beyond traditional powers, emerging and middle powers are also positioning themselves. Gulf states and Turkiye, among others, are investing heavily in ports, security, logistics, agriculture and energy infrastructure across Africa. India, in its part, has expanded its development cooperation, technology transfer and capacity-building initiatives, where Japan emphasizes quality infrastructure and governance, while Russia has sought influence primarily through security and political engagement. At the systemic level, the declining relevance of traditional coordination platforms such as the G7 and the G20 also signals a deeper transformation in global governance where in their place, a pragmatic and informal multipolar configuration, often described as an emerging Core Five (USA, China, Russia, Japan and India), appears to be taking shape among the most consequential global powers.

In this context, reframing relations between Africa and global powers must not be an exercise designed exclusively in the capitals of external actors, nor neither Africa be absent from these discussions nor reduced to a passive listener. Instead, African states and institutions must be part of the designers, planners and implementers of engagement frameworks with global powers. Genuine partnership requires African participation from conception through execution, not merely endorsement after decisions have been made. At the same time, African unity must be approached with realism. As a continent of 54 countries with diverse histories, political systems and development priorities, Africa cannot rely on one-size-fits-all approaches. It is imperative therefore to strengthen national-level mechanisms, as most negotiations ultimately occur at the state level. As a result, individual states must retain the confidence and capacity to directly negotiate with global powers in ways that reflect national priorities while contributing to broader continental objectives.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge that the short comings of African states in the past must not be attributed solely to external interference or aid dependency. Many of the continent’s vulnerabilities were and still are indeed internally generated – weak governance, fragile institutions, Leadership deficits and the personalization of power, among others, have often created openings for foreign interference. In some cases, external actors have exploited these weaknesses by encouraging proxy conflicts or incentivizing African states to engage in wars with each other for external benefit. Thus, without addressing these internal governance failures, Africa will always remain susceptible to manipulation regardless of shifts in the global order.

Nowhere is this dynamic more dangerous and clearer than in the Horn of Africa region. Horn of Africa sits astride one of the world’s most vital maritime artery – the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Yet, this strategic gift feels like a curse. Region’s shores are dotted with foreign bases, and its politics are militarised by proxy wars and its local conflicts are regionalised/internationalised. The rivalries of Gulf powers and the competition between global giants don’t just play out in the Horn, they actively reshape and exacerbate region’s conflicts. Therefore, the fact remains that the Horn of Africa region is not just a region in crisis, it is a geopolitical battleground. The choice is therefore stark. Will Horn of Africa remain a permanent theatre for others’ wars, or can leaders in the region lead the mother continent by example and forge their nations into the bridge linking Africa, the Middle East, and the global economy for the benefit of their people?

In conclusion, the new world order is being drafted in real-time. I therefore see two futures for the mother continent – one where African leaders recognize the opportunities presented by the emerging multipolar system and responding with pragmatic, Africa-owned and Africa-led strategies and they come to the table, pen-in-hand, insisting that Africa’s priorities, from climate justice to technological leapfrogging and manufacturing capacities are central to the new global blueprint or a future where Africa remains objects of rules, policies and strategies, reacting to agendas set elsewhere, forever scrambling for a seat at a table it did not build and arguing about instability, irregular migration of its youth, climate changes stresses etc.

Balal M. Cusman
Email: bcusman@gmail.com
X: @BalalCusman
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Balal is thh, Former State Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia.
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References

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National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (2022). Washington, DC: The White House.
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (2021). Dakar Action Plan (2022–2024). Beijing.
United Nations Development Programme. (2023). Africa Human Development Report. New York.
World Bank. (2024). Africa’s Pulse: Navigating Multiple Crises. Washington, DC.