The suicide bombing that claimed the lives of more than 70 people watching the final world football match in Kampala last month, once again put the spotlight on Somalia’s Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen. Riz Khan's programme on Aljazeera has dedicated one episode to the discussion on Al Shabab (Al-Shabab: A regional threat?) At hand to discuss the Al Shabab phenomenon were, “Abdi Samatar, a professor at the University of Minnesota; who has covered most of the peace conferences on Somalia as well as foreign interventions in the country, Alem Hailu , a professor at Howard University's Department of African Studies, and Mark Schroeder, the director of Sub-Saharan Africa Analysis for STRATFOR, a global intelligence firm.”

On the motives of Al Shabab to target Uganda Mark Schroeder argued that Al Shabab was keen to undermine the peace-keeping role of Uganda. Professor Abdi Samatar does not view Al Shabab as an organisation with ambition to spread its wings regionally but attributes the emergence of Al Shabab to the Ethiopian “invasion” in 2006. Professor Alem Hailu begs to differ for he is of the opinion that there were extremist elements within the Union of Islamic Courts ‘disbanded “ prior to the Ethiopian intervention in December 2006. Professor Samatar countered that the Union of Islamic courts was an act of Somalis coming together, and that the movement made Mogadishu “ more peaceful than Addis Ababa.” It is true that the Union of Islamic Courts pacified Mogadishu and many parts of southern Somalia after warlords were devastated but the Union of Islamic Courts did not acquire the characteristics of pan-clan organization for two reasons:

1- Union of Islamic Courts was not politically inclusive organisation. It was a coalition of clan-based Islamic courts in Mogadishu and reformed warlords.

2- The Union of Islamic Courts challenged the feeble Transitional Federal Government of Somalia then based in Baydhabo. The TFG depends on the support of Somalia’s neighboring countries. If the leaders of Union of Islamic Courts disliked the TFG’s dependency on Ethiopia, they could join the government through negotiations and attempt to promote their agenda. Instead the UIC forces attacked the government base; the former secretary of defence of the Islamic Courts made threats “to attack Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital” And this what caused the AU-sanctioned intervention “ to back the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.”

Both professor Hailu and Schroeder, agree on the threat Al Al Shabab “poses to East Africa” but Professor Samatar cautions against “heavy international presence in Somalia” because past interventions particularly the 1992 US-led humanitarian intervention— have failed due to lack of political programme. Professor Samatar argued that Al Shabab would go within two to three months if Somalis are left to each other.

Schroeder argued that the Ethiopian intervention was “not ideal” but the international community support for the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) has not helped president Sharif Ahmed to “contain” Al Shabab threat.” It is Somalis’ actions that cause interventions in Somalia. The international community can only support Somali authorities ( national or regional government) that do not pose threats to other Somali regions and Somalia’s neighbouring countries.

Another topic on which discussants aired their views is the role of Somaliland. Professor Abdi Samatar suggested that the international community work on moving the seat of the TFG to Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland and the “population will line behind that regime.” Schroeder disagreed with professor Samatar because ‘clan dynamics’ in Somaliland is 180° opposite to the political dynamics in southern Somalia.” Professor Samatar described Schroeder’s explanation as a mischaracterization. In 1991 when the central government was overthrown the clan became the only institution in which Somalis put their trust to survive the new trend: statelessness. In southern Somalia, clan warfare led to famine but in the north (Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991)and north east ( Puntland was formed in 1998 ) post-1991 power struggles was resolved through locally conceived reconciliation initiatives that drew on the expertise of traditional leaders.
Is moving the seat of the TFG to Hargeisa the best way to reconstitute the Somali state?

Somaliland has recently conducted its second presidential election since 2001 when three political parties were formed. It is difficult to foresee Somaliland's political elite endorsing hasty reunion. The conditions that were conducive to union between the ex-British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960 are not here today. Reunion between Somaliland and Somalia is possible, but it can not be achieved through initiatives that have a lot in common with past reconciliation conferences for Somalia.

Liban Ahmad
E-Mail:libahm@gmail.com