

# **Elections or no Elections? The question beguiling many in Puntland State**

By Syed Ahmed Gashan Nov 22, 2023

"Every one of you is a shepherd, and is responsible for his flock; the leader of people is a guardian, and is responsible for his subjects..." Abdullah ibn Umar, source: Sahīh al Bukhāri:7138, Sahīh Muslim:1829.

#### **Preamble**

In the annals of history, this year has the hallmarks of *circa*. 2001, when the State faced its toughest challenge, one which could be argued planted its roots, albeit at a cost in blood and

property [1]. Shortly post its inception, and through successive political leaders, attempts had been made to institute democratic system of governance in the form of state institutions, and direct elections of its political leaders at its three levels of government. District Council elections, for the first time, had been held in October, 2021, followed by Statewide District Council elections in May, 2023 [2] excluding three districts including the Capital, where elections are pending due to a dispute as to the election



process, howbeit election results had been widely accepted, and with commendation to the State.

A challenge now facing the State entails as to how best hold Presidential and Parliamentary elections scheduled on February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2024, albeit was originally expected on January 8<sup>th</sup>, 2024 the end of term of the current administration, ergo causing the dispute with the opposition; January 8<sup>th</sup> is a generally accepted convention for the Presidential election [3], and whilst aforesaid date is more of a tradition, it is arbitrary, as the State Constitution, in Article 42, section (6) states: "The date for each election shall be determined by the Electoral Authority, but it shall NOT be: a) Less than two (2) months, nor b) More than four (4) months after the end of the period of the elected functionaries". As the aforesaid Article clearly states, and with the current administration's tenure ending on January 8<sup>th</sup>, 2024, Presidential and Parliamentary elections could be held no earlier than November 8<sup>th</sup>, 2023, and no later than May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2024. It is as clear as daybreak, hardly requiring legal luminaries to interpret, nor political nuancing. Yet, many a person led by the opposition camp is of the view that unless elections take place on January 8<sup>th</sup>, the sky shall fall.

That is at the heart of the dispute, where the administration is not honoring the convention, and the opposition is not heeding provisions of the said Article, and with the dispute arising from a constitutional matter, one would have expected the Constitutional Court to resolve the dispute. Neither party is considering its potential implications, constitutional or otherwise, and seem content in its begetting political crises, which in turn could morph into a mortal clan conflict, which almost always leads to violence. In principle, it is easier to resolve legal matters in court rooms by erudite legal minds, of which there are naught, settle political matters in discourse amongst seasoned political luminaries, of which there are a few, but clan conflict is more intricate to resolve potentially leading to protracted, if deadly clashes, as have been observed in the recent past in Puntland and elsewhere in the Somali peninsula [3].

Equally, this brings into question the role of the Traditional elders (Issims), more so in Puntland, whose role and influence is greatly enhanced by its inclusion in the State constitution, which shall be discussed. Before delving into the nature of the election dispute, which could potentially lead to Constitutional crises, let us reflect upon election challenges elsewhere, and in doing so, remind oneself of the age old Somali axiom "*One's erstwhile misdeeds influence one's latter deeds*".

#### **Election challenges**

In practice, holding elections is an element of democracy, and for elections to yield desired result, its core tenets must be observed, and in doing so, distinguish we must between its: a) form, and b) substance. The former, which entails scheduling, casting votes, ballot boxes, poll stations *et cetera* might be present whilst the more critical elements: its substance, which entails genuine engagement, fairness, transparency, inclusion, consultation, participation *et cetera* might be missing. Absence of said substantive elements render its being mere exercise, which defeats the intent, and purpose of holding elections, or by extension the desire to implementing democratic institutions.

Instituting fair, and transparent democratic elections face challenges, technical or otherwise, more so in troubled, and developing nations, and even in industrial nations, albeit do present tangible gains to the citizenry [4].

Political violence, instability, and authoritarian rule ensued elections elsewhere in developing nations [5]. In the 1980s, election boom had been observed with many a nation experimenting with democratic elections, yet in the 1990s a trend of election failures had been observed. In Eastern Europe, with the fall of the Soviet Union, and end of the cold war, more nations turned to democratic elections in choosing their political leaders with the number of nations holding elections doubling between 1988 and 1997. For instance, during said period, in any given year in the past three decades, one out of every four countries held elections of some kind whilst three out of every four had been within a year of doing so, and more so in developing nations [*ibid*]. A meaningful indicator of elections gaining momentum had been the number of developing nations regularly holding elections with the exception of nations classified as election *exceptionalists*, which had not held elections since the second war, albeit the gap is narrowing. In 1987, 57 of 135 developing nations had yet to hold elections whereas by the end of 2015, only thirteen (13), most of which are in the Middle East with monarchic systems, remained in the list [*ibid*].

Equally of interest was the 2020 general election in the United States, considered a model of a mature, stable democracy, where election results had been disputed with lawsuits of alleged election fraud aplenty, and with ensuing troubles, including the January 2020 ascension unto the United States Capitol still ongoing. Another example is India, said to be the largest democracy in the world, where 563 million voters, out of 815 million eligible citizens, choosing amongst 8,251 candidates, representing three dozen political parties, competing for 543 seats, cast their votes in the 2014 general election [5]. Egypt and Pakistan offer worthy case studies, and so does Liberia. In the case of Egypt, where in the 2011, Mohamed Morsi was elected only for his administration to be toppled by the military, which in turn installed General Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi resulting in mass death sentences, incarceration, and of repression of dissent at a record high [*ibid*].

In the Horn of Africa, elections have been held both in Ethiopia, and Jibouti with mixed results. In its last general election in 2021, Ethiopia elected Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's Prosperity party winning 410 seats of the 425 contested seats with the main opposition parties only winning 11 seats: 96% of the seats of the Parliament; three (3) of the ten (10) regions including the Somali region, due to *irregularities* in voter registration, and Harar, due to disputes over *eligibility*, initially did not participate; nor did Tigray, following a two-year long bloody *civil war*. According to NEBE, Ethiopia's National Electoral Board, 31.7 million registered with 38 million casting their votes, of its 120+ million population, a high turnout all thing being equal. There had been reports of opposition parties crackdown, improper arrests, voter intimidation, and harassment of observers and journalists [6][7].

In Jibouti, where President Isma'il Omar Ghelle was re-elected with an over 97% of the votes cast in his favour in 2021: a nation of just under one million where only 230,000 registered to vote with just over 171,000 casting their votes [9]. That is 23% of the total population are registered to vote with only 17% casting their votes. There have been opposition claims of the election being "*charade*" lacking integrity and legitimacy. Now, let us reflect upon Somalia.

# **Elections in the Somali peninsula**

In the case of Somalia, elections were first held in 1960 with the last held in 1967 [10] where democracy and elections are now foreign concepts to the average person after more than two decades of military rule followed by thirty plus years of civil war. Striving in its recovery, the nation adopted Federalism in 2004, albeit yet to be determined as to its essence and nature, with a plan to implement democratic institutions and wider one-man on-vote elections. None has materialized even if some notable progress had been made in some regions.

For instance, in Somaliland, which sought to break away from Somalia in 1991, first held democratic local and general elections in 2002 and 2003 respectively with subsequent elections marred by successive term extensions, the root cause of its current political turmoil [11]. In the 2010 elections, just over one million voters registered with just over half a million casting their votes, a high turnout in all estimations (*numbers include* Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn *regions, which are now the SSC-Khaatumo interim administration*). As remarkable as the elections had been, every President, who was elected for a five-year term, extended his term by two years (Riyaale: 2003 – 2010; Silanyo: 2010 – 2017; Bixi: 2017 – 2024); the House of Representatives was last elected in 2005 till in 2021 with a 16 year gap, and the *Guurti*, House of Elders was never elected.

In Puntland, one of the Federal Member States (FMS), after successive attempts to implementing democratic elections, the first had been realised with pilot elections in three districts in October, 2021 [2], followed by wider local District Council elections in May, 2023. Over 449,437 registered voters in 33 districts, for 861 contested seats, at 520+ polling stations participated in the District Council elections; 215,035 cast their votes, a high turnout of almost half of registered voters (*numbers include data of the three pilot districts viz.*Qardho, Eyl, and Ufayn). It must be noted three (3) districts in Nugaal [13], and districts in Sool and Cayn regions (*Now SSC-Khaatumo interim administration*) have not participated in said elections.

In a recent non-scientific poll carried out by radio Daljir, under its *vox populi* online flagship, of a population sample of 20,888 people, 73% expressed a clear desire for one-man one-vote elections whereas 27% favoured a return to the legacy sixty-six format of MPs selecting the leaders [12]. With Presidential and Parliamentary elections scheduled on February 25, 2024, dispute surrounds as to the integrity, scheduling, and administration of elections.

Current leadership seems intent of holding elections whilst opposition is adamant it shall not participate unless corrective measures had been implemented to ensure election integrity, fairness, and transparency. Other Federal Member States are expected to follow suit in 2024, albeit security challenges might impede wider one-man one-vote elections. To analyse the nature of the dispute and pugilists in the ring, let us glance at the tape of who is who on the foil.

#### The incumbent

Like his predecessors, Mr Deni is a man of contradictions, yet succeeded where others before him faltered insofar as many commending his capacity in implementing challenging projects *viz.* the first political leader to hold District Council Elections, completion of the Garowe–Galkacyo main road project, commitment to completing the Ceel Daahir – Ceerigaabo project, support for the SSC- Khaatumo interim administration *et cetera*, whilst others find his brinkmanship, and unilateral decision-making rather detestable.

No one in the political theatre, proponents or otherwise, remotely expected of, or thought of him capable of delivering elections. By all qualitative measures, local District Council elections in October 2021, and May, 2023 had been received as fair and transparent, and accepted by all parties with no undue interference or irregularities, implicit or otherwise, observed or reported. As commendable as it was, Mr Deni has a questionable track record in that, he is being accused of:

- a) Violating State Constitution more than once, a good example being monopolising State institutions, including Treasury, in campaigning for the Federal Presidency in the summer of 2022 whilst hanging on to power in the State, with the desire of remotely managing its affairs whilst campaigning in Mogadishu, and insofar as feuding with his Vice President, who questioned as to the constitutionality of his candidacy whilst disagreeing with his usurpation of the Executive branch in the day-to-day decision-making.
- b) Flexing undue influence in mismanaging the Federal Parliamentary selection process in the summer of 2022, a precedence, which gives many cause for concern, and rightly so.
- c) His opponents further argue he wasted valuable resources and time on dual-horse racing in Mogadishu whilst State affairs had been neglected, and had he not done so, elections would have held on schedule, and without delay.

It so being, Mr Deni is still rather popular with the locals, with a considerable following in the Diaspora, and is regarded as an enigma in his ability to push through his policies, and manoeuvre past his adversaries, in what is considered a Machiavellian leadership style, which for all intents and purposes should not be popular with the general public. His popularity partially flows from his staunch stance against successive Federal leaderships as it pertains to their anti-Federalist politicking, and more so by the current President at Villa Somalia, who is being accused of, with supporting evidence, hijacking Federal institutions to

advance a Unitary system of government contrary to the agreed upon decentralized, Federalist model deemed as a solution to reconcile, harmonize, and unite a nation in perpetual turmoil.

Further, many credit him for being the sole voice of keeping the federalist sentiment in motion, and for keeping the Federal leadership from overstepping, if overextending their powers. For instance, the Federal Constitution, of the non-amended version of 2012, expressly grants the Federal government four (4) Exclusive powers (Appendix A), however, against the Federal Constitution, and with very little Consultation with political stakeholders including [all] Federal Member States, the current President of the Federal government is unilaterally seeking to bring far-reaching powers under his domain, as outlined in proposed unilateral amendments to the Constitution (Appendix B). Aforesaid proposed amendments violate power-sharing, and founding principles of the Federal Constitution amongst others, particularly Article 3, sections (3)(4).

Furthermore, the Federal government seeks to abandon the Parliamentary system, where the Executive power is now vested in the Office of the Prime Minister, and replacing it with a Republican system, where the President presides over the Executive branch. This is in violation of Articles 3, 48, 50, 51, 90, 97 and 99, and with other FMSs being dependent, financially or otherwise, and under the aegis of the Federal government with no meaningful political influence over their respective domains, Federalism is highly likely to be replaced with the infamous Unitary system in its stead unless a guardian steps up to the platform. Not a single Federal Member State, barring Puntland, challenged aforesaid blatant power-grab, if anything leaders of the other four (4) FMSs signed away to the Federal government powers expressly granted to the States including Elections, and Judiciary.

In response to the aforesaid violations, which is the foundation of the dispute between the Federal government and Puntland, Mr Deni formed a Consultative Committee, which later issued a ten-point communique outlining contested issues at the root of the State's opposition to the Federal government (Appendix C). In it, Federal leadership was accused of violating power-sharing structure, abandoning founding principles of Federalism, failing to frame national security system, and for advancing policies contrary to the nation's sovereignty [4][8]. And with that, federalist voices in Puntland, and elsewhere in the nation see him a positive force of influence.

# The Opposition

It appears as if the nearer the time, the wider the gap, the louder the voices, the greater the fissure, the more complex the dispute, and the more probable the larvae to fully grow into a deadly volcanic eruption. The average person in Puntland, and elsewhere in the nation, is not acquainted with the esteemed rhetoric of modern politics more popular in the West, where in the spur of the moment, candidates engage in aroused verbal spats in public discourse, without resorting to violence. Some might take what one says literally to heart, and what

might have begun as a constitutional or legal matter quickly morphs into a political feud, which further ascends to sectarianism possibly begetting unnecessary animus between the citizenry potentially leading to violence.

Of their many strands, opposition could be primarily aligned under three columns:

- a) Political parties and reputable politicians with genuine interest in the election process,
- b) Aspiring politicians arriving late, and have neither formed, joined, or participated in the District Council elections, and
- c) Rogue elements, and armed *prima donnas* uninterested in democratic elections. Groups (a) and (b) of the opposition must be commended for raising the bar, and interest in State elections, but let not that go to their head, and beget more harm than good. The general public lost confidence in the opposition's ability to articulating an alternative political vision, or exercising mature political discourse with their support amongst target constituencies at its lowest; their reputation was further tarnished by armed militias, loyal to some in the opposition, clashing with State security forces. Yet, groups (a) and (b) must be consulted, included in the election decision-making process, and afforded participation.

Group (c) is armed, volatile, and has neither the wisdom to be consulted nor the intellect to contribute. For instance, owing to their highly charged rhetoric, and goading on armed militias, civilians had been killed in June, 2023, as preceded by another armed incident earlier in May, 2023 when armed militias, aligned with members of the opposition, tried to prevent election convoys to depart Garowe headed to other regions.

It must be noted seven (7) of the nine (9) registered political parties are aboard to participate in the forthcoming Presidential and Parliamentary elections, albeit with reservations. With its so being, opposition is justified in suspecting Mr Deni's intent, and for a reason, however they too have demonstrated how reckless they are with the lives of ordinary citizens [5]. Further, opposition have demonstrated theirs is one of "He has done wrong once, therefore all he does is wrong", when under their direction, armed clan militias loyal to some in the opposition, shed blood of the innocent in Garowe, the seat of State institutions. That is unforgivable!

#### **Electoral Commission (PEC)**

With so much riding on the integrity of election results, the body must be seen as exercising impartiality and nonpartisanship whilst serving in the best interest of the public, and the State. In its current form, of its twelve (12) members, as sworn in by the Parliament in its current session, six (6) members had been appointed by the government, three (3) each by the Offices of the Presidency, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the remaining six (6) appointed by registered political parties, which participated in the District Council elections; two (2) political parties decided not to appoint members in time.

This is perceived to afford the government an unfair advantage, and in order to instill confidence in its activities, and by extension in the integrity of election results, and to remove said perceived imbalance, it would be wise to restructure the Electoral Commission, and institute a more balanced body, where each political party would nominate a member, ergo a more representative body of equal standing. This eliminates perceived suspicion of impartiality. As public servants, PEC is ONLY responsible, and accountable to the public, and loyal to the State, and not to an individual. And so was the essence of their oath.

#### **Constitutional Court (PCC)**

Primary responsibility of the Constitutional Court, under Article 95, sections (2)(4) of the State Constitution, is to rule on, and resolve cases of disputes amongst organs of State institutions, and constitutional disagreements, wherein lies the crux of the current dispute. Without a favour or prejudice, Justices of the Court must play an active role in resolving contested constitutional matters. Silence and lack of response to cases currently lodged with the Court implies, if further strengthens, claims of the Court becoming an extension of the Executive branch, ergo its being iniquitous, if unjust. Show, in deed, it is not so!

# **Traditional Elders (Issims)**

The role and presence of Issims is a constant fulcrum maintaining the balance, and stability in the State, and with their power and influence defined in the Constitution, under Article 101, sections (4)(5)(6), particularly in conflict resolution, traditional or otherwise, are expected to engage the sides, and to harmonise their differences sans appearing to favour or prejudice a particular party, or being a part to the conflict. Head in the sand is unbecoming of Issims, nor is waiting till blood has been shed, nor when time has lapsed; instead the best strategy is to disarm the torpedo now 'inta ay goori goor tahay'. Splitting along partisan lines only further widens the political fissure. Issims' role must serve as an antidote to the malady rather than the antithesis!

#### **Recommendations**

Notwithstanding discussed challenges, the Presidential and Parliamentary elections must go on, and be carried out in a manner interpretive of the desire of the public in the State, and elsewhere in the nation at large; it must be consultative, participatory, and inclusive of all stakeholders, be it current leadership, political parties, Independents, Issims, general public, and so forth. Any right-thinking citizen has a role, and so must be recognized. Of the many reasons to stay on course, noteworthy are:

a) The level of enthusiasm amongst the general public is at an all-time high, with turnout expectation being higher than District Council elections, thusly it is incumbent upon current leadership, and opposition to agree upon an acceptable form and schedule to hold consensus-based elections.

- b) All things being equal, despite recent challenges, now is the most opportune time to hold elections in the State, for:
  - i) Security-wise, there are fewer obstacles to consider with security threats from either the northern or southern perimeter minimsed by recent developments. In the South, the Federal government in Mogadishu is almost insolvent, struggling with al Shabaab hardly able to interfere whereas in the North, Somaliland is wrestling with a self-inflicted instability, arising from the SSC-Khaatumo conflict. The leadership of the Federal government has been accused of trying to adversely influence, or interfere with the elections, for instance surrogates and proxy candidates under the aegis of the Federal government are said to have been canvassing support, and injecting undue cash and disharmony into the local politics.
  - ii) Opposition is more organised, making political discourse more engaging, and thereby making this election that much more interesting to observers and locals alike, more so amongst the young, and diaspora.
  - iii) Diaspora involvement is greatly heightened, which adds to the elation, with some social media personalities touring the State to participate in, and further advance local engagement.
  - iv) With a number of high-intensity conflicts brewing elsewhere in the globe, attention-span of the usual agitators is focused elsewhere, with there being less focus on local matters, and with external forces to derail or influence rather disposed.
- c) It is cost-effective with the necessary, if basic systems, if inadequate, in place, and with recent local District Council elections in May, 2023 held with very little impediment.

With the biggest challenge against holding democratic elections being safeguarding the integrity of election results, and to ensure all parties are aboard, meaningful control measures must be put in place, thusly:

- a) Firstly, the process must be inclusive, free of interference, perceived or otherwise, and fair with all candidates afforded equal access.
- b) Secondly, Election Auditors of which sole function is to oversee, review, detect anomalies, and identify irregularities, must be appointed; such Officers would be vetted for suitability and qualifications, approved by the Parliament, and with stakeholders including political parties consulted as to their appointment.
- c) Thirdly, equally important are Election Canvassing Boards, at the District, and State levels, of which sole function is to ensure election result accuracy and credibility; included could be Judges, retired public servants, and educators.
- d) Fourthly, political leaders, not aligned with political parties, must be able to run as Independents with equal access. Alternatively, they may consider forming new political parties between now, and election date.

- e) Fifthly, the Electoral Commission (PEC) must be deemed neutral, non-partisan, and a reliable institution beyond reproach, and for so to be realised, like in aspiring democracies, members of PEC must be:
  - i) Men and women of good standing and sound judgment in the society, possibly retired judges, educators, and retired public servants with no political interest or affiliation.
    - Ergo, notwithstanding the outlay or latency, restructure the current PEC, and form a more neutral body, as in (e)(i); the cost of bloodshed, or election irregularities, or presumed election fraud far outweigh than presumed gains in expediency and arbitrary election dates.
  - ii) Each political party would choose one (1) member to instill public confidence of their neutrality, representation, and inclusion; as is the case now, neither the Legislature nor the Executive should be afforded unfair advantage with each appointing three members; this is an unjust practice, and must be abandoned.
    - If untenable, then allow Traditional Elders (Issims) to have an oversight over the Electoral Commission (PEC), for in doing so, the probability of partisanship is being minimised, if not wholly eliminated.
      - If this is not a possibility, then consider the Jabiye & Co. plan of the public democratically electing MPs, who in turn shall select the President and Vice President; not ideal but a worthy compromise.
        - If improbable, then abandon the entire election process, and revert back to the legacy sixty-six model, for the political class is neither mature, nor ready for democratic elections.
          - And if so comes to pass, then neither the current leadership nor the opposition deserve to hold public office. History shall not be kind to such men of questionable intellect, and weak leadership.
- f) And finally, violence must not be an option regardless of the outcome, and anyone found to act, intimidate, threaten, or initiate violence must be held accountable, stricken off, and never hold a public office.

#### President Saeed Abdillahi "Deni"

"U tur, uguna hambee sidii ay kuugu liseen". This is not circa. 2000-2001, and political landscape is far more stable than then years, thusly risks far outweigh than any perceived rewards with there being more to lose today than then. Reflect upon lessons of yesteryears. Above all else, do that which best serves the public interest, and the State: the common good. Now is an opportune time for Mr Deni to show true leadership, that he is in it for the right reasons. The best way to demonstrate so is:

- a) Engage and negotiate with the opposition in a reasoned win-win formulae recognising they too are stakeholders,
- b) Engage and consult Issims in resolving the dispute, and bringing the impasse to a close, and
- c) If unable or unwilling to do so, then remove himself from the process, and in turn designate Ahmed Osman Elmi "Karaash", the Vice President, to take charge of the elections. Mr Karaash is an elder, astute in regional politics, a steady hand in practice, and with a proved track record capable of savouring the day, as has been demonstrated in his management of the SSC-Khatumo conflict. Under his reign, even the most vocal amongst the opposition are more likely to heed his counsel, and are less likely to challenge his leadership including the proposed February 25<sup>th</sup>election date instead of January 8<sup>th</sup>, a delay of 47 days within the permitted timeframe, as stipulated in the State constitution; as projected, opposition is more receptive, if patient under his leadership than under the incumbent.

# **Opposition**

Groups (a) and (b) must tone down the rhetoric, seek direct engagement, and consultation with the administration; work with Issims and local medium to get their message across. Violence could not be, and must never be an option. Spare a thought for the recent turbulent history of the nation. It deserves your best, and not your worse. Thus far, we have seen elements of your worse in deed and spirit. Show us your best!

The public must be cautious of, and careful with group (c), and instead rally behind rational voices both in government, and credible opposition.

Syed Ahmed Gashan

Email: gashan@gmail.com

#### Addendum:

- a) General public:
  - This is a good time to be exercising one's duty to elect public servants; accept not anything less than democratic elections. Beware of politicians in empty suits promising honey from the sky. Beware of politicians, whose sole interest is in self, and not that of the public, nor the State.
- b) Members of the Diaspora:
  - The best role the diaspora could play is to return home during election season to mobilise the public, inject fresh energy, positivity, and genuine esteem in public discourse, and political dialogue, be it through social medium, or inperson visiting remote villages and districts whilst sharing own experiences in respective host nations with the locals, who have not experienced, at first hand, how democracy is being practised, and elections exercised in mature democracies.

Stoke not animus, nor add fuel to the flame from afar. Engage in healthy political discourse irrespective of one's favoured political party, or personality. Look around you, and see how your neighbours in your respective host nations practise, and exercise politics at the provincial, State, and federal / national level, even when at loggerheads over policy and principle.

Make not matters worse, and if you could not positively contribute to the common good, or emphatically influence to further advance the public good, do stay away. Intent ought to be to make matters better, and not further sully pre-charged conditions with ill-advised rhetoric.

- c) A final message to any politician aspiring for public office:
  - If unable to improve the status quo, be it social, economic, political, public discourse *et cetera*, seek NOT a public office. If your actions might, even remotely, make matters worse, seek NOT a public office. If you are seeking fame and fortune, public service is not for you, sir!

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#### **APPENDICES:**

# Appendix A: Constitutional powers granted to the Federal government

- 1) Foreign Affairs,
- 2) National Defense,
- 3) Citizenship and Immigration, and
- 4) Monetary Policy.

# Appendix B:Proposed unilateral amendments of powers to be brought under the Federal government

# A. Federal powers:

- 1) Constitution,
- 2) Sovereignty,
- 3) Elections, and referendum,
- 4) Foreign affairs,
- 5) International agreements,
- 6) Immigration,
- 7) Religious affairs,
- 8) Human rights,
- 9) Census, and identity,
- 10) Overall control of political parties and elections,
- 11) A single Electoral Commission at Federal, State, and District levels,

- 12) A national policy for land, marine, and aviation,
- 13) National boundaries,
- 14) Copyright and intellectual property,
- 15) Federal civil servants,
- 16) A policy for personnel and human resources,
- 17) Scale, measurements, and benchmarks.

# B. Economy:

- 1) National economic development plan,
- 2) Monetary policy,
- 3) Determine national revenue sources, Federal taxation, and regulation,
- 4) National statistics.
- 5) Intra and inter rivers between and amongst Fed. Member States,
- 6) Foreign trade,
- 7) International investment, and financing,
- 8) Policy for energy, and water.

# **C. Infrastructure and Transportation:**

- 1) Ports and airports,
- 2) Interconnecting roads,
- 3) Transportation policy for land, sea, and air,
- 4) Aviation.
- 5) Postal, telephony, Internet, radio and television frequencies services along with Cyber Security, and data protection; telecommunication, and broadcasting.

#### D. Security and Judiciary:

- 1) Defence, and nation army,
- 2) Federal police, and national secret service,
- 3) Restoration of order, where there is instability in Fed. Member States,
- 4) Ownership of personal small arms,
- 5) Federal Courts, and Judiciary systems,
- 6) Federal Military Courts.

#### E. Public Health, and Services:

- 1) National public health policy,
- 2) National policy for remediation, medicine, and food,
- 3) Immigration, refugees, and displaced persons policy,
- 4) National policy for:
- 5) Archives,
- 6) Libraries,
- 7) Theatres, and stadiums.

## F. Education:

- 1) National education, and curriculum mandating examination of High school certification,
- 2) Higher education, technology, and research.

# **Appendix C:**

# **Articles of contention between Puntland State and Federal government:**

- 1) Develop clear and strict safeguards of the national sovereignty with SSC-Khatumo question at its heart.
- 2) Completion of the Constitution, where guiding principles of power-sharing and consensus, participation, inclusivity, politically or otherwise, are adhered to.
- 3) Devise an agreed upon inclusive national security programme.
- 4) Agree upon a natural resources management and sharing plan.
- 5) Delineation of, and separation of Federal-State powers, and collaboration of institutions, as outlined in the Constitution.
- 6) Create an agreed upon National judiciary system, defining Federal-State functions and roles.
- 7) Formulate a transparent National economic and treasury programme with defined, and agreed upon guidelines.
- 8) What form or type of Election at the Federal level to be adopted.
- 9) Determine as to the status of the Capital city, along with its rules and regulations.
- 10) Map out a political resolution on contested issues prior to any Constitutional amendments are effected, and presented to Federal institutions.