By Dr. Towfik Elmi

Larry André, a retired U.S. ambassador to Somalia and former USAID contractor, penned an interesting recommendation memo that adopts a cautious, diplomatic, and procedural tone. It frames Somaliland’s status as an open question that requires inclusive and substantive discussion among all stakeholders. Similarly, Michelle Galvin, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, in a recent article advanced a solution that closely aligns with Ambassador Larry’s middle-ground approach.

Galvin underscores that the federal government’s recognition of the new Northeastern State, a unique bottom-up model, cannot be relegated to the dustbin of history or dismissed as a mere “paper power grab”. She points to the recent clashes in Dhahar district where local troops from the new state confronted and ultimately defeated the better-equipped Puntland Maritime Security Forces, which is backed by the UAE. This event, Galvin argues, starkly reveals Somalia’s persistent fault lines over political representation, self-determination, and control of rare mineral elements in the region (Galvin, 2025).

Within the “Somaliland” status framework, Larry presents three policy options, expressing preference for a “middle course”, namely, establishing a U.S. diplomatic office in Hargeisa with a coverage extended to “neighboring Puntland”. Whereas in another part of his memo, he mentions, as a new reality on the ground, the Federal Government of Somalia’s recognition of the new Northeastern State, “bordering Puntland”, which adds yet another layer of complexity to the dynamics facing northern Somalia. I would, however, respond that Larry’s preferred middle course, establishing a U.S. diplomatic office in Hargeysa, risks undermining Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Such a move recalls the failed “dual-track policy” and would serve to legitimize the “Somaliland” claims unless and until the authorities in Hargeysa unequivocally renounce their secessionist agenda. While Amb. Larry demonstrates a degree of objectivity, his rhetoric is far from neutral. His word choices carry a demeaning undertone and reproduce a neocolonial discourse that echoes the very colonial designs which fragmented Somali society in the first place.

This is most apparent in his conflation of “colony” and “protectorate.” In historical and legal terms, “Somaliland” is defined as a protectorate, not a colony, because its legal status was derived from the protection treaties signed between the British Crown and six major Somali tribes in the late nineteenth century. To misrepresent this history as colonial rule disregards Somali political agency and the degree of self-governance embedded in those agreements. Similarly, the reference to unionists as “Somalilanders” within the claimed borders of “Somaliland,” coupled with the reductionist binary of “Isaq” versus “Non-Isaq” communities, distorts both the historical record and the political reality of the region.

Another glaring fallacy is the reliance on falsified demographic figures. Here, Larry regurgitates a population estimate that predates Somalia’s political independence from colonial powers. Those figures were propagated by certain colonial officers and given academic legitimacy through the writings of I. M. Lewis (1961). The recycling of those figures in subsequent sources, demonstrates how inaccuracies in colonial ethnography became entrenched in both scholarly and policy discourses.

Alternatively, there is one key survey document from the pre-independence era that was conducted by an Italian research team. Titled, Le Genti Somale, the survey estimated that the Harti clans constituted 45 percent of the population of the former British Somaliland Protectorate and the Isaqs 37 percent. These findings stand in stark contrast to the figures cited by Ambassador Larry.

The selective misuse of non-official population estimates reflects not only academic dishonesty but also a broader effort to erase or minimize the population size of unionist communities within the now defunct “British Somaliland Protectorate”. It also reveals the political utility of demographic manipulation in justifying secessionist claims with profound security implications.

Above all, proposals such as opening a U.S. diplomatic office in Hargeysa absent a clear renunciation of secession may erode Somalia’s sovereignty and embolden secessionist movements backed by  falsified colonial records. It also undermines the political rights and lived experiences of Somalis who are opposed to the unilateral, predominantly one-clan secessionist movement.

A permanent solution demands careful engagement with all stakeholders and recognition of the complex social fabric, history, and political dynamics that define Somalia as a whole.

Dr. Towfik Elmi
Email: towfik.elmi@gmail.com
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Dr. Elmi is a board certified healthcare executive and is a fellow of the American College of Healthcare Executives (ACHE). Dr. Elmi has served in both government and executive leadership roles and was a senior policy advisor with the AHCCCS in Arizona  prior to moving to Minnesota in a similar capacity. Parallel to his healthcare career, Dr. Elmi has engaged in research and policy analysis in *international conflict resolution and security governance,* with particular emphasis on the Horn of Africa.
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References:

1. Galvin, M. (2025, August 19). When It Comes to Somalia, It’s Always Complicated. Council on Foreign Relations. 
2. La Genti Somale (circa 1945). 
3. Lewis, I.M. (1961). A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. Oxford University Press for the International African Institute. 
4. Touval, S. (1963). Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa. Harvard University Press.